00083694

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020

AN AUSTRALIAN IN GERMANY

AN AUSTRALIAN IN GERMANY

BY

A. D. McLAREN

83694

LONDON

CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD.

1911

PREFACE

For many years the writer of the following pages has been a student of the trend of thought and policy in Germany. In the course of two visits to the country extending altogether a little over two years he has been able to gain first-hand impressions as well as to correct or confirm those second-hand ones which had previously been formed from books and newspapers or from intercourse with English tourists and German residents in England and Australia. "A man who is whirled through Europe in his post-chaise and the pilgrim who walks the grand tour on foot will form very different conclusions," wrote Goldsmith a century and a half ago. So, I may add, will the visitor who stays only at first-class hotels and the man who earns his living in the country, sees something of its officials, and makes it his aim to mix with all classes. If the book as a whole seems to lack unity, the explanation is that it is made up of notes written in the intervals between the soul-withering occupations of teaching boys and setting and correcting examination papers.

A. D. M.

Berlin. 1*st July*, 1911.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	German Imperialism	1
II.	Germany and Holland	64
III.	Germany's Pair of Irelands	72
IV.	The Gospel According to William II	89
V.	A Glance at Political Parties	96
VI.	The Outlook for Responsible Government	105
VII.	Socialism, Protection, and Free Trade	116
VIII.	National Insurance	127
IX.	Schools and Education	142
X.	Religious Instruction in German Schools	181
XI.	Mind and Manners	198
XII.	Protestantism in Germany	216
XIII.	Rome and Germany	226
XIV.	Some Impressions of Berlin	243
XV.	Notes on Some Movements	263
XVI.	The Danish Question	279
XVII.	A Glance at the Present Chancellor	285
XVIII.	Bagdad and the Persian Gulf	295
XIX.	North and South	303

AN AUSTRALIAN IN GERMANY

CHAPTER I

GERMAN IMPERIALISM

It is usual to contrast Germany in her economic development, her imperialist aspirations of to-day, with the old-time Germany—the idealist Germany of the poets and philosophers who immediately succeeded Lessing. The Germany of 1911 is materialist, we are told. This seems to be a word of fairly liberal scope. The United States has always been sunk in materialism. Englishmen have for generations applied the term to the French; it is the principal charge brought against the English by many of themselves and by one of the acutest of their foreign critics, the Swedish writer, Herr Gustav Steffen; and it is the special danger of our young Australian Commonwealth. As far as I know, the only nation still free from the taint is Spain. It was impossible for Germany to develop on commercial and imperialist lines until she felt the consciousness

of national solidarity and power. But a careful study of her earlier political writers—of patriots like Stein, Möser, Arndt, List—shows that the men even of that time, some of them, had visions of German unity, and scattered throughout their pages can be found vague shadowings forth of the Fatherland's political greatness yet to be through that unity.[1] For Imperialism merely expresses a nation's consciousness of unity and power and its desire to extend that power. Those Englishmen who, during the past two or three years, have spoken so much of German aggression should make an effort to think out all that has been involved in their own policy of expansion, and should ask themselves whether, if they were Germans, they would wish their Government to act otherwise than as the German Government is now acting. Men who call themselves the "dominant race" and preach the gospel of the "maintenance of British prestige" speak indignantly of the "German menace" and "German ambitions." In all countries and in all times that has been the attitude of those whose vision never reached beyond a narrow nationalism. Whether Germany's ambitions are a menace to Great Britain or not, there is no inherent

[1] In his *National System of Political Economy*, published in 1841—a time when some Englishmen looked upon colonies as a burden—List wrote: "Colonies are the crowning glory of a nation's industries and manufactures, of the home and foreign trade which they create, of a strong mercantile marine, of fisheries, and naval power."

infamy in them unless all forms of Imperialism are infamous. What is the position of Mr. Robert Blatchford, "the best-known leader of the English socialists"? On page 4 of his pamphlet reproducing the *Daily Mail* articles he tells us that "the policy of Germany is the Bismarckian policy of deliberate and ruthless conquest," and on page 13, "It does not require a very great effort of the imagination to enable us to see that proposal (for disarmament) with German eyes," and he admits that if he were a German he would not agree to it and accept the invitation "that we shall all be brothers and that nobody shall fight or steal any more." Is he speaking as a Socialist here?

No passage from any German writer has been so frequently quoted in England of late as the following from Professor Heinrich von Treitschke:—

"If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent Colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is unavoidable. It was natural and logical that the new great Power of Central Europe had to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, and with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and most difficult."

These words have based the text for some vigorous denunciation in England. They may be found in

Mr. Blatchford's articles, in Sir Edmund C. Cox's extraordinary contribution to the *Nineteenth Century* for April, 1910, and in Colonel Lyndon-Bell's *How Germany Makes War*. Perhaps English statements concerning Treitschke's anti-British sentiments lean towards exaggeration. For English political freedom and for the expansiveness of the English constitution he expresses almost unbounded admiration.[1] His biographer, Herr Bailleu, says: "Like Dahlmann and Gneist he derived his ideas of political freedom from his study of English history and the English constitution." He was, however, an ardent patriot, a passionate believer in "the mission of Prussia," and an assiduous preacher of a gospel that has been no less assiduously preached by many Englishmen—the gospel of world-sway, *Weltherrschaft*. Probably no other historical writer has exercised so much influence on German thought. Colonel Bernhardi called him "the great educator of our race." In a letter which was published shortly after his death he asks some interesting questions and gives some interesting answers:—

"When the German flag covers and protects this immense Empire, to whom shall the sceptre of the Universe belong? What nation shall impose her will upon the others in a state of weakness or decadence?

[1] I have been told that in his lectures at the University, where he was the idol of the undergraduates, on more than one occasion he concluded with the words *delenda est Britannia*; but I have not been able to obtain any satisfactory proof of the statement.

Shall it not be Germany, whose mission it will be to guarantee the peace of the world? Russia, a vast, half-developed Colossus, with feet of clay, will be absorbed in economic and internal difficulties. England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will doubtless see her Colonies break away, and become exhausted in fruitless struggles. France, a prey to discord and faction, will sink deeper and deeper into decadence. As for Italy, she will be able to do no more than assure a meagre existence to her sons. . . . The future belongs then to Germany, and Austria, if she values her national existence, will stand by her side."

The vigour of the Pan-Germanism here may be somewhat overdone; but nevertheless it represents, in substance, the opinion and teaching of many of Germany's leading statesmen and professors during the past quarter of a century. Another active apostle of Pan-Germanism was Delbrück, the friend and teacher of the Kaiser. He is reported to have said, "The next great struggle of the Germans will be a combat for the annihilation of England."

The desire to expand is now deep in the national consciousness, and the spirit that underlies it is being carefully fostered by the rulers of the country. Every German child is taught to regard himself or herself as, first and foremost, a unit of Empire. School-books and University lectures aim at the same result.[1] The

[1] A small book by Adolf Schroeder, *Die Flotte als notwendige Ergänzung unserer nationalen Wehrmacht* (The necessity of the Fleet for the completion of the National Defence) is specially intended for use in schools.

energy of Germany now is manifesting itself in such a way that some Englishmen foresee a probable clash with British interests; but this energy is part and parcel of herself, and it is absurd to refer it to some preconceived policy, anti-British or anti-anything. That a strong and capable people like the Germans, animated by Imperialistic ideals, should exert themselves to the utmost to acquire an invincible fleet, may be a source of danger to British Imperialism. Few serious-minded Englishmen will deny this. But we have had to face dangers and crises before, and we shall have to face them again. In Germany the material and spiritual superiority of the German people has become an article of faith. "Nothing should take place in the world without the intervention of Germany and the German Emperor." It is William II who has expressed this opinion, but it also phrases the ambitions of many of his subjects. The struggle for markets is a potent factor in world-politics, and Imperialism and High Finance tend to move along parallel lines. "Trade follows the flag," we are told, and hence the desire for territory—for dominion. But trade does not always follow the flag. However much politics and economics become intertwined, economic rivalry alone will not explain either ancient or modern Imperialism. This fact calls for emphasis at the present moment. The Greeks had the word *Hegemonia* to express the feeling of national domination; the Germans speak of *Machtpolitik*, the

consciousness of power which is accompanied with the reaching out for wider national sway. Altogether unconnected with the activity and vaunting of Junkertum and the Pan-Germanists, there is a silent, indefinable force at work, and running through all the economic aspects of German Imperialism is this lust for Weltherrschaft. Not only is it seen in the powerful support given to the Flottenverein and the Kolonialgesellschaft, each of which has its own special organ and floods the country with its own special books and pamphlets, not only is it seen in the pride of the German people in their Colonies, though financially these have been a dead loss to the Fatherland; but the Zeitgeist, that spirit of the times that cannot be entirely embodied in leagues and associations, seems to be working towards the same end.

The Teuton, it is sometimes said, is warlike. But he is not more so than the Frenchman. He has the genius for commerce. So had the Portuguese and so have the British still. But Germany, rightly or wrongly, has the consciousness of a superior *morale*, which in her opinion entitles her to a premier place in the struggle for world-power. To that end she is building a fleet of such size that, some English authorities assert, unless we greatly accelerate our own shipbuilding, the date is only a few years distant when she will be almost equal to Britain in battleships of the first class. Many English Imperialists

have shown their disquietude at Germany's progress. Some of them have shown it in a childish way. The attitude of the latter is inconsistent with their own principles. Ever since the first Empire gave way to the second the world has travelled on much the same lines. Germany has twenty millions more people than Great Britain. Her population is increasing twice as fast as ours, her losses by emigration at present are much smaller, and her industries are extremely flourishing. There is no mystery about Germany's development, economic, industrial, and financial, during the past thirty years. Anyone can look up the figures in the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich* (1910) to be found in almost any public library. Here are four items worth noting :—

(*a*) The population of Germany in 1880 was 45,000,000 ; on 1st December, 1910, it was 64,800,000.

(*b*) In 1895 the machinery returns gave a total horse-power of 3,427,000 ; in 1907 the total horse-power was 8,827,000.

(*c*) In 1880 the total tonnage of shipping for the ports of the Empire was given as 7,000,000 ; in 1908 it was 25,418,000.

(*d*) In 1880 the Savings Bank deposits amounted to 180,000,000 pounds sterling ; for 1910 they are estimated at 800,000,000 pounds sterling.[1]

[1] This is the estimate of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (1st October, 1910).

Germany is conscious of her development. She feels her present strength and is confident of the future. Can such a country help wanting colonies—good colonies—for its surplus population ? For the pressure of this population and the industrialisation of Germany are forcing her to seek an outlet. Her people can go to South America and Australia and Canada; but they are lost to *Deutschtum*. We wrested the command of the sea from Spain. We snatched Canada and India from France. These two countries, whether decadent or not, at any rate were unable to hold what they had taken. The German Imperialists now say that they have exactly the same right to wrest from others what they cannot hold. It has been widely circulated in England that the Germans regard the British people as decadent, that the men who mould German opinion have for years been hammering into the minds of the people the view that the English, for centuries engrossed in trade and finance, have gradually grown soft, in fact, contemptible. On 16th April, 1910, *Die Kreuz Zeitung*, the most influential Conservative journal, referred several times to the decadence of Britain, and jubilantly proclaimed that emigrants were leaving England in hundreds of thousands every year, and that the accumulation of capital in the country was a certain sign of decay. But this idea is not widespread in Germany. Few, however, who have followed the trend of German political thought

during the past few years will deny that the Pan-Germanists regard England as the chief obstacle to their expansion. Most German Imperialists are amused or enraged when they read English accounts of the "German danger," and when they are asked to check their naval development, they say with a sneer: "You have taken large territories from other nations in war, and now you ask us to limit armaments on the basis of some *status quo*, and allow the British Navy to retain for all time its present supremacy." A good deal has been said in both countries about the anti-British or the anti-German party, as the case may be. There are anti-everything parties in all countries. Putting aside this generality, however, it is undeniable that amongst a certain section—a fairly large section—of the population there exists a strong feeling of Imperial rivalry towards England. "One-fifth of the world, and that embracing some of the richest lands, under British rule; in every quarter of the globe strategic points and coaling stations; the Mediterranean held at both extremities; the Red Sea closed at Aden; Gibraltar, Malta, Colombo, Singapore, Fremantle, the Cape, all under the Union Jack." This, indeed, seems to be the "head and front" of our offending in the eyes of some Imperialists; others point out, when enthusing the people in the direction of a big navy, that Asia is awake, that the partition of Africa is at an end, and that the Monroe Doctrine blocks them

from Labrador to Cape Horn. But it is not at all unusual to hear that "Germany has never recognised the Monroe Doctrine." Count Reventlow said last October that "Germany had never given a formal recognition of the doctrine, or a recognition that could be considered of general validity." He also stated that if, as had been rumoured, Germany really desired to establish a colonial Empire in Brazil, her hands would be stayed by the rivalry of England, not by the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. How can England be blamed for the Monroe Doctrine or for the awakening of Asia ?

But as to how the feeling—call it Imperial rivalry, national pride, the will to dominate, or anything else—originated, and how it is kept alive, different reasons will always be assigned. The important thing for us is that it is there. It is the extreme of weakness to apply the term "scaremongers" to those who simply point out that the feeling exists and is growing. To many who have been insistent in calling English attention to German developments nothing could be more welcome than some tangible assurance that there is no fear of any aggressive move from Germany. Each country, it is frequently said, distrusts the other; but this distrust—if it really exists—is less easily explicable on the part of Germany, especially as many of the Germans themselves are constantly pointing out that Great Britain would gain very little, even from a successful war with

Germany. A German Socialist who has written extensively on Anglo-German relations, says :—

"England's naval power would never be in a position to destroy the foundation of Germany's already flourishing trade. The utmost it could do would be to injure the shipping interest, but not even during the war could Germany's trade be kept under, for Germany has so many boundaries that are inaccessible to England's fleet." (Herr K. Kautsky, *Justice*, 30th April, 1910.)

A somewhat similar view is expressed by Herr O. von Gottberg in the March (1910) issue of *Velhagen*. Such assertions do not, of course, support the appeals for a big fleet on the ground that we intend to attack Germany. But the "explanations" of the growing armaments have not been at all consistent. Mr. Blatchford has been charged with inconsistency for saying in one of his articles that the blood and iron theory is to cajole the enemy with friendly treatment while preparing to make an unexpected attack on him, and in another article: "Germany has threatened us and warned us over and over again." But the two statements are quite reconcilable.

Why should England want to attack Germany? Look at the situation from a purely capitalistic standpoint. There are no rich colonies to tempt Britain's cupidity. The days of our colonial expansion have passed, and we have not yet consolidated what we have acquired. Few well-informed Germans believe

that Great Britain contemplates an attack on Germany or the invasion of the Fatherland. Dr. Thomas Hodgkin says that " it hardly lies in us to denounce ' Germany's naval programme,' seeing that we are building a navy more enormous," and he points out that our recent additions have been made confessedly and almost ostentatiously for a possible war with Germany (*Nineteenth Century*, May, 1910). Much emphasis has been placed upon this side of the relations between the two countries by many English writers, and rightly so, if it can be shown that a large fleet is the same necessity for Germany that it is for us. But is it possible, seriously, to put forward this argument—except on the understanding that Germany aspires, as she has a perfect right to do, to become the first of maritime powers ? Would Dr. Hodgkin maintain that we have been the aggressors in the present competition ?

Last July Mr. Asquith, in a speech that was evidently intended as an indication of goodwill towards the German people, showed how much more vital the maintenance of a large navy is for us than it is for Germany. Does the proportion of two to one express the difference ? Professor Theodor Schiemann speaks of England's striving to remain " sovereign Mistress of the Seas " as the pursuit of a " phantom." How many Englishmen will agree with this ? Does Dr. Hodgkin agree with it ? If, as some Germans assert, British animosity has been

growing ever since Germany entered the field as a great commercial Power, why is England waiting for Germany to complete her naval programme? If she meant to strike, why did she not deliver the blow when she had the opportunity at the time of the Jameson raid and the famous Kaiser telegram? The result of Great Britain's proposal for reduced armaments at the last Hague Conference has been to strengthen the hands of those German Imperialists who are indignantly asserting that such a reduction would simply permit Great Britain to *hold in peace* the vast empire she has acquired.

Great Britain's interests are so scattered, the risks at a hundred different points on the earth's surface so serious, that she is not likely to seek trouble with any other Power. Germany's position, as seen by the Chauvinists, is entirely different. Dr. Erich Zechlin says that the murder of two German missionaries in Schantung in 1897 was the very thing that Germany longed for, because it gave her the opportunity of seizing Kiautschou (*Deutsches Reich und Volk*, "Unsere auswärtige Politik," p. 19). Professor von Stengel, a well-known jurist and student of naval politics, writing in *Die Flotte* (September, 1910), says that "the peace movement is a positive danger to Germany and the German people," and from his—imperialistic—point of view, he gives good reasons for his statement.

General von der Goltz, speaking last January on

the fortieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Empire, quoted approvingly the words of von Moltke: "Eternal peace is a dream and not even a beautiful one." The same day Rear-Admiral Stiege warned his countrymen to continue, at all costs, their preparations for war, and the semi-official *Norddeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung* advised Germans to remember that "the nation can only develop through strife." It is flying in the face of the facts to blame Great Britain as a peace-disturber in the present competition. It will be time enough for Germany to speak of trade-jealousy when she opens her ports to the commerce of the world.

It must not be forgotten, however, that, as far as relations with this country are concerned, there are two parties in Germany, one desirous of peace, and the other—much larger than many English democrats think, and by no means confined to the oligarchy of Wilhelmstrasse—which dreams of a great maritime empire, and thinks that Great Britain stands, or will stand, in the way of German overseas expansion. No exact estimate can be given of the number of each of these parties, but a question of more immediate interest to the rest of Europe in general, and to Great Britain in particular, is: What are the evident intentions of the Emperor and the ruling classes in Germany? English Labour Members, or tourists, who pay flying visits to the Fatherland, and who, for the most part, study German politics through the

medium of an interpreter, give us misleading impressions. The workers desire peace. That is beside the question. Let us carefully examine the recent statements of Germany's leaders and of eminent outsiders—men who have made the development of Germany's sea power a lifelong study.

It may be that neither an Englishman nor a German can discuss present Anglo-German relations perfectly free from bias. But does outside opinion regard England as the disturbing element in European politics to-day? The Americans, Captain A. T. Mahan,[1] the greatest living authority on Weltpolitik from its naval side, and Croly, whose *Promise of American Life* shows much acute insight into European politics, clearly do not blame Great Britain as the originator of the present fierce competition in armaments.

What is the state of feeling in France? And it must be borne in mind that there is no longer any influential "revenge party" in France. At the beginning of last year (1910), I was talking to a Frenchman who for nearly twenty years has represented in Germany one or other of the big French

[1] He has been the subject of many bitter personal attacks in Germany. He is "deutschfeindlinch" and a "Hetzer." Rear-Admiral Kalau writes (7th November, 1910): "His great predilection for England and everything English accounts for his unfriendliness to Germany, which, as he is ignorant of German, he does not know first-hand, but only through the medium of English and French writings."

dailies. He assured me that few thinking Frenchmen believe that Alsace and Lorraine can ever return to *la patrie*, and that there is less Chauvinism in France now than there has been for years. Yet we find in every quarter of the country that distrust of Germany is as great to-day as it has ever been. In February, 1910, *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales* advocated a Latin Federation as a counter-movement to the "aggressive Pan-Germanism" of Austria and Germany. Vice-Admiral Besson, one of the keenest observers of the world's naval chess-board, wrote in November, 1910:—

"The Kaiser desires to check the naval, commercial, and industrial prosperity of England, and he desires to seize the French colonies which would be a virgin field of exploitation for his industry and an outlet for his population. Perhaps, too, it is his wish to use war in order to divert attention from the growing Socialism at home."

Admiral Fournier, in *La Politique Navale* and elsewhere, has expressed the opinion that the increased expenditure on armaments has been forced upon Great Britain. The great Italian authority on naval affairs, Commandante Limo, founder of the Italian Navy League, was reported a few months ago as having stated that, whereas the British Fleet is maintained for purposes of defence, the German Fleet is clearly meant for aggression. The same thing has been said over and over again by the best-

informed Italian journals, *Secolo, Stampa, Giornale d'Italia.* In Italy, as in France, the Pan-German movement is regarded as a menace to Europe.

"The official organs in Germany are striving to make it appear that they do not take seriously the Pan-German Imperial mania. To be sure, they are disavowing before the world the very thing to which they are giving their secret support. Among those in authority everything possible is being done to rouse and further Pan-Germanism." (*Stampa*, 28th August, 1910.)

What answer do we get if we consult the leading European Socialists? Mr. H. M. Hyndman, the veteran English revolutionary Socialist, has no doubt whatever about the objective of the German Imperialists. No recognised authority among the German Social Democrats has any doubt. However friendly, then, the English Socialists may desire to be towards their German comrades, they will do well to remember that opinions based upon ignorance, or upon a superficial knowledge gained from hasty tours, may possibly do more harm than good. British Labour Members must be aware that foreign policy in Germany is not controlled by public opinion to the same extent as foreign policy in England. Amiable words alone will not bring about a relaxation of the tension which has been visible in recent years. On the contrary, amiable words accompanied by actions

that belie their amiability only increase the strain and distrust. In that honeycomb of intrigue and selfishness known as *Weltpolitik*, "friendly assurances" are the stock-in-trade of every nation. As long as the aim of the oligarchy in Germany is to grasp the trident, conflict with this country is always possible and will not be averted by "friendly assurances." The outstanding fact is that Germany desires Imperial expansion, and many of her leading political thinkers consider that this country stands, or will ultimately stand, in the way of her realisation of world-power. To many impartial observers her naval programme is unintelligible except on the assumption that she intends, at her own time, to challenge Great Britain in the North Sea, that is, in all the seas. The trend of the German naval policy since the introduction of the Act of 1900, and the speeches of her rulers during the three or four years preceding that Act, have *seemed* aggressive. So much even some of the English M.P.'s who denounce the "scaremongers," and object to the increased naval expenditure on the ground that the money is wanted for Social Reform, will admit.

Let us very briefly review the growth of German opinion on naval politics since the date of the Kaiser's telegram to President Krüger. On the 30th March, 1897, in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Reichstag, the Kaiser said that it was one of his "cherished desires to see Germany's Navy take

rank with the navies of the first sea-powers." A month later he said at a banquet at Cologne :—

"Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have new tasks to fulfil since the Empire has been welded together. . . . That trident must be in our fist."

Shortly after this came the significant words: "Our future lies upon the water." On the 30th April, 1898, the Flottenverein was formed—a league that was "to educate the people on naval affairs and to be kept entirely aloof from party politics." The events of this year all helped to strengthen the hands of the Kaiser and his Government. First came the Spanish-American War, then the Fashoda incident, and last, the Samoan complications. At the launching of the *Kaiser Karl der Grosse* at Hamburg on the 18th October, 1899, the Emperor reviewed the two or three preceding years and summed up the arguments for a strong fleet. His speech made a profound impression on all classes in the Empire.

"The sluggishness shown by the German people in interesting themselves in the great questions moving the world, and in arriving at a political understanding of those questions, has caused me deep anxiety. Let us look around us. How the world has altered its face in a few years! Old Empires disappear, new ones are coming into existence. Nations a moment ago scarcely known to the lay politician have suddenly appeared on the world's

horizon, and they are taking their place as competitors with the other nations. Events which work with revolutionary effect alike on international relations and on the economic life of the people, and which in times gone by needed centuries to mature, are brought to pass in a few months. Hence the problems of our Empire and our people are now assuming vast proportions. They demand from me and my Government unusual and heavy exertions which can only be crowned with success if the German people renounce parties and stand behind us united and firm. But to this end our people must be prepared to make sacrifices."

Three months afterwards (January, 1900), during the Boer War, the Government's plans were again furthered owing to the seizure and search of a German mailship by a British cruiser. This same month came the Kaiser's announcement :—

"As my grandfather reorganised the Army, so shall I reorganise the Navy without flinching, in the same way, so that it will stand upon the same level as my Army, and that, with its help the German Empire will reach the place it has not yet attained."

In pursuance of this policy, so clearly laid down, the Naval Construction Act was passed. Referring to this Act an eminent publicist, Professor Friedrich Ratzel, of Leipzig, wrote (10th February, 1900) :—

"And here I ought to mention something that lies deeper—that the movement for strengthening

the German Fleet forms a link in the chain of our destinies, and that the initiation of this movement coincides with a great turning-point in the history of sea-trade and sea-control (*Seebeherrschung*). . . . May the Germans lay hold of this historical moment; their own position and power and the present position of the competing nations promise a high reward to the victor."

Seebeherrschung—command of the sea. Since the passing of the Act, has Germany consistently striven towards this goal? An annual naval budget exceeding twenty-two millions, the creation of several great harbours in the North Sea, including one in Heligoland, the propaganda of the Flottenverein, which apparently has a large section of the people ranged behind it, convince many Englishmen that Germany is anticipating an offensive war. Those, however, who think that this huge equipment is needed for purposes of coast defence, or for the protection of Germany's shipping and oversea possessions, are entitled to their opinion also. But how have those who deny German ambition and German "hostility" towards England, and who say that the enormous fleet (in any case unable to operate far from its base in the North Sea [1]) is solely for the protection of

[1] "The North Sea and Baltic coasts are so much enclosed that a war against commerce only, advantageous as it may be to other nations, is not possible to us, even if our cruisers succeeded in making the open sea."—Vice-Admiral von Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the Marine, in the discussion on the Navy Bill in 1900.

Germany's coast and sea-borne commerce, arrived at their opinion ? This question demands a straightforward answer. It is not facing the question at all to say that the workers in both countries desire peace. The whole discussion in England has taken a party colouring ; hence the mutual recriminations so much in evidence lately, one side being styled " scaremongers " and the other " Little Navy Men "—the ripe fruit of two centuries of Party Government. With those to whom the expressions " national honour " and " national humiliation " are meaningless combinations of words, the opposition to armaments of any kind is logical. The position of such men is more defensible than that of certain politicians who affect to disregard all naval activity across the North Sea, and who brand everyone who dares to refer to it as a " rabid Jingo." Who are the leading politicians or political writers in England, of whatever party, that do not desire a friendly understanding between the two countries ? The real obstacle to that understanding is the portentous growth of Germany's Navy, side by side with the growth of a spirit of aggressive Imperialism. Britain's maritime supremacy, and therewith her Empire, are threatened. If the challenge came from a nation whose every movement, in other respects, betokened friendship, Great Britain would be bound to respond to it ; but the challenge comes from a nation in which the ruling classes are striving for *Weltherrschaft*, and have in

recent years manifested a spirit of rivalry towards Britain of a somewhat special kind. This gigantic navy is being built by the first military Power of the world, a Power which is already protected from aggression on land, and which, if its University professors, writers, and public men represent the feeling of the nation, is doing all it can to foster a desire for colonial expansion.

Mr. Norman Angell tells us (*The Great Illusion*) "that the mass of the German people are not hostile to England."

"Such support as they give to the German Government in the maintenance of its armament in competition with England is given because they cannot be sure of the sentiments animating those parties upon whom the British Government depends for its existence. Is not the obvious solution, therefore, for the anti-aggressionists in England and the anti-aggressionists in Germany to co-operate such a consciousness of community of ideas that there will be no doubt in the minds of either as to the motives, influence, and intentions of the other?"

If by "hostile" Mr. Angell means actuated by a spirit similar to that which existed in France for some years after the war, he is doubtless right; but "hostility" in this sense is not the cause of international and imperial jealousy. There are other great illusions besides that to which Mr. Angell refers. One is that all forms of Imperialism are grounded in

racial hostility, another is that people can find out what is in the mind of a nation by reading statistical year-books. Too much has been said about "misunderstandings" and "suspicions" and "hostility." Misunderstandings there may be, but they cannot, on any reading of the facts, account for all the vigour and popularity of the Flottenverein, the Kolonialgesellschaft, and the Alldeutscher Verband.

The articles of international law allow the capture and destruction of private property at sea in time of war. Great Britain's attitude towards the "right of capture" has been for some years the subject of strong criticism in England and Germany. In a thoughtful survey of "England's Foreign Policy," contributed to *März* (September, 1910), Mr. G. H. Perris says that Germany's anxiety for the security of her increasing trade and remote colonies is due to England's obstinate adherence to the "piratical doctrine according to which private property at sea is unprotected." Many others, apparently, are of opinion that all would be well if Great Britain would consent to abandon this right. It would require the knowledge of an expert, or of a specialist in international law, to discuss the question in all its bearings, and I certainly am not such an expert. But the statement, or suggestion, that we have only to agree to respect private property at sea in time of war in order to arrive at a German *entente* is grotesquely absurd. Neither Mr. Perris nor any other English

authority can produce a single statement of any responsible member of the German Government or of the Flottenverein to the effect that Germany will curtail her naval programme as soon as Great Britain revises her attitude towards the "right of capture." During the premiership of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who, with the best motives, strove for an understanding with Germany on the question of armaments, von Bülow stated that *no scheme whatever could be devised for a reduction of armaments* that would be acceptable to his Government, for the very plain reason that any such scheme would commit Germany to a position of permanent inferiority. There is no possibility of mistaking the meaning of such language. In the face of his statement—and it is only one of many similar statements that have been made recently by public men in Germany—it is a strange argument, in the mouth of an Englishman, that we are blaming another nation for the very thing that we are doing ourselves. In our efforts to promote goodwill between England and Germany we shall lose nothing by being fair even to our own country. Judging from the Kaiser's Königsberg speech (25th August, 1910), from the naval annual, *Nauticus*, for 1910, which for all practical purposes may be considered an official publication,[1] and from the present Chancellor's speeches in the Reichstag last

[1] It is not avowedly official, but most of the statistics and much of the other information are supplied by Government departments.

March, Germany is likely to adhere to the position taken up by von Bülow. *Nauticus* reiterates the statements that have been current in Germany during the past few years—that England is the only nation that looks with suspicion on Germany's growing Navy, and that trade-jealousy is at the bottom of this suspicion. Proposals for disarmament and arbitration are summarily dismissed as impracticable, idealistic, and unworthy of a strong people full of strong national aspirations.

"Any war is a good war when it is undertaken for increasing the power of the State." Such was the dictum of Frederick the Great, and it has been the basis of traditional Prussian policy. It has been the policy of all Imperial States. Much has been written about the war against Denmark for the sake of acquiring Kiel and the control of both banks of the Elbe, of the war with Austria that made Hanover and Hesse Prussian provinces, of the struggle with France, hastened and brought to a head by Bismarck, which gave Alsace and Lorraine to the Fatherland. But from the Imperialist standpoint Germany's case for each of these aggressive wars is strong—as strong as Britain's for the South African War and the annexation of the Boer republics, and for the continued occupation of Egypt. Von der Goltz said that the statesman who, when war is inevitable, his own country ready, and the enemy unprepared, fails to strike, is a traitor. Just after the introduction

of the Naval Construction Act, Professor Max Lenz wrote :—

"From this [Imperialist] standpoint, the question so often asked by the historian, on the outbreak of a conflict between two States, as to which was the originator or aggressor, is an entirely unnecessary question ; in reality all the parties are acting on the offensive, and he who attacks is taking only precautionary measures to hinder his opponent from collecting the forces which would become dangerous to him." (*Die Woche*, 24th March, 1900.)

This represents an ingrained principle of Prussia's foreign politics—a principle which no one has more clearly enunciated than von Moltke in his book on the war of 1870–1. Referring there to the war with Austria in 1866 he says that Prussia had long foreseen and calmly prepared for the struggle which she entered upon, not in obedience to public opinion, nor for territorial aggrandisement, but for an ideal end—the establishment of power.

In the face of such statements—and I could bring forward many more—it is strange that some English pacifists go so far as to assert that the mere suggestion of strained relations between England and Germany is apt to create a rupture. Mr. James Ramsay Macdonald, the leader of the English Labour Party, said after a visit to Germany in 1909 that it was absurd to talk about a war with Germany being inevitable, and that there were other products of the cosmic law besides navy leagues.

" There are dangers—and antidotes to the dangers. But upon one thing both the people and the administrators, the sheep and the shepherds whom I met are agreed. To familiarise Germany and England with the idea that they are the two rivals which must fight the next duel is criminal. It will lead to the duel being fought." (*Daily Chronicle*, 24th June, 1909.)

It is principally in Germany that leading publicists and writers have been speaking of war between the two countries as " inevitable." I have met very few Socialists, and read very few Socialist publications, that will take the responsibility of asserting that Germany's Navy is not being built primarily against ours. As a contributor to the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* Mr. Macdonald must know that this publication, at any rate, is constantly discussing international questions, and has time after time within the past three years referred to the strained relations between Great Britain and Germany and the possibility of war. To talk of war with any country being " inevitable " is absurd. This is one of the shallowest of truisms. But those who advise us not to notice and discuss Germany's naval preparations are advising us to commit national suicide. Openness is the friend of peace, mystery her deadliest enemy. When speaking to Englishmen who have been living in Germany during the past three or four years I have sometimes felt convinced that they are unwilling to say all that is in their minds. Now it seems to me that this atti-

tude, carried beyond the point of avoiding what is likely to excite international bitterness, or to emphasise the existing strain, is altogether bad. Commonplace utterances about the maintenance of peace, generalities that mean anything or nothing, are necessary for the cautious politician, especially if he happens to hold office. Major-General Keim, then President of the Navy League, said in a speech at Cologne in May, 1907, that "the Chancellor may write pretty notes, but the world always asks what lies behind." The serious recorder has to deal with facts and not generalities which the reader is left to translate into concrete expression for himself. A frank discussion of what is now preparing in Germany, of the avowed aims of the ruling minority, of the opinions of influential professors, of the articles in powerful newspapers and reviews—and in Germany the book and the professor have greater influence than the politician [1]—will do more to promote peace than an attitude of consternation and hush whenever the possibility of a clash between the two nations is barely mentioned.

Many Englishmen see that the Kaiser, with Hohenzollern astuteness, is seeking a counter-irritant

[1] The labour members say much about the workers in both countries desiring peace. One would think that scholars and university professors would have even more in common. Yet there are no institutions in Germany in which a spirit of Weltherrschaft and national expansion is more carefully fostered than in the Universities.

to the ever-spreading Social Democracy which is already within measuring distance of striking at his autocratic powers. They are aware that German patriotism is a deep-rooted sentiment of which even the Socialists, anti-Imperialist though most of them are, are not ashamed, and that the Government, as soon as it desires war, has only to convince the nation that the supreme law of preserving the Fatherland demands an appeal to arms. Yet seeing and knowing this, they will not tell the English people, in blunt terms, to adopt the Bismarckian motto, *Toujours en vedette.* Let no English democrat imagine that the German Socialists wish to see the Fatherland weakened. Those who are of this opinion need only turn to the reports of the debates in the Reichstag at the time of the introduction of the Navy Bill. In a conflict with a neighbouring Power the Socialists would stand shoulder to shoulder with all the other parties in defence of the nation. They are not political poltroons, nor are the workers whom they represent. The German people exercising little direct political power, and chafing under an electoral system (in Prussia) that effectually prevents majority rule, and under the autocracy of a Ministry that is not responsible to Parliament, nevertheless feel that the men at the helm of the State, however hostile to parliamentary government, are jealously guarding the national interests. The German oligarchy is disliked, but it is not distrusted. Even with the

majority of Socialists the ill-will to the dominating clique is subordinated to the claims of Vaterland. A well-known Socialist writer, Herr Karl Leuthner, in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (22nd April, 1909),[1] strongly resents Great Britain's proposals for reduced armaments, and asks indignantly how England can assert that the German Navy will be a menace to her, seeing that she will only have to tolerate the same state of affairs on sea that all the Continental nations are already obliged to tolerate on land. His article, "Herrenvolk and Pöbelvolk" ("Nation of Lords and Nation of Menials") provoked much criticism both inside and outside Socialist circles. It must be admitted that it is a fair statement of the difficulties of reaching any workable agreement for reduced armaments. Herr Leuthner is of opinion that the agreement which the British Government is striving for means nothing else than a state of affairs from which the European Powers asserted that they wished to protect Servia—the derogation of her honour and sovereignty. In the one case there was an attack on a nation's sovereign rights on land; in the other case a nation's sovereignty on the water is attacked. An agreement based upon equal rights is out of the question; for England must stipulate her superiority, Germany her inferiority. What is the teaching of history in regard to such treaties? That the re-

[1] Compare a strongly anti-British article by the same writer in the January (1909) issue of the same publication.

strained party, not venturing on war, accepts a condition of things tantamount to defeat.

"But I do not wish," he concludes, "to raise objections even to this. If we cannot otherwise escape the menace of a maritime war that will devastate our trade, then we must submit and resign ourselves to the sacrifice of part of our sovereignty. But it is unworthy of a great people to obscure facts by phrases.

"A treaty is never what its text sets out. It is what exigencies will allow, as we can see from the history of the Treaty of Berlin. An arrangement, then, between Germany and England would not alter the fact that the possibilities and interests of each nation are entirely different. . . .

"History speaks clearly enough concerning such onerous agreements and their working. They have always been forerunners of wars that arose, because either the arrogance of the conqueror or the revolt of the party held inferior led to unavoidable extremes.[1] Look at the Continental System or the Peace of Tilsit—and the comparison is not arbitrarily chosen, for then as now the question at issue was the claim to *Weltherrschaft*. It is almost comical to read that this claim, in Germany of all places, is docilely recognised, not as an existing fact—to which of course all must bow—but as a natural right of the British. How otherwise are we to understand England's assertion that she cannot complacently

[1] Almost the same arguments against such an agreement were used by the ultra-conservative Prince Hatzfeldt in the Reichstag during the debate on the Estimates on 14th December, 1910

regard the prospect of Germany's sea-power equalling her own ? She could not, that is, tolerate the danger with which every Continental Power is threatened by its equally armed neighbours, though even a defeat of her navy would not mean the inundation of the country by the enemy's forces."

There is a widespread opinion in England that the growing Socialism will check Imperialism. It is easy to attach too much importance to that opinion. Thousands of working men who vote Socialist are proud of the Empire's progress during the past forty years, and confidently look forward to colonies and overseas expansion. One of the principal Socialist journal in the south, the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, has always thrown cold water on the efforts of English Liberals to arrive at an understanding with Germany in the matter of Naval Armament. On 25th March, 1911, this journal declared that Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith were Jingoes, that their peace proposals were due solely to the fact that the day of England's maritime supremacy had passed for ever, and that to blame Germany for England's increased naval expenditure was only another way of saying that they did not want any opponents. On these principles no agreement on any subject could ever be reached. There must be some starting-point. Is that starting-point to be a recognition of existing possessions or not ?

Wilhelmshaven, a few years ago a mass of shallows

and sandbanks, now the second naval port of the world; Brunsbüttel transformed into another great naval base; Heligoland, Borkum, and other places made impregnable; the Kiel Canal widened and deepened for the passage of Dreadnoughts, with Kiel itself a reserve base; the transfer of the fleet's headquarters to the North Sea. From an Imperialist standpoint all this, the work of a few years, is creditable to Germany; but it is astounding that there are men in England who say that it ought not to be referred to by the English press and English statesmen. This has not been the policy of Germany. It was the anticipation of probable eventualities and the readiness to meet them that gave her such easy victories over Austria and France, and made her the greatest military Power in the world. Every German schoolboy can tell the story of how von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, was awakened one night in 1870 by his aide and told that war had been declared, and how the General simply said, "File No. 5," turned over, and went to sleep again. The file was opened, and complete plans were found for mobilising the Army, with the orders to the various officers signed, the date only being left blank. All the aide had to do was to fill in the date and take the orders to the nearest telegraph office. Of course, the story is fiction. The only significant thing about it is that the Germans are so fond of telling it. Many Englishmen have little doubt that the German Admiralty and

every German admiral have a carefully digested plan as to the probable course of operations that their fleet would follow in the event of immediate war with this country. Our own Admiralty, too, has plans and schemes for such an eventuality; so that here again it ill becomes us to blame Germany on this score. But can our pacifists point to any men in this country, holding similar positions, who have written like this?

"Moreover, war with a nation that can only be reached by sea has now passed from a possibility to a probability, so that for this reason also a strong Navy is necessary." (*Das Kleine Buch von der Marine* (1904), by George Neudeck, naval constructor to the German Government, and Dr. Heinrich Shroeder, one time instructor in the Naval School for Warrant Officers.)

And Captain Pustau, of the Imperial Navy, welcoming the change of the Fleet's head-quarters from the Baltic to the North Sea, says (*Tägliche Rundschau*, 30th March, 1910), that the crews will now have practice in the stormy waters "in which they will have to fight." Against whom? The *Marine-Rundschau*, which receives an annual Government subsidy of £1260, and which, notwithstanding the notification on the title-page, "Der Inhalt ist nicht amtlich" ("The contents are not official"), is looked upon by all well-informed Germans as a distinctly official publication, has for months been so offen-

sively anti-British that in January last (1911) one of the Progressive Liberals in the Reichstag moved that the subsidy be discontinued.

The extreme pacifists say that we must not talk about possible hostilities. They may be right; but if the Empire is to be maintained we must prepare for them. It is necessary for England from time to time to form a sound judgment as to how far her naval supremacy is threatened by the building programme of any other nation. The effort to do so is not anti-German, it is not childish, it is not dread of a phantom. Most Englishmen recognise that it was inevitable that Germany, with her marvellous resources and rapidly growing population—a population better organised and better educated than any other in Europe—should desire to play a leading part in *Weltpolitik*. But it is also inevitable that we should appreciate that desire.

Dr. Bernhard Harms, Professor of Political Science in the University of Kiel, has given some reasons why Germany should have a strong Navy.

"The fact to be emphasised is that Germany to-day is no longer the Germany of Bismarck's time with its principal interests in Europe. It is now a land that must, for the mere purposes of material existence, carry on world-politics and world-economics. How can we guarantee the placing upon the markets of the world of the products of our industry? is to-day one of the most critical questions of our

foreign policy, although many of our diplomats of the old school have not yet clearly grasped the situation and refuse to play the part of what is called the commercial clerk. Nevertheless it is, and will become increasingly, one of the essential problems of new German foreign politics—the creation and maintenance of commercial spheres outside Germany. And here ultimately is the cause of our strained relations with England. . . . Even if the peace-party in England continue in power, in our whole domestic development we are still dependent on her goodwill. Every encroachment in the matter of trade we must simply put up with. Such a state of affairs for a people of seventy millions, with enormous economic interests all over the world, is impossible, and unthinkable. For this reason we must have a marine equipment which will under any circumstances involve heavy sacrifices, which will, in short, make attack appear too hazardous. . . . The position in India and Egypt and Canada's openness to attack compel England to be increasingly on her guard against concentrating her forces in one place.[1]

"In the history of every people there are times which are fraught with serious anxiety about the present and the future, times in which, for the sake

[1] Many Germans, and the Press organs of all parties, are fond of pointing out that our colonies will soon be independent republics. "England's troubles [in India] are increased by the fact that the revolutionary ferment is also spreading and threatening in Egypt, and that the movement for independence is gradually gaining

of preserving the nation, they must be ready to go almost to their possible limit in the way of sacrifices. Such times now and in the near future the German nation is passing through." (*Deutsche Revue*, March, 1910.)

"Haven't we as much right to build Dreadnoughts as you have?" is a question which was put to me only the other day by a German—he was a Jew, but very loyal to the Fatherland. Nobody ever disputed the right. It is the probable, or even possible, destination of the Dreadnoughts and their influence on what is called the balance of power in Europe, and throughout the world, that is of interest to us, for whom the only alternative to a supreme Imperial Navy is Imperial effacement. At the beginning of 1910 Mr. Balfour asked the pregnant question, What would it avail if we trained every man in the country to the pitch of perfection if the sea were not "free and open to bring to these shores raw material and the food on which we depend?" For what is "command of the sea"? Neither more nor less than freedom of sea-communication, which may be lost to us by a single engagement in home waters. With the exception of Sir Edmund C. Cox, who advocated the immediate

ground in Australia and Canada (*Bremer Nachrichten*, 11th August, 1910; cf. *Der Reichsbote*, 11th June, 1911). Their own colonial system is administered almost entirely from Berlin, the local residents having no voice in the fiscal or political administration of the territories. Few Germans are afraid that their colonies will ever be independent republics.

destruction of the German Fleet, failing an agreement for reduced armaments, though his proposition was not taken seriously either in England or in Germany, probably no responsible public man in England disputes Germany's *right* to carry out, within her own borders by sea or land, whatever plans she thinks wise in her own interests. It is for Germany and Germany alone to say whether she needs one dock or a dozen docks at Emden, whether she ought to fortify Borkum or not, and whether she ought to build one warship or fifty. But if Germany decides to do all these things on the larger scale every public man in England—Tory, Liberal, or Labour Member —should do his best to bring the facts to the knowledge of the British people. It is Germany's duty to protect her shipping, her colonies, and her coasts, and to decide for herself how strong a navy she needs for these purposes; but when so eminent an authority on European politics as Colonel Gädke asserts that she is building a fleet out of all proportion to the needs of her defence, surely the nation most affected by her naval development has a right to ask for its probable explanation.[1] Why should all efforts to arrive at this by the application of simple logic be characterised as "anti-German" (*deutschfeindlich*), "German-baiting" (*Hetzerei*), and "childish" (*kin-*

[1] In a pamphlet published in 1899 Vice-Admiral Valois said that the new naval preparations were undoubtedly directed against Great Britain.

disch), to mention a few of the terms on the lips of nearly all German Imperialists whenever their growing naval power is referred to by an Englishman? The *National Zeitung* a few months ago stated that the efforts of the English press to discover a German menace in everything that occurs throughout the world had long since passed into the region of pathology.

We hear a great deal from the English pacifists about "peace being the greatest Anglo-German interest." One may read this sort of thing in the English Press nearly every day :—

"All our great interests were in common : we were their best customers ; next to India, they were ours. They knew and we knew that war would be disastrous to both, that we had one overwhelming interest in common, and that was peace." (Lord Avebury, reported in the *Morning Post*, 16th June, 1910.)

Yet in the very speech containing this profound observation his lordship said that "he felt with regret that if Germany increased her fleet other countries in self-defence must follow suit." *In self-defence.* And the Albert Committee, the new body which has been formed to "disseminate trustworthy information" in this country about Germany, and to "make an effort to bring the two nations close together," has issued a leaflet dealing with the navies of the two countries under the heading, "The Naval Crisis : The Year After," in which the writers accept

"as idiomatic the statement that the British Fleet is the main defence of the Empire, and that consequently the predominance of the British Fleet is, and must always remain, the essential feature of British Policy." If Lord Avebury's statement that we are obliged "in self-defence" to watch Germany's movements represents the situation, why this fatuity about peace being the greatest interest of both nations, seeing that the German Imperialists are never tired of pointing out that Germany stands to lose by Pacifism? Admiral von Köster recently declared that the enthusiasm of the German adherents of a purely idealistic peace movement is cooling down, and the impossibility of the limitation of armaments is being more and more recognised. In September last Count Reventlow, who has probably more influence with the Pan-Germanists than any other living man except Admiral von Tirpitz, made a similar statement. And writing in the *Deutsche Tagezeitung* on 27th March, 1911, he said:

"If we had had then [at the time of the Boer War] our fleet that is to be, either this war would have had a different result, or Germany would have been able to force England to make extraordinary concessions to her."

When Pastor Umfrid, a prominent member of the German Peace Society—a body of men that has worked sincerely and vigorously for goodwill between

England and Germany—suggested some months ago an international agreement on naval armaments that would leave Great Britain a permanent margin of superiority, several journals attacked him savagely. The influential *Deutsche Reichspost*, referring to his proposal, asserted that "whoever seeks to abolish war is committing a sin against the law of nature and God's ordering of the world." Would it not be better, then, for the pacifists in this country to advise, quietly and soberly, that the British public should make itself acquainted with Germany, with her political developments, her past and present history, and the utterances of her leading men? Every nation asserts its desire for peace even when making the most open and shameless attempts at aggression that must provoke hostilities.

"The psychology of the powerful, of those in high places, presents some difficult problems. Did not the same Czar who invited delegates from all parts of the world to consider the dangers of armed peace, afterwards enter light-heartedly upon war with Japan to defend his investments in timber on the Yalu?" (G. H. Perris, *März*, September, 1910.)

The warning sounded by Mr. H. M. Hyndman at the thirtieth annual conference (1910) of the Social Democratic Party is more likely, ultimately, to make for peace. This Party, he said, was the only international peace party, but it would be madness to

overlook what was going on in every country, to imagine that Imperial aggression was at an end, or to flatter themselves that the workers in any nation were sufficiently well organised to impose the maintenance of peace upon their rulers.

"The tremendous competition in armaments now proceeding in every direction must convince them to the contrary. Hence, in order to uphold their own independence, to oppose a determined resistance to any policy of conquest in Europe, to maintain that right of asylum which could only be conserved in the long run by force of arms, and to ensure the continuity of their food supply, the Social Democratic Party had always been ready, whilst striving continuously for a complete social revolution at home, to support in the transition period the provision of an adequate navy for the defence of our commerce and our coasts."

There is a school of well-intentioned pacifists which is only blocking the way to universal peace. The adherents of this school forget that no one desires war for its own sake: that war is not an abstraction, a thing that has no reference to *Weltpolitik*. And Germany has made a religion of *Weltpolitik*. Her naval policy is merely a part of this wider policy. She would be quite willing, no doubt, to federate Europe under her own hegemony. Meanwhile, with Teutonic thoroughness, she has developed her armaments and imposed taxation which has been sanctioned by successive Parliaments. That some of her

public men should wish to give us "friendly assurances" pending these preparations is only natural; but that England should desire to be lulled into a sense of security, and that it should be made a reproach in England to call attention to Germany's preparations is astonishing—if, indeed, anything is astonishing.[1] Neither hysterics about "German aggression" nor maudlin whinings about the "appalling waste" of the resources of both nations will ease the tension in the slightest degree. That can only be brought about by a study of Germany's present tendencies in the light of German character and German history.

German "explanations" of their naval activity vary among different people and at different times. The "friendly assurances" of a few years ago have to a considerable extent given place to an open admission that Germany is building against us. But sometimes we come across strange inconsistencies. In the April (1910) number of *Ueberall*, Admiral Valois, in a violently anti-British article, "Unsere Marine im Dienst der Kolonialen Bewegung," says that "there is at present no greater menace to the world's peace than the presumption

[1] In *Die deutsche Schlachtflotte, eine Gefahr für Deutschlands Machtstellung* (1911) Herr Hartwig Schubart states very clearly the different relative importance of a fleet to Great Britain and to Germany. "Great Britain must, as a matter of Imperial necessity, maintain a navy capable of opposing every probable combination." The whole question is discussed with great frankness and fairness.

of England." In the same issue the editor severely condemns "articles calculated to nourish hatred between Germans and English."

It is possible that Mr. H. M. Hyndman knows as much about German Socialism and Germany's public men as the English Labour Members, and he has given his opinion of Germany's intentions towards this country in the clearest language. He stated last July that the German Social Democrats, one and all, had told him that they could not hope to check war by Germany on France by land if the Emperor and the Federal Council had determined upon it, and he asked how, then, they could prevent war by sea when, in the first instance, the Army would not be called out.

"I do not hesitate to say, as a Social Democrat, that the governing minority of Germany is steadily preparing for war against this country, and I have given this publicly as my opinion for just seven years."

Herr Südekum and Herr Ledebour, leading Socialists, asserted in the Reichstag last June that those Englishmen who maintained that Germany's naval programme was directed against England were right. I have heard the same thing from several active Socialists in different parts of the country. And it must be remembered that the Social Democrats, close students of their own country's foreign policy and keen critics of every German Government, know

as few other Germans and probably no Englishmen know, the real aspirations of those in whose hands lies the control of Imperial Germany. I have before me a letter from a friend who has a wide knowledge of European Socialism, and who has contributed largely to the German Press. In answer to a letter that I wrote asking for certain information, he says, among other things :—

"That Imperial feeling has been ripening for several decades, and has now become a settled conviction with many. You speak of the 'rulers of the country,' but I think it is possible to lay too much stress even on that. It is not seen in this or that party, nor only in the armaments. They are accidents of the new economic and international developments. These developments are making for *Weltpolitik* in spite of ourselves."

At the end of 1909 the German Navy League numbered 1,031,339 members, a gain 23,776 on the preceding year, while the cash in hand amounted to nearly £17,000. *Die Flotte*, the official organ of the League, has 345,000 subscribers, more than the number of subscribers to any daily newspaper in the Empire. During the year the League conducted an excursion of 300 schoolmasters, recruited from the interior of the country, to the sea-coast, and for 1910 and 1911 it is planned to conduct these excursions on a much more extensive scale. I was in Wilhelmshaven in June last year and saw a party

of 300 teachers returning from one of these "educational excursions." Admiral von Köster sent them a greeting by telegram, which was received with great enthusiasm. In the very interior of the country, in small towns like Unna, for instance, where few of the people have ever seen a ship of any sort, the traveller will see a large picture of a battleship over the door of some inn and an announcement of the dates on which the local branch of the Deutscher Flottenverein meets there. The membership of the British Navy League is about 20,000. Its official organ, *The Navy*, has a circulation of 18,000. The two sets of figures are of interest to English Imperialists. Referring to the enthusiasm and activity of the German Navy League, *Die Kreuz Zeitung*, the leading Conservative journal, said (5th April, 1910) that the pressure of altered conditions will compel the Englishman to familiarise himself with the idea that the times when Britain ruled the waves passed away a decade ago.

The remarks of Sir William M. Ramsay, a staunch Liberal and by no means a Jingo, will, I am sure, be endorsed by most Englishmen who have lived in Germany. He writes in the *Manchester Guardian* (12th May, 1910):—

"Less than three years ago a German consul in a foreign city, whom I knew well and esteemed highly as an educated, thinking man, declared in conversation that the most popular topic in a German public

meeting was war with England. I do not think he would say so now. But he also said that although he personally deeply regretted it, he did not see how the relations between the two countries could be settled without war. He might not improbably say so still. . . . I do not, of course, pretend to know what is the whole plan in the minds of those who are guiding German development. But one thing is certain—a definite plan is being worked out with clear and far-seeing view; that no one who lives in Germany can doubt or does doubt."

The average Englishman's lack of knowledge concerning what is going on in Germany, and of the men who are behind all this activity, is appalling. When we compare the German's accurate information about our naval and political affairs with the Britisher's almost total ignorance, and frequently indifference, concerning Germany's naval and political affairs, and especially of her developments during the past decade, we have difficulty in expressing our astonishment. How many Englishmen, except students of international politics, could point offhand on the map to Sylt, Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel, Emden, Cuxhaven, Kiel? Many, perhaps, have never heard of Count Reventlow, of von Köster, of von Tirpitz. The men who are desirous of seeing some signs of a real waking-up on the part of the average man on this side of the North Sea are not all either alarmists or anti-Germans. To anyone, even anti-Imperialist, who cares for efficiency and

looks straight at things, there is something at least sportsmanlike in the sight of the youngest of European Navies, created with a rapidity unequalled in history, being made ready to fight an old Navy with the greatest traditions in the world on its side. Men who pay flying visits to the Fatherland, pass a week, or maybe a fortnight, in a hotel, seeing nothing of the real Germany, and then return to England and tell the workers that the Germans are a peace-loving people and that they must not heed the "scare-mongers," will do no lasting good to either country. Will the politicians, of whatever party, who have so much to say about "alarmists" advocate the abolition of the Navy altogether? Yet, if it is not able to defend the country against any probable attack, the money spent on it is sheer waste. We are told by the British Labour Members and others that the money is needed for social reform. The statement is true, but irrelevant. What good can there be in any scheme of social reform if the national security is threatened? Curiously enough, in Australia, the Labour Party (now in office) seems to look at the question of defence from an exactly opposite standpoint to that of our Labour Members. There the Government has just introduced a scheme of compulsory training, on the ground that the country must be secured against outside attack before industrial reforms can be carried out. Are we to suppose that if English Labour Members and the

advocates of disarmament found themselves suddenly in power in the House of Commons, they would, under a new sense of responsibility, adopt a similar policy ? Or have they been protesting against the acceleration of our shipbuilding and asserting German friendliness, under shelter of the British Navy, which still maintains a certain superiority over Germany or any probable combination ?

The youngest of European Navies now ranks next to the British. Some English critics at first affected to regard it as the fad of the Kaiser. Whatever it may have been at the outset, it is certainly now the heart and soul of a large section of the people, and that people the most strenuous of all that are striving for Empire, for a premier place in the game of *Weltpolitik*. In the face of the Navy League's 1,031,339 members and its activity and success among all classes of the Empire, it is ridiculous to speak of the naval programme as the work of a handful of Chauvinists. The enormous output, during the past two years, of books dealing with naval politics and Imperial expansion—whether serious studies or mere popular appeals to the national vanity[1]—is itself a sign that the new ambitions cannot be confined to a very small section of the

[1] Of the latter class *Germany's Fleet in Action. The Coming Naval Struggle between Germany and England*, by Count Bernstoff, Korvetten-Kapitän in His Majesty's Navy, has been eagerly devoured. Of course, Great Britain is thoroughly thrashed and humiliated.

people. In spite of the electoral anomalies and the exclusion of the masses from political power, in a country where nearly every man is educated and, especially, well-informed on European matters, leaders can only interpret feelings that already exist and call for interpretation. The Kaiser and his Chancellor could not force upon the country a policy to which an overwhelming majority of the people stood opposed. *Nauticus* (1910) admits this and vehemently repudiates the " assumed opposition " between the Government and the people in regard to the naval policy. Herr Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberals, who declare that they are not Jingoes, said in the Reichstag in 1906 : " Until we have a strong Navy, it would be a mistake to let ourselves be drawn into a hostile policy towards England." On the 2nd October, 1910, at the annual meeting at Cassel, he told his party that their first concern would be the maintenance of the Empire's military and naval equipment, and that the colonial policy entered upon in recent years would be resolutely continued. And in the Reichstag at the beginning of December (1910) he spoke in a similar strain, expressing the satisfaction of his party that Herr Kiderlen-Wächter was at the head of the Foreign Office. Yet it is well known to every student of German politics that there are few men in the Empire less friendly to Great Britain than Herr Kiderlen-Wächter. Everything points in the direction of a determination to have an invincible

Navy and to pursue an Imperial policy. The Königsberg speech, recent statements by Admiral von Köster at Eisenach and Dresden, by Captain Pustau, *Nauticus*, the repeated hints of new taxation in the immediate future, the constant comparisons by economists of the taxable limits of Germany with those of England, all show a desire to carry through the competition to the bitter end.[1] Nothing could show more conclusively how easy it is to deceive some of the English pacifists than the jubilation in certain quarters over what is called Bethmann-Hollweg's "conciliatory tone" in his speech in the Reichstag last December. He said that Great Britain had never yet put forward, for Germany's acceptance or rejection, a definite scheme for an agreement reducing armaments. This after the statements of von Bülow and the general attitude of Germany during the past four years. Those who can read into his speech any probable change in the views of the German Imperialists on armaments must be born optimists. No hard and fast scheme can be proposed that will not be open to criticism, and any proposition would be impossible unless preceded by a general attitude

[1] Since the above was written the Flottenverein has held its eleventh annual meeting at Nürnberg (29th May, 1911). It was resolved that instead of two Dreadnought-cruisers (as provided under the present law), three should be built yearly between 1912 and 1917. The new demand has met with the unanimous approval of the Conservative and the National Liberal Press. No one reading the speeches of the members of the League will look for an agreement to reduce armaments from the present oligarchy.

of peace and conciliation. In some quarters in England it was actually asserted, just after the German Chancellor's speech, that there is now no reason why we should not come to an understanding such as we have with France. But there are no points of analogy whatever between the two cases, for—

(1) France has already a vast colonial empire, Germany is seeking one.
(2) There is no Imperialist movement in France corresponding to the Pan-Germanism of Austria and Germany.
(3) The population of France is almost stationary, Germany's is increasing by about eight hundred thousand a year.
(4) France is democratic, Germany oligarchical.
(5) French industrial development is slow, the growth of German industries during the past twenty-five years has been phenomenal.

A section of the English Radical Press, in its desire to conciliate Germany and Austria, says that the Triple-Entente does not exist, or that it is not directed against the Pan-Germanists. A curious manifestation of English Liberal journalism that gloats over the jubilant reproduction of its articles in the most Chauvinistic and reactionary newspapers in Germany and Austria.

The plain truth is the chances of an agreement with Germany for the limitation of armaments are small, and when the English people study Germany and

know what the German Imperialists want as the Germans study England and know what she wants, they will give up the futile hope of expecting such an agreement. And I say this as a friend of peace and uninfluenced by the clamour or aspiration of the extreme Pan-Germanists. But so far from desiring to see this awakening, so far from urging a closer study of Germany's politics and naval progress, some English pacifists denounce all our public men, without respect to party, who have uttered a note of warning. These men will only hurt the cause of peace. They seem to be doing their best to show England as Arnold's "Weary Titan," unable to cope with the burden of Empire :—

> "Bearing on shoulders immense,
> Atlantean, the load,
> Well-nigh not to be borne,
> Of the too vast orb of her fate."

On the 29th March, 1909, Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons :—

"The problem of naval defence has entered upon a stage more grave, more serious, requiring greater care than anything we have yet known."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said in September, 1910 :—

"Until an arrangement on the subject of armaments is reached with other nations, we have no option but to go on building ships to maintain the irreducible minimum of strength compatible with safety."

All these political leaders can be dismissed with a wave of the hand and the cry of "panic-monger," but there is one institution in England which cannot be treated in this way. The *Daily News* (31st March, 1910) thus referred to the change of Germany's naval base from the Baltic to Wilhelmshaven :—

"First the Isle of Borkum was fortified, as well as Wilhelmshaven, where all sorts of naval establishments, docks, and storehouses are to be built; the artillery was transferred to Emden and Borkum; and now the new naval base has been inaugurated. The *Tägliche Rundschau* adds that henceforth surprises like those of Port Arthur will be rendered impossible. It is not stated who is suspected of planning such surprises, but the omission of the name makes the comment as significant as the news itself."

If Great Britain is obliged to recall the whole of her fleet to home waters, how will this affect the rest of the Empire, and especially outlying and defenceless posts? Where will our "unassailable superiority" be if the Mediterranean, the Eastern seas, and the Pacific are denuded of British first-class ships? We hear much of *ententes* and alliances nowadays. Germany complains sometimes that she has been isolated by England; but this "isolation" did not prevent her from bullying France recently over the Morocco question, and Russia during the Balkan crisis. She and Austria seemed like asserting their hegemony over the whole of continental Europe.

Percival A. Hislam, in the *Admiralty of the Atlantic*, reminds us that the Anglo-Japanese alliance will expire in 1912, and he asks how we may stand if Germany forms an alliance with Japan.

"It should not be forgotten that our kinsmen in Canada and Australia, who are some thousands of miles nearer the Yellow Sea than we are, do not take such a happy view. We may be apt to think this of little importance, since the affairs of the Empire are directed from London and not from Sydney and Ottawa: but it is well to bear in mind that not for a century—a century, too, of almost continual fighting—has England engaged in a war for her own safety."

Japan has just annexed Korea, and though her goodwill towards Britain is doubtless sincere, there is a widespread opinion in Europe that she is resolved on playing a more important rôle in Asia, and particularly in China, and that her recent victory over a great European Power has given fresh vigour to the propaganda that has for some time been going on in all Southern Asia, for the object of winning self-government, of throwing off European domination and holding "Asia for the Asiatics." The Chinese are determined to assert their independence. There is no doubt about that in the mind of any man abreast of events in the Far East. This determination is seen in the increasing attention paid to military matters, in the growing distrust of foreigners, in the boycott, and in the present efforts to gain control over

all new railways. While the activity of the Pan-Germanists is causing anxiety to France and Italy, Pan-Islamism is growing, and some of our Imperialists tell us that it may ultimately threaten the Empire in various parts. Have not the Germans and Austrians, and the Mohammedan countries, as much right to form defensive and offensive leagues as the British have to hold Imperial Conferences? New problems are opened for us. For other countries, too, new problems are opened. At the very moment when the Mohammedans in Constantinople and Teheran are holding meetings and acclaiming William II their protector, we find the Berlin Missionary Society making urgent appeals to German Christians to combat the progress of Islamism in Germany's African colonies, where it is said to constitute a positive danger to her colonial empire. A commentary, in one word, on Imperialism.

But apart from the remote possibility of the alliance hinted at by Hislam, the altering circumstances of naval Europe demand the close attention of the whole of the British Empire, and particularly of Australia and New Zealand. Twenty years ago, that is to say when the German Navy was a negligible factor in European politics, and when Japan, as a world-power, did not exist, Mr. John Ballance, Premier of New Zealand (he had previously held office as Minister of Defence), in a speech at Wanganui, called attention to the defenceless state of Australia

and New Zealand, and the grave crisis that might arise for them if the supremacy of the British Navy were suddenly challenged. To us, looking back from 1911 to this period, the words sound like a prophecy. During the past three years British expert opinion on Imperial defence has undergone a complete change. An illustration of this change is furnished by the movement recently initiated by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridges to create an Indian Naval Establishment, and by the dramatic suddenness with which the British Government has abandoned its former attitude in regard to the creation of an Australian Navy. Less than four years ago Australia was advised strenuously by the home authorities not to embark on a navy of its own. Now she is being as strenuously encouraged to do so. What is the reason for this change of front? Principally Germany's amazing naval activity. It is now realised that if the Imperial flag is to be kept flying in Australasia, Great Britain must be left unembarrassed in her own waters; in other words, Great Britain realises now as she never did before that Australia will be playing a more Imperial part in the game of *Weltpolitik* by getting ready to defend herself as soon as possible. Lord Kitchener's report, published a few months ago, on a defence scheme for Australia, emphasises that "national considerations may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other theatre of operations."

Australians will be interested to hear that the Labour victories at their recent elections gave satisfaction to all sections of the German Press. The *Kölnische Zeitung* (28th December) said :—

" From the German standpoint these victories are highly gratifying, for the leaders of the Labour Party are, in general, far more friendly to Germany than their Liberal opponents, who have always got their eyes fixed on England and English precedents."

This great Liberal journal and all the others that expressed similar sentiments may possess their souls in peace. Australia is the most democratic country in the world. She has heard and read of the " mailed fist," and she takes more than an outsider's interest in the Empire of which she forms a part. She hates Jingoism, but she does not hate British institutions, British freedom and fairplay. The leaders of Labour in Australia, enjoying a full measure of Home Rule, are also more likely to keep " their eyes fixed on England and English precedents " than on Prussian Cæsarism, the Three-class Electoral System, and German colonial administration.

It may be well here to mention that the Australian people have adopted what is called a " White Australia Policy," which is a source of extreme irritation to Japan and the other Asiatic nations, including our own subjects in British India. The influx that was threatening some years ago made such a policy necessary It is still necessary if the national existence

is to be preserved. Nearly the whole of the northern part of Australia, that is, nearly all above the twentieth parallel of latitude, is unsettled and defenceless. How many ships could Great Britain, threatened at home, send there in the event of an attack by an Asiatic Power? This is the opinion given by Lord Rosebery, an ex-Prime Minister of Great Britain, to an English audience in December, 1908:—

"But you are told that invasion will take place when the Fleet is engaged elsewhere. That again I think a great aspersion on the wisdom of our governors. The Fleet engaged elsewhere! Is it to be supposed that at any moment when there is any possible contingency of the kind barely to be apprehended, a sufficiency of the Fleet to defend our shores would be allowed to leave these shores? What possible danger to any part of the Empire could justify our Fleet being sent in that direction as compared with the danger threatening the heart of the Empire? If it is capable of demonstration that the first thing to protect is this Empire, any Government would be culpable and criminal that allowed this island to remain undefended by any allurement or any interest elsewhere." (*Times*, 5th December, 1908.)

Australians and New Zealanders see the soundness of this view. Our fellow-Britishers in the outlying portions of the Empire realise as fully as any Britisher at home the necessity of being able to enforce freedom of communication in the ocean highways in the four quarters of the world, if our sea-borne commerce,

including especially Great Britain's food-supply, is to be adequately protected.

The growth of the Colonies to Nationhood, under the free play of British institutions and British democratic sentiment, will form the lasting consolidation of the Empire. The determination to have a navy of her own marked a definite stage both in Australia's relations with Great Britain and in her own development. It was an assertion of self-respect and nationhood, but it also showed that Australia realises the present strain on the mother country. The Empire can never be consolidated on the lines advocated by the English Tariff Reformers. These men have preached the duties of patriotism, and they profess undying devotion to the Colonies, but as soon as self-governing communities have shown the slightest spirit of independence or any local national feeling, the patriots have been mightily alarmed.[1] They want to hold the Colonies in allegiance to Great Britain by fostering a frothy Jingoism or excessive respect for monarchical institutions. This they can never do. Some years ago I was assistant master in a school near Syndey, the headmaster of which was a fine specimen of the old English Tory. His ideas of what Sir Henry Parkes, ex-Chartist, used to call "our glorious Hempire" amounted almost to a monomania. Empire Day (24th May) was always one of the

[1] In their original scheme of preferential trade they enumerated certain industries which were to be prohibited in the colonies.

events of the year. I remember that on one occasion the little Union Jacks distributed to the boys were insufficient to go round, and I suggested that we might make up the balance with the Australian flag. Not soon shall I forget the Tory chief's look of indignation as he said to me: "Do you know you are proposing the very thing we want to avoid?" A good deal of similar sentiment exists in England. But the sooner the extreme Imperialists realise that the growth of local nationalism is the very thing they cannot avoid, the better it will be for any sane form of British Imperialism.

CHAPTER II

GERMANY AND HOLLAND

At the time of the South African War German politicians and newspapers sympathised with the Boers, not because they had the least desire to see any calamity befall the British Empire, but because they themselves and the defenders of the "brave little Republics" were of "kindred race." Racially there is not a very great difference between a Prussian and a Dutchman. The German and Dutch languages are also closely related, though it is an absurdity to say, as some Germans do, that Dutch is merely a German dialect. Notwithstanding this relationship, racial and linguistic, the general feeling of Holland towards Germany was for many years far from friendly, and it is not yet all that the Pan-Germanists would like. In 1870, when it was thought that Dutch neutrality would be violated by Prussia, anti-German feeling ran high and the King of the Netherlands seriously discussed with his Ministers the advisableness of declaring war against Prussia.

The important part which Holland will certainly play as the German Empire develops has been in the

minds of German statesmen and political writers for many decades. Every year since Germany embarked on her Imperial policy, Holland and Belgium have loomed larger on the European political horizon. But more than half a century ago Friedrich List, one of the early advocates of German unity and of encouraging German industries by means of a tariff, was never tired of pointing out that Germany required an extended coast-line, and that while Holland possessed the mouth of the Rhine, Germany was in the position of a man who owned a house, the door of which belonged to another. Still earlier, Ernst Moritz Arndt had declared that Prussia must in the future take possession of the great western rivers and ports, and that when she did this she would be mistress of the sea. In *Die Frage Über die Niederlande* (1831) and *Belgien und was daran hängt* (1834) he has anticipated with wonderful foresight some later developments of German policy, or, at any rate, German feeling.

Holland, acting, it is believed in some quarters, upon advice from Wilhelmstrasse, has just begun to fortify Flushing and the mouth of the Scheldt, or more correctly, to put new fortifications in the place of the old ones. The English and French papers have been speaking of the Scheldt as an international river. In what sense is it "international" more than the Danube? Does "international" mean that any nation may use it in time of war? Germany, it is said, went so far as to notify Holland that she was

already adopting certain measures herself. In some quarters the construction put upon this action is that Holland must prepare to defend herself against France or Great Britain. Why? The independence and neutrality of Holland and Belgium has been one of the cornerstones of British European policy. Last January a number of French and Dutch journals published the report of an interview on this question, which the leading Dutch Socialist, Mr. Domela Nieuwenhuis, granted to a representative of *Le Matin*. According to this report—and so far it has not been contradicted—Mr. Nieuwenhuis said that war between England and Germany was inevitable, and that England was greatly interested in preventing Germany from gaining possession of the Dutch coast. He also stated that the Dutch Government fears Germany, and that both the Court and the Ministry are particularly anxious to keep on good terms with Germany, all of which seems natural enough, seeing that the eastern frontier of Holland is completely exposed to German attack. On the top of the statements by Mr. Nieuwenhuis comes the declaration by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that France must consider how these fortifications affect the permanent neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by the Powers in 1839. German politicians say that it has nothing to do with either France or Great Britain if Holland fortifies her coast from the island of Terschelling to Walcheren. Has it also nothing to do with Belgium?

Public opinion in Belgium is considerably exercised over Holland's action. The question that occurs to France and Belgium is not whether Holland has a right to prepare for her own defence, but whether the circumstances all point to the use of the fortifications for another purpose and by another Power. At the same time, judging by what I have heard from numerous Dutchmen recently, I should say that Holland is far more pro-British than pro-German. Whether there has been pressure from Berlin or not, Holland looks across her eastern frontier with feelings much more akin to fear than to love.

An "unprovoked attack" upon a neighbouring state by any European Power is now out of the question. This is what we are told by certain English politicians. Some special magic seems to cling to the words "unprovoked attack" Yet there are thousands of men still living who can look back upon many wars and who would find it difficult to say which of the two contending parties in any given contest had been the aggressor. Whenever it becomes expedient to force an issue with another Power, an opportunity can be found. *Une querelle allemande* has, among the French, become a proverbial expression for a picked quarrel. But Germany's policy in regard to picked quarrels has not been very different from our own.

Germany may adopt a far easier method of securing what List called the door of the house. The Germani-

sation of Holland and Belgium is proceeding apace. Much of Holland's trade consists in the transit of goods to and from Germany. Many of the shops are in the hands of Germans, and German books and newspapers are read perhaps as extensively as Dutch by the educated classes. Also German schools for German children are being established. It has been said often enough recently, that Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Antwerp might all pass for German towns. In view of the close commercial relations between Germany and Holland, German influence must assert itself. But this does not alter the fact that a large section of the Dutch people fear Germany and speak of German "designs" and "intrigue." Several times during the past twelve months I have had the opportunity of discussing German-Dutch relations with Dutchmen, some of whom seemed to be very well informed on European politics. The impression conveyed to my mind was that the Dutch fear and distrust Germany. One of the men to whom I refer was for some years in Celebes and Java, and he told me that it was an unwritten law among the Dutch colonists that the first thing they would do if Germany attacked Holland would be to hoist the Union Jack in all the colonies. Whether he seriously thought that this would be effective British occupation within the meaning of international law or not I cannot say. Another matter showing Holland's distrust is her persistent opposition to the proposed customs union

between herself and Germany. Such a union has been suggested time after time by influential Germans, and it is probable that such an arrangement would work to the trade advantage of Holland; but the Dutch see in it a blow at their political independence.

Holland's colonial possessions are extensive and rich, and Germany is considerably distressed concerning their ultimate fate if the integrity or neutrality of the Netherlands is in any way threatened. Professor Paul Samassa says that at present Holland is pursuing a policy of strictest neutrality, and if she could maintain this neutrality in war-time—in a war, for instance, between Germany and England—this would be of the greatest service to the German Empire, which would not have the slightest occasion to alter in any respect Holland's position among the Powers. For now as before Germany could continue her export and import trade with the neutral States, or she could send goods to them via Hamburg and Bremen. But since such a course would render the blockade of her North Sea ports nugatory, it is self-evident that England and France would not observe the neutrality of the Netherlands, which would, however much against their will, be drawn into such a war and their fate would be handed over entirely to the German Empire, and that even in the event of a victory for Great Britain, because England could never by any possibility drive the German Army out of the Netherlands.

"Germany ought to advocate a political alliance with the Netherlands, for purposes of attack and defence, with a view to at once organising, before the outbreak of war, the defence of the country. With such an alliance we should be obliged to guarantee—a heavy responsibility—the protection of Holland's colonial possessions, and our Fleet has not yet attained sufficient strength to face this problem." (*Deutsches Reich und Volk*, pp. 280–1. 1910 edition.)

Herr Fritz Bley writes: "What we want is a free pathway along the German Rhine right to its mouth, and the passive resistance of Holland makes this difficult for us." But he admits that the Dutch "hate us and have a horrible dread of being incorporated in the Prussian State." (*Die Alldeutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande*, pp. 5 and 7.)

Among sober-minded Germans one sometimes meets with the view that the ultimate destiny of Holland is to pass into German hands. In the quaint little town of Soest (in Westphalia) at the beginning of last year I had a long and interesting conversation with an intelligent young University student in whom there was certainly not a particle of anti-British feeling. The subject turned mostly upon German commercial and Imperial development. "Yes," he said, "Schleswig-Holstein came to us in '64, Hesse and Hanover in '66, Alsace and Lorraine in '71. I don't know what's going to come next I'm sure." The tone of his remarks showed unmistakably that he thought there was to be a "next." I suggested

that Holland might come into the Federal Empire. "Well," he returned, "you know there's not so very much difference between a German and a Dutchman." Apart from German-Dutch questions altogether the student's whole conversation indicated ideas that have soaked well into young Deutschland. It was not often that I found Germans of an older generation so ready to go into details when I tried to open a discussion on Imperial and foreign questions. I was often enough assured of the absolute sincerity of Germany's goodwill towards England, but such general assurances unfortunately did not convey much tangible information to my mind, though they seem to be a sufficient guarantee of Germany's peaceful intentions to a section of the English Press.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY'S PAIR OF IRELANDS

POLAND

EVERY day the Polish Question is becoming more acute for Germany. The long centuries of struggle between Teutons and Poles are far from the end, and few matters of domestic policy, which, in this case, is to some extent bound up with foreign policy, are causing more anxiety to the Prussian Government than the problem of Poland.

In May, 1832, the Prussian General, Wrangel, then stationed in Poland, wrote :—

" The Province must be Germanised unless we want to be compelled eventually, by stress of war, to maintain two army corps there to keep order."

In 1911 Poland had not yet been Germanised.

At the beginning of the stormy '48, General von Pfuel said in his proclamation of pardon to the Polish insurgents :—

" Why has so much blood flowed ? Men who tried to mislead you said that you would have to become Protestants, and you are as good Catholics now as ever. They said your churches and altars would be destroyed, and your churches and altars still stand

inviolate to console you after so much strife and sorrow."

The Poles have not since raised the flag of open revolt, but their mind towards Prussia remains unaltered. Their churches and altars stand stronger to-day than in 1848. In 1861 the leading Catholic journal, the official organ of the archiepiscopal see (Posen), declared that the supreme duty of the priests was to fight for the recovery of the external and internal freedom of Poland, and to that end to use the power they derived from their faith and from church organisation. In 1863 serious outbreaks occurred in Russian Poland, and Bismarck immediately stationed four army corps in the Prussian provinces to prevent similar occurrences there. But even in Prussian Poland many Catholic priests, and laymen, too, were found guilty of high treason and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

Bismarck foresaw more clearly than any other statesman that the Polish problem would become harder and harder to solve, and would ultimately dominate Prussian policy. He therefore tried might and main to denationalise the Poles. The three principal channels through which he worked towards this goal were :

(*a*) A ruthless suppression of the Polish language.
(*b*) The settlement of Germans in Posen and other provinces.
(*c*) The industrialisation of Poland.

His policy has crushed Polish nationalism just as effectively as his anti-Socialist laws crushed Socialism.

With von Caprivi came a policy of reconciliation, which appears to have been favoured at first by the present Emperor. But when Koscielski, the leader of the Polish Party in the Reichstag, supported the Government's naval programme, the other Polish representatives renounced his leadership. He himself subsequently withdrew his support of the Government, and again became as anti-German as any other members of the party. Since then, repression, not reconciliation, has been the policy of the Government.

There are few communities in which the national consciousness is more intense than it is in Poland. This is the invariable result of oppression. The common struggle drives the oppressed in upon themselves. The chief, but not the only, difficulty with Prussia is, of course, the difference of language. Polish is spoken by about eighteen millions of people throughout the world, and has a literature, which, though not to be compared with German, still entitles the language to be regarded as a Kultursprache. It is a hard demand to ask the Poles to give up their language. In the Austrian Empire, with its Babel of tongues, we have, on more than one occasion, seen what acute national antagonism difference of language may engender.

But there is also the difference in religion to be considered. The Catholics in Prussian Poland have

never been persecuted on account of their religion, as were their countrymen and co-religionists for a period in Russian Poland; but the extreme anti-Catholic Party in Prussia is fond of pointing to Poland as an instance of how the Roman Catholic religion can degrade and destroy a nation. An Englishman, Mr. H. S. Chamberlain, who has spent many years in Germany and Austria, has written (in German) a book entitled *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* ("The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century"). This work is a general apology for everything Prussian and Protestant. The author says (Vol. I, p. 480):—

"Probably nowhere else can be found so complete, so ample, convincing, radical an example, as in Poland, of the manner in which religious intolerance, and especially the influence of the Jesuits, destroys root and branch a flourishing country, just as it is reaching out to a brilliant future, ripe spiritually and economically."

But socially and culturally the Catholic Pole is quite equal to the Protestant Prussian. The Polish peasant is at least as "advanced" as the Prussian peasant. Poland, with a population of which 90 per cent is Catholic, is prospering to-day in spite of a century of oppression. It would be interesting if the apologists for Protestantism and Preussentum would tell us just how much religious toleration would be extended to a Catholic or a Freethinker in Prussia if the Evangelischer Bund had absolute power.

The most important factors in the propagation of nationalism are :

(1) The Press.
(2) The Clubs.
(3) The Boycott.

Of these three the Press comes easily first in importance. There are sixty Polish newspapers in the German Empire, half of which are in Posen alone. The clubs and the benefit societies ably second the efforts of the Press. Two of the largest unions are *Straz* ("The Sentry") and *Oswiata* ("Enlightenment"). The latter is strong, flourishing, uncompromising. Its members must undertake—

(*a*) To contract only Polish marriages.
(*b*) To join only Polish associations.
(*c*) To subscribe only to Polish newspapers.
(*d*) At elections to support only candidates selected or approved by the Committee.
(*e*) In all cases "to support their own people" (that is, to purchase only from Polish shopkeepers).

The religious clubs, St. Adalbert and St. Johannes, are also strongly nationalist.

There are at present twenty Polish Nationalists in the Reichstag and fifteen in the Prussian House of Representatives. The following figures show how the votes cast for National candidates for the Reichstag have increased in less than twenty years :

1893 . .	230,000	1903 . .	348,000
1898 . .	244,000	1907 . .	454,000

Some of the German leaders of Catholicism have from time to time used their influence to oppose the Polish national movement; but the pressure of public opinion in Poland, exerted through the Press, the clubs, and the parliamentary representatives, has broken down all such pro-German abuse of the offices of religion. Even Cardinal Kopp, the most strenuous of the German reconcilers, was forced to give up his open opposition to the Nationalists. In the archdiocese Gnesen (Posen) Archbishop von Stablewski, during the Caprivi reconciliation era, declared that the Church was a "bulwark of Polish national feeling," and he vigorously opposed the candidature of a pro-German Catholic priest. In every district the clergy, but especially those in the lower ranks, give their support to the local organisations and agitators. German Catholic Associations have been formed to counteract them, and they have spared no pains to spread the German language in Poland. They have protested vehemently that "Catholic and Polish are not the same thing in Poland." And Bishop Rosentreter (of Kalm) has taken an active part in discouraging his underlings from propagating Nationalism, but his efforts have been utterly fruitless.

There is an international aspect to the question. Polish newspapers are published in St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and in the United States. These papers are media for collecting money, and the funds

received from countrymen outside the Motherland are increasing every year. In the European capitals, especially Paris, are many members of the Polish nobility, Polish artists and literally men, all of whom are engaged in active work to influence public opinion. In parts of New York and Chicago recently, Polish influence was strong enough to prevent German from being taught in the public schools as an optional subject unless the Polish language was similarly favoured. Last December the Poles brought about the defeat of the Austrian Ministry, and it has been widely asserted in Germany that hints from Austria prevented the enforcement of the expropriation clauses of the last Settlement Act.

Bismarck was the first to make a special systematised attempt to banish Polish from the public schools. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Frederick William III, King of Prussia, solemnly promised that Polish would be maintained in the courts and the schools.

In 1842 William IV decided that instruction should be in the language which was spoken by the majority of scholars. This resulted in frequent complaints from the Germans that their children were thus obliged to learn Polish, until, in 1872, German was made the teaching medium, except in the matter of religious instruction, which, in the province of Posen, was to be given in Polish for junior classes and in German for senior classes. The Poles pro-

tested and the Government's difficulties increased yearly until the "school strike" of 1906, when hundreds of school children were flogged for refusing to say their prayers in German! Prussian officials declare that the stories circulated about the floggings were exaggerated, but I have been assured by Poles in Bochum and elsewhere that the reports were perfectly true.

In 1886 Bismarck introduced his "real" Polenpolitik. He first of all cleared the country, as far as possible, of Russian and Austrian Poles. Then he tried his new agrarian policy which was to settle Germans in the Polish provinces. This was continued by von Miguel, who further established technical schools. He, too, aimed at the industrialisation of Poland. Bismarck's law (26th April, 1886) created the Settlement Commission. This was to buy up the large estates and establish closer settlement; that is, to plant a number of small German proprietors on the land. In spite of the activity of the Settlement Commission, the opposition of the Polish land-banks and Polish private speculators brought more German land into the hands of Poles than vice versa. Hence in 1904 a supplementary Act was passed, according to which, in the "settlement provinces," and some others adjoining them, local consent for the establishment of small holdings became unnecessary. It was hoped that the operations of the Polish land-banks would be paralysed.

Another illusion. The land-banks now devoted their attention to the acquisition of large estates and their subdivision and sale to neighbouring peasants on the time-payment system. The next Prussian steps were the establishment of the Mittelständkasse in Posen in 1905, and of the German Farmers' Bank in 1906, both subsidised by the State. All this attempted forcing of Prussian settlement of course sent up the price of land enormously. In twenty years, 1886 to 1906, the prices in many districts nearly trebled. This, and other considerations, led to the Enteignungsgesetz (Expropriation Law) of 1908—one of the most infamous Acts that have so far disgraced the Prussian statute book. Two hundred million marks is to be spent by the Settlement Commission, of which seventy-five millions will be devoted to domiciling German artisans and to assisting the German Farmers' Banks. The expropriation clauses of the Act have not yet been enforced. The Prussian State Ministry, it has just been semi-officially announced, will shortly "declare its attitude" towards them.[1] One thing seems certain. It will not succeed in Germanising Poland.

Professor Ludwig Bernhard said last January (1911) that during the past century Prussia had ten times distinctly altered her policy in regard to

[1] Herr von Schorlemer, the Prussian Minister for Agriculture, said in the House of Representatives on 11th January, 1911, that no attempt would be made to enforce the expropriation clauses this year.

Poland, that the recent settlement policy was at a complete standstill, and that Germans were beginning to doubt the sincerity of the Government in regard to the Settlement Act. The *Lokal Anzeiger*, commenting on these remarks, said that many a German is saying to himself, "We have now been working for twenty-five years without success. We have spent a thousand million marks. Should we not now pay some attention to those who declare that the time has come to make a change, to try a policy of reconciliation?"

There are several points of similarity between Prussia's Polish question and England's Irish question. In each case there is a strong Protestant country dominating, or, at any rate, governing against the will of the governed, a weaker Catholic community, alien in race. In each case a large over-sea population of descendants of the oppressed is supporting with money and sympathy the land of their fathers. In each case a strong parliamentary party has been working for Nationalism, and has refused to be drawn into the politics of any of the other parties. The Polish democrats, in December last, were denounced by German Socialists for offering no protest against the Kaiser's divine-right speech at Königsberg; but they said that the views of the German Emperor on kingship and the Grace of God were no concern of Polish Nationalists. In each case there have been Coercion Acts and sup-

pression which have resulted in worse than failure. Another strange point of similarity is that the "dominant partners" are using the same arguments to justify their domination. The Prussian men of "blood and iron" who want to denationalise Poland say that those who are not loyal to the Prussian Law and the Prussian system cannot expect the same rights as those that are loyal. In the same way, the English Conservatives assert that, even if the Imperial Parliament has a majority in favour of Home Rule, this majority cannot count if it is due solely to the preponderance of Irish Home Rulers! There is one respect in which England's treatment of Ireland shows worse than Prussia's treatment of Poland. In the former case a people has oppressed a people, for the Government of England is practically a democracy. Germans have told me that if public opinion in Prussia could find the same full measure of political expression it would grant autonomy to Poland. England has, it is true, had no language question to consider in the Irish difficulty. But there are many parts of the British Empire where that question has had to be faced. The solution of the problem has not been found in ruthless suppression, but in the granting of equal rights, as in Canada and South Africa. What would be thought in England if anyone suggested that the Welsh language should be blotted out of existence? And yet Welsh cannot be considered a Kultursprache at all.

Whatever solutions may ultimately be found for the Polish and the Irish question, it is a clear present fact that Expropriation Laws have not Prussianised Poland and Coercion Acts have not Anglicised Ireland.

ALSACE-LORRAINE

"Alsace-Lorraine will, in every respect, be placed on an equality with the other German States, and I hope it will secure an able and wise administration, so that the people may be induced to forget, in a comparatively short time, the pains of the war and of the annexation." (Bismarck, in March, 1872.)

These hopes of Bismarck's have not yet been realised. It is forty years since Prussia's victory over France made Alsace-Lorraine a part of the German Empire. During the whole of that time it has been ruled as a conquered province. The same brutal Preussentum, the same bureaucratic persecution, the same attempts to crush an alien language, have been practised here as in Poland. And in both cases a vast majority of the people profess a different religion from that of the conquerors. The Rhine-lands have, of course, sent their representatives to the Reichstag, but these have always been "Protesters." For forty years Germany has shown how an Imperial statesmanship ought to be applied to a dependency. She has, at various times since 1871—

(1) Forbidden the teaching of the French language in the primary schools.

(2) Banished inhabitants on the most paltry pretexts.
(3) Changed many French names of places to German names.
(4) Introduced an oppressive system of passports.

In the Federal Council (Bundesrat) the interests of the two provinces have always been ignored, or rather, sacrificed. This is proved beyond question by the discussions on the tariff, the potash deposits, the levying of river dues on the Rhine. The more liberal section of the Prussian Press admits this.

Now comes the proposed constitution. It is a Prussianised constitution that a Prussianised Germany offers the Reichslande. The provinces will remain Reichslande. There is nothing democratic about the new proposals, nothing generous, nothing that shows confidence in the people. The strongly pro-German *Strassburger Post* (3rd January, 1911) says :—

"It may safely be asserted at the outset that the new reform will not essentially advance the political reconciliation of the provinces with the Empire. The whole Draft Constitution is the product of a deep-seated distrust. The first chamber of the new Parliament is so constituted owing to distrust of the second. Distrust of the first chamber is seen in the proposal that half the members shall be nominated by the Kaiser and that the new arrangements shall only remain in force five years, while distrust of both

chambers is seen in the financial clauses which confer a mere semblance of rights."

The Governor (*Statthalter*) will henceforth be advised, not by the Provincial Council, but by a Parliament consisting of two Houses. The Upper House will be composed of thirty-six members, eighteen of them nominees of the Emperor and eighteen delegates from churches, universities, and municipalities. The Lower House will be elected, but on a peculiar franchise. Three years' residence in the same place entitles every man to a vote, but every elector over thirty-five years of age will have two votes, and every elector over forty-five three votes. The Government will not be responsible to the local Parliament. That is the important point. It is doubtful whether the Reichstag will seriously modify the proposed constitution in the direction of Liberalism. Prussia has not yet won manhood suffrage for herself, and it is not likely that her representatives will readily grant it to a conquered dependency.[1]

Such is the Home Rule offered to Alsace and Lorraine after forty years of tyranny and repression. Four years after the South African War Great Britain conceded to the annexed territories complete self-

[1] To the bitter disappointment of the Pan-Germanists the Reichstag has just (26th May, 1911) passed the Constitution Bill, which has considerably liberalised the original draft in regard to the franchise, and given the provinces three votes in the Federal Council, thereby placing them on a level with most of the other States.

government, with the right to retain (and teach) their own language. It is interesting to note the contrast here, because the statesmen in Germany who are now offering this mockery of a constitution to Alsace-Lorraine belong to the party which, at the time of the Boer War, had so much to say about "the crushing out of two brave little republics." Even the paltry concessions proposed are characterised by the Pan-Germanists as "imprudent," and likely to create "grave complications." The provinces, it is said, are "not ripe for autonomy," and it is "necessary to revert to the old Preussentum and to proceed with a firm hand."

On 28th January, 1911, the Committee of the Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German Union) declared that the proposed constitution was a danger to the Germanisation of the Reichslande and to the Empire, and that the only solution of the problem was to make the provinces part of the Kingdom of Prussia. At the same time the valiant Prussians passed a resolution regretting that the Government had not yet enforced the expropriation clauses of the Settlement Act in Poland.

But the history of German rule in the transferred territory and in Poland shows that the soul of a people cannot be changed by the "old Preussentum" and by the "firm hand." The efforts to Germanise the provinces (*die preussische Germanisierungspolitik*) have been a dead failure. The

evidence of this failure is too overwhelming to admit of any rebuttal. The Conservative *Dresdner Nachrichten* (1st January, 1911) laments bitterly :—

"As we have already stated, French influence in Alsace is actively at work among the rising generation. Autonomy is to be brought about by spreading the French language and culture, and by the glorification of the republican form of government. Unfortunately this propaganda is meeting with more and more success. There are few students in old Alsacian circles who are not, openly or secretly, working for these ends."

A German writer in *Das Freie Wort* (January, 1911) says that before 1870 most of the inscriptions in the Alsace cemeteries were in German, but to-day most of them are in French, that the French language has made great progress where German formerly prevailed, that the French clubs and their Press organs are "blooming and thriving," and that the general feeling towards Germany is certainly not more friendly than it was. The Rev. Father Spieser has just published a small book entitled *Deutschlands Unfähigkeit, das Elsass zu entwelschen* ("Germany's Inability to Denationalise Alsace"). He says that it is not national bitterness and war-memories that are making Germany hated, but "the fastening of the Prussian system on to the people," the introduction of officialdom, with its

arrogance, its "caste-feeling and titled orders" (*Kastengeist und Titelwesen*).

Paris remains the intellectual, the literary and cultural centre for Alsace and Lorraine. That Berlin can never be. It is still the French language that the people of the two provinces regard as the mother-tongue, it is still the Marseillaise, born in Strassburg, and the folk-songs of *la patrie*, not "O Strassburg, O Strassburg du wunderschöne Stadt," that the Alsacians and the Lorrainese are proud to sing.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO WILLIAM II

RICHELIEU represented kings as "God's living images." "I am the State" are the words which Louis XIV is said to have hurled at a refractory Parliament. Whether he actually used the words or not, they expressed his idea of kingship. "He who gave kings to men," he proclaimed, "has willed that men should honour them as advisers appointed by Him, for He alone reserves the right to judge their conduct." Texts in support of the doctrine were found in abundance in the Scriptures.

Such a belief in divine right was once widely held. The German Emperor holds it still. It ought to be borne in mind that William II is the first German Emperor that has really felt his political feet. That helps to explain why he has always been saying things, always standing on the brink of some big event that never eventuates. William I was overshadowed by the giant form of Bismarck. Frederick III, as Crown Prince, was supposed to be inclined to a sort of Liberalism in both politics and religion, and when he appeared at the Imperial rudder the expectations of

Liberal Germany ran high; but his career was too short to fulfil these expectations. Then William II stood forth as full of confidence as of youth. Though his last important utterance, the Königsberg speech (August, 1910), seems to have caused more than usual stir, it must not be forgotten that he has been saying exactly the same thing—that he rules by the Grace of God—for twenty-two years. In 1890, in the very same place, he expressed similar views of the relationship in which the Hohenzollerns stand to the Almighty. And at Bremen, in 1897, he was quite clear:—

"If we have been able to accomplish what has been accomplished, it is due above all things to the fact that our House possesses a tradition by virtue of which we consider that we have been appointed by God to preserve and direct, for their own welfare, the people over whom he has given us power."

In the same year at Kiel Prince Henry of Prussia graciously confirmed His Majesty's claims by asserting that he was actuated by one single motive—a desire to proclaim to the nations the gospel of His Majesty's sacred person, and to preach that gospel alike to those who will listen and to those who will not.

The Imperial Chancellor has assumed responsibility for the recent Königsberg speech, which must now be considered as representing deliberate statements made by the Emperor with the advice and consent of his chief minister.

"It was in this spot," declared His Majesty in this speech, "that my grandfather in his own right placed the royal crown of Prussia upon his head, insisting once again that it was bestowed upon him by the Grace of God alone and not by parliaments and meetings and decisions of the people. He thus regarded himself as the chosen instrument of heaven, and as such carried out his duties as a ruler and lord. . . . I consider myself such an instrument of heaven, and shall go my way without regard to the views and opinions of the day."

Probably both the Emperor and the Chancellor are giving expression to a belief in which they are intensely sincere. But while the Kaiser has always been looked upon as "religious," his opinions on religion seem to undergo frequent changes.

In 1902, in Görlitz, he said that the freedom he desired for the German people was "freedom of thought, freedom for religious progress and for scientific research." Yet it is only a few months since he expressed at Beuron his admiration of the Roman Catholics and their work in combating "the thought of the twentieth century." The choking of twentieth-century thought is surely a low ideal even for a Kaiser. Korvettenkapitän Traugott von Koppelow has just published a pamphlet in which he says that the inconsistency of the Kaiser in his religion has led him to sever his connection with the Church altogether.

"It was my lot to be placed in command of the Kaiser's yacht, *The Hohenzollern.* Painful as it is to me to make the statement, the personal conduct of this high personage has caused me to break completely with the Church. His Majesty is in the habit of reading on Sunday a proof of the Court chaplain's sermon. The Kaiser controls every sentence and every single word, individually and in its context, sentences often being re-read two or three times. It is not the discourse but His Most High Majesty that is the first consideration. What is in the mind of this Prince when he busies himself with God's word ?" (*Mein Austritt aus der Landeskirche,* Berlin, 1910.)

While there is a growing body of Liberal opinion in Germany that challenges the doctrine of divine right and that is striving for a representative Parliament for Prussia, there are still some influential public men who range themselves on the side of the Emperor and his faithful henchman. In Germany the alliance between religion and monarchy has been closer even than it is in England, and has always been insisted upon by the Conservatives. The Chancellor said at the beginning of 1910 that Prussia could not allow herself to be towed into the waters of parliamentary government." On 10th February, 1910, in the House of Representatives, the view of the Conservatives on electoral reform, which has been agitating Prussia for many years but has recently become "a burning question," was thus expressed by von Richthofer, one of their leading supporters :—

"We can only vote for a system of electoral reform that will guarantee us a Parliament in Prussia that will continue the ideal principles of Prussian rule (*die idealen Grundlagen des Preussentums*),[1] a Parliament which will maintain the monarch in his strong position as the wearer of the German Imperial Crown, not the semblance of a monarch, but one that is dependent upon something higher than Party and Parliament—one dependent upon the King of all kings. It is our wish that the State in Prussia may be known as a Christian State. It is our wish that the principle of our Conservative platform may be firmly maintained: Church and State are institutions ordained of God"

But even among the Conservatives there has been considerable indignation at the Kaiser's invoking the aid of the Benedictine monks of Beuron to assist him in combating Socialism by deepening the religious consciousness of the masses. These Protestant Conservatives ask, very pertinently, how far the religious orders in Catholic countries like Portugal and Spain have helped the monarchy. Just after the Beuron speech Cardinal Fischer said:—

"Even the Emperor knows that he cannot rule without the support of the Centre. The Centre is an extremely powerful party."

[1] This one word, *Preussentum*, contains within itself all that a German understands by a "blood and iron policy," and all that is conveyed to an English mind by the words "mailed fist."

And the great Catholic organ *Germania* hinted that the Jesuits might be reinstated in Germany as their Order differed but little from that of the Benedictines. Naturally, then, the Emperor's sympathy with the Party which for decades has been a block to all political progress is keenly resented by Protestants, who feel that the sincerity of the Emperor's belief in the divine mission of kingship cannot be accepted in exchange for their political and intellectual freedom. In a time in which strictly Catholic countries are rising up against the Church's authority, Protestant Germany sees the Catholic Centre holding the balance of power and practically dominating the Reichstag. In such times a speech like the Kaiser's must excite hostility. And it has excited it among all parties except the Centre. The ultra-Conservative *Kreuzzeitung* and the *Reichsbote* say that the speech should never have been reported by the Catholic Press. *Grenzboten* (November, 1910) says :—

"On the one hand the wearer of the German Imperial Crown shuts his eyes to the teachings of the history of the German Empire, and on the other he shows that he is not sufficiently instructed in the prevailing temper of the country."

We might state the case in another way: the Emperor's speeches at Königsberg and Beuron are an admission that his throne is not rooted deep in the hearts of the people, but either in the grace of God or somewhere in cloisters and castles. Mr. George

Sylvester Viereck, a German-American writer, says that if Germany were to be declared a republic to-day and a president had to be chosen, the unanimous choice of the people would be William II, and he believes that even the Socialists "secretly adore" him. Evidently William II himself was not of this opinion when he asked the Beuron monks to help him "to combat the thought of the twentieth century"—a fairly large order for either monk or monarch.

Germany appears to be on the verge of a struggle between semi-Absolutism and Constitutionalism. The former, backed up by Militarism, by Imperialism, by the Church, stands for all that is dear to most of the rulers of the country. The triumph of Constitutionalism, on the other hand, means a check to those movements or institutions, and it probably means also the still more rapid dissolution of the crumbling Protestantism of the Established Church in Prussia. Whether it will result in the further spread of Socialism or not is a much-debated question. Herr Friedrich Naumann and most of the Progressives and Radicals assert that the growth of Constitutionalism means the distinct weakening of Socialism as an organised force, and they point to England and the United States as proving this assertion. However this may be, the ruling minority in Germany has much to say of the "danger" that is threatening, of the "domestic enemy."

CHAPTER V

A GLANCE AT POLITICAL PARTIES

THE CONSERVATIVES

THE true conservative principle was summed up by Friedrich Stahl sixty years ago. "Autorität nicht Majorität." The German Conservatives are, according to their own oft-repeated declaration, "monarchical in politics, orthodox in religion." For many years one section of the party has been known as the Free Conservatives or the Imperial Party. They have differed from the ultra-Conservatives (Deutsch-Konservative Partei) on questions concerning Church and School, but on all fiscal and Imperial matters there is practical unanimity. The main planks of their platform are:

(1) Maintenance of the principle of monarchical rule.
(2) Recognition of the Christian character of the State (religion in the schools).
(3) Opposition to Social Democracy (an extraordinary plank to introduce after (1) and (2)).
(4) Support for a Colonial policy.
(5) Agrarian and Industrial Protection.

(6) The combating of Jewish influence, especially in regard to the appointment of Jewish teachers in the public schools.

The last plank has had considerable influence in winning for the party small farmers as well as a fair number of tradesmen, especially in Hesse and Saxony, where many peasant proprietors have for years had their farms mortgaged to Jews. But the mainstay of the party has been the powerful Agrarian Union (Bund der Landwirte), which at present numbers nearly four hundred thousand members. Theoretically it supports no political party, practically it is the greatest bulwark of Conservatism. Another less Conservative agrarian organisation is The German Farmers' Union (Deutscher Bauernbund), which stands politically nearer to the Free Conservatives, but is united to the Agrarian Union in the common interest in Protection.

At the last general election sixty German Conservatives and twenty-four Free Conservatives were returned, and twenty-nine Conservative supporters (Anti-Semites and others).

LIBERAL PARTIES

The Liberal Party is divided into three main branches:

(1) The National Liberals.
(2) The Progressives (Fortschrittspartei).
(3) The Liberal Democratic Party (Freisinnige Volkspartei)

Since most of the National Liberals are Protectionists and are practically in accord with the Free Conservatives on questions relating to school and church, the difference between them and the latter is merely one of name. It is not uncommon to hear members of the party say that they strive to follow a path that lies midway between opposing interests, in which respect they are similar to many other politicians in all countries.

The Freisinnige Volkspartei is democratic, the main planks of its platform being:

(1) Radical electoral reform.
(2) Imperial laws for protecting and insuring workmen.
(3) Abolition of all import duties on food-stuffs.
(4) Protection of the Empire's trade and subjects outside the Empire, "but no addition to the Fleet as a mere parade of power or in the interests of a so-called *Weltpolitik*."

The Deutsche Volkspartei, whose stronghold is Württemberg, has almost exactly the same platform.

The Progressives have much in common with the Freisinnige Volkspartei. They demand:

(1) Ministers to be responsible to Parliament.
(2) Abolition of all privileges granted to the Church by the State.
(3) Abolition of the separate Confessional Schools.
(4) Abolition of import duties on food-stuffs and raw material.

(5) Progressive taxes on incomes, property, and inheritances.

(6) Furthering of International Peace.

Fifty-four National Liberals and forty-nine Progressives and Radicals were returned in 1907.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The Social Democratic Party stands as the party of the wage-earners. It has grown as Capitalism and the Factory System have grown. In 1863 Ferdinand Lassalle founded the General German Workers' Union, and in 1869 Liebknecht and Bebel the Social Democratic Workers' Party. In 1875 both parties united on the Gotha Programme, and at the Reichstag elections ten years later 493,400 votes were cast for the party. The result was a source of considerable anxiety to Bismarck. As early as 1876 a law threatening imprisonment for attacks on Marriage, the Family, and Property had been proposed, but was rejected. After the Hödel outrage, in May, 1878, another Bill was submitted to the Reichstag "to combat the spread of Social Democracy" and again rejected by a large majority. A month after the Hödel affair came the Nobiling outrage. Both Hödel and Nobiling were probably madmen, but Bismarck made political capital out of their acts. The Reichstag was dissolved, and Bismarck used the opportunity to weaken the Liberals who bore the responsibility for the rejection of his

Bills. The new Reichstag passed a severe Anti-Socialist law by a majority of over seventy, and this law was continued with slight modifications till 1890. Under the law many Socialist leaders were banished, meetings and newspapers were suppressed, trade organisations broken up. At the 1881 elections the number of votes decreased from 437,100 to 312,000; but since that date the increase has been enormous and continuous, as is shown by the following figures:

1881.	312,000	1893.	1,786,700
1884.	550,000	1898.	2,107,076
1887.	763,100	1903.	3,010,771
1890.	1,427,300	1907.	3,259,000

The attempt to stem the tide was seen to be hopeless, and to-day the large industrial centres are almost exclusively represented by Socialists. The programme adopted at Erfurt in 1891 has remained unaltered:

(1) The direct system of elections; one adult one vote.
(2) Referendum.
(3) Citizen Army for Defence.
(4) People to decide on Peace and War.
(5) International Courts of Arbitration.
(6) Freedom to form unions and hold public meetings.
(7) Separation of Church and State.
(8) Education, free and secular, and feeding of school children.

(9) State expenditure to be met exclusively by taxes on Income, Property, and Inheritance.

Herr Wilhelm Schröder (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*, September, 1910) gives some interesting data showing the progress of the party during the past twelve months. The organised membership is 722,830 against 633,309 in 1909. During the preceding year the party held 29,826 meetings of members and 13,184 public meetings, and distributed twenty-three million leaflets and two and a half million pamphlets. Other recent returns show that the Socialist Press in Germany has to-day 1,160,000 subscribers and seventy-eight journals. In 1904 the number of subscribers was 600,000.

Leading Conservatives, as well as the Kaiser and other members of the Royal Family, are constantly warning patriotic Germans of the "domestic enemy." Last September General von Bissing, Commander of the Seventh Army Corps, said that the Army knew exactly how it was to proceed in the moment of civil trouble. Their first act would be the arrest of editors of Socialist newspapers. Socialist members of the Reichstag would be similarly treated, despite the guarantee of personal immunity under the Federal Constitution. In the event of serious disturbances, said General von Bissing, it would be impossible for the Government to respect the immunity of Socialist members even of the State Parliaments. "There is

no doubt about the nervousness of the German authorities and their conviction that the present discontent is radical and widespread. On 13th February, 1911, Prince Henry of Prussia told the veterans of the Thirty-fifth Regiment of Infantry that the army must protect the country not only from dangers abroad but from dangers at home. Referring to Socialist activity, he declared :—

"The outlook is full of grave anxiety and misgiving in spite of forty years of peace."

Probably no other country possessing a Parliament would allow members of the Royal Family to go about interfering in party politics in this way.

At the 1907 elections forty-three Socialists were returned, but since then they have won ten by-elections.

THE CENTRE

The Centre is the political representative of Roman Catholic Germany. Theoretically it is not a religious party at all. Practically it is purely a religious party. Its strongholds are the Catholic States and districts : Southern Bavaria, Württemberg, Breisgau, Würzburg, Westphalia, Osnabrück, and Ermland. But Poland must be excepted from the list of Catholic districts (or provinces) controlled by the Centre. The Poles have refused to pay the price which the support of the Centre would cost—the Germanisation of their country.

There is no special Catholic trades organisation ;

but the "People's Union for Catholic Germany" (Volksverein für das Katholische Deutschland), which has a membership of about a million and three-quarters, exerts considerable political influence in the industrial centres. It is the only organisation that can be compared with the Socialist unions in regard to working-class membership.

Closely associated with the history of the party is the Kulturkampf (The May Laws, 1873), by which Bismarck hoped to check the growing power of the Church and its Orders. The greater his efforts to weaken organised Catholicism the stronger it became. Priests were looked upon as martyrs, and the embittered masses were determined to make any sacrifice for their religion. In Windthorst the Catholics found a leader as crafty as Bismarck, and with the organising genius of a Scharnhorst. A powerful parliamentary party was formed. In 1878 Bismarck wanted to crush Free Trade, and he found the opposition to Protection so strong that he could not carry through his new tariff without the help of the Centre, whose policy had always been: Support in return for concessions. The May Laws were practically repealed till only the law enforcing Civil Marriage and a few minor regulations concerning the Orders were left.

Since 1879, with the exception of the years 1887–1890, the Centre has held the balance of power in the Reichstag. Between 1887 and 1890 the "Kartell" (National Liberals and Conservatives) had a working

majority, and were able to pass the Septennat—the Bill continuing the effective force of the Army, on a peace footing, for seven years. The opponents of the measure wanted to reduce the period to three years.

In regard to economic interests, and especially Protection, the Centre has always represented the Agrariers.

The Programme drawn up by the Catholics in 1871 is practically the same as the party's programme to-day:

(1) Christian (not merely civil) marriage.
(2) Religion in the primary schools.
(3) Freedom of teaching.
(4) Maintenance of the federal character of the Empire.
(5) Centralisation only so far as necessary.
(6) Maintenance of the Church's independence.

The party secured one hundred and five seats in 1907.

CHAPTER VI

THE OUTLOOK FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

WHEN we hear from all political parties, except the Conservatives and some members of the Centre, so many bitter expressions of dissatisfaction concerning the Königsberg speech, we naturally ask the question, What have the German people and their Parliament been doing during the past forty years to force the Emperor to show regard for "Parliaments, meetings, and decisions of the people" and "the views and opinions of the day"? Nothing could do more to lead such a man to look upon the Reichstag as a nonentity than its inability to protect its own dignity and its own interest.

To answer the question we must glance at German history and German political temperament. Though the average German is better informed than the average Britisher in regard to foreign policy, in the matter of domestic politics he is a very unimportant unit. A few years ago, at an international Socialist Congress, when the French and German delegates were at variance on some question, the former re-

minded their comrades in somewhat strong language that they had fought behind barricades for their constitution; but in Prussia the constitution had been conceded by a king. The statement was true, and in Prussia the Conservatives still regard the Parliament in that light—a concession. Besides this, the German's position right in the heart of Europe, with strong military powers on all sides, has forced him to keep his eyes on other nations and to look up to a few leading men at home. The political constitution of federated Germany, born in a day out of strife, international and inter-State ferment, is an outcome of the same fact. It is Cæsarean, not parliamentary. It leaves to any Emperor of strong personality such initiative for action that he rules with almost absolute power. And the extraordinary industrial progress under the Empire has to some extent directed the eyes of Germany away from political reform. What is the situation to-day? On the one side a ruler of overweening confidence, on the other a body of citizens without enough confidence to assert even such power as they have. "Look at England!" was the cry of many of those who were struggling for political freedom in Prussia in 1848. It is still the cry of some Germans, who think that the ideal of political freedom is embodied in the English Constitution. Every English schoolboy is told by his middle-class instructors that foreign nations admire the English Constitution as the symbol

of all that is fair and just and free, and as—this is the point especially insisted upon—the successful reconciliation of democracy and aristocracy. But where and what is this "Constitution"? It is simply the growth of the English political genius. Few plants thrive on foreign soil even if they happen to strike root. The Munich brewers are fond of telling a story at the expense of an English firm that was determined to brew beer equal to the Bavarian article. German experts were sent for, but the beverage turned out in England was not Münchner. Water from the Isar was then imported, but the result was only another disappointment. So the English brewers came to the conclusion that the Munich beer must derive its special qualities from the air, and that they could not import. Herr Friedrich Naumann, one of the Progressives in the Reichstag, says that his countrymen need "more west wind in their sails." But this "west wind" cannot be imported. Germany has had a Parliament for several decades, and those who cry "Look at England!" should look at their own Reichstag and ask why it has not tried to exact respect for parliamentary institutions. All parties are to blame except the Conservatives, who do not consider themselves a parliamentary party in the ordinary acceptation of the word. They have always regarded themselves rather as a sort of House of Lords within a House of Commons, and they openly assert their

right to rule by virtue of their class. General von Wrochem, in a speech at Potsdam on 8th January, 1911, deplored, in pathetic terms, the present demand of the masses for Constitutionalism.

"We are," he said, "allowing the principle of unbridled freedom to drive us out upon a shoreless sea on which the State is to be developed along democratic lines, and no one to-day can tell us where this extremely hazardous (*hochbedenklich*) journey will end."

This well expresses the fear of the truly conservative-minded—all change is *hochbedenklich*. There is no ground for doubting the sincerity of these men, or, in regard to many of them, their concern for what they consider the best interests of the Fatherland. Some of them would be the first to the front in the hour of their country's call. Nor are they extreme individualists in economics, totally indifferent to the sufferings of the poor. They have introduced or supported legislation which many of the individualistic Radicals of England, a generation ago, would have denounced as Socialistic. But they are class-conscious, they have learned at home from parents and tutors that some men were born to rule, others to go into the bowels of the earth and hew coal and ask no questions. For the Conservative and the Centreman the word "progress" has little or no meaning in politics or religion. It is enough to lay down the principle that the masses always have been, and

always will be, led by the few, and for the "Black-Blue Block" a "born ruler" does not necessarily mean a man of administrative genius. Privilege and the pride of birth is their watchword in politics; tradition and custom and authority in religion. There is an unbridgable gulf between master and servant, lord and vassal, and what is ought to be.

The National Liberals are a Liberal party in name, but in no other respect. Most of them are indistinguishable from the Free Conservatives. Had they from the first energetically asserted the principles of representative government, it is doubtful whether the Emperor would have dared to express himself as he did on 25th August, 1910. The party has always been spineless and spiritless, ready to comply with the demands of any Ministry or to grant it a further lease of life even when its programme stood directly opposed to its own. These self-styled Liberals have done more than the Imperial Conservatives to hinder the evolution of democracy in the German Empire. Their excuse has always been that national considerations demanded that the Government for the time being should be supported. Now the position of those who hold that patriotism precludes the formation of parties altogether is intelligible enough. But a party which is constantly making concessions to the "Black-Blue Block," which is fearful of *attempting* to carry through its own programme, is nothing but

a political name. What else can we say of men who are continually denouncing Bethmann-Hollweg's Conservative Ministry and yet persistently refuse to go into opposition to it ?

The Progressive People's Party (Fortschrittliche Volkspartei) and the Radicals (Freisinnige) are taking a definite stand against the present system of irresponsible Ministries. If at the next elections these two parties and the Socialists are considerably strengthened, the Conservatives, the Centre, and the more anti-democratic section of the National Liberals will have difficulty in warding off the demand for responsible government.

Outside all the other parties stand the Social Democrats. Their attitude towards the whole political and economic life of to-day requires that they should lend no support to capitalistic parties. It is not true that they have, as some of the Radicals and Progressives declare, blocked every reform and every effort to palliate existing conditions, on the principle that one party is as good as another until the co-operative commonwealth is established. Nearly all the Socialists have opposed the Chauvinism and Imperialism of the other parties, they have worked hard for electoral reform in Prussia, they have ridiculed divine right and denounced Protection. But they are prone to underrate political democracy as compared with the development of the class-struggle. Yet this political democracy is a pre-

liminary to the realisation of their programme, for few of them now hold that the changes for which they are working will be brought about by a single revolution. In the meantime the comrades must be either Liberal or anti-Liberal, in the ordinary, non-political acceptation of the words, on many questions. They must be, for instance, either clerical or anti-clerical on the question of State education, and the maintenance of a State Church. That many of the Socialists now admit this was proved by the speech of Herr Ledebour in the debate on the Königsberg speech.

German Socialism appears to be at the parting of the ways. It has now reached a point where it must decide whether it will have a united party or will cling to revolutionary traditions and allow its organisation to be broken. The Social Democrats cannot go on year after year passing resolutions condemning considerable minorities for Revisionism. The Baden " cases " last year and the recent Lindemann " case " seem to point to a revolt against orthodoxy in Socialism analogous to the revolt against it in religion as seen in the Jatho and Traub cases.

The year 1911 (or 1912) will probably see one of the most important electoral campaigns in the history of German democracy, owing to the political developments of the three preceding years, and particularly of 1908 and 1910. There is an undoubted tendency on the part of the people to take a definite step to the

right or the left. In some of the recent by-elections which were won by Social Democrats thousands of middle-class voters must have supported the Socialist candidates. Hatred of the conditions of life and politics under the Empire is now making its way well into all strata of society. The Dreiklassenwahl system alone is a bitter source of discontent. Under this system in Prussia, and with slight modifications in Saxony, the electors are divided into three classes, according to the amount paid in direct taxation. Each class, having equal electoral powers, chooses an elector (*Wahlmann*), who directly votes for the representatives for the State Parliament. And not only is the voting indirect and open, but the electorates are so delimited that much more political power is given to the agricultural districts than to industrial centres. Berlin returns nine Members to the Landtag; on a population basis it should have twenty-four or twenty-five representatives. In practice the system works out in this way—the 'first' class, 3½ per cent of the total number of voters, has the same number of representatives as the 84½ per cent rated in the third class. In the two duchies of Mecklenburg the mass of the people are even more insignificant politically, for they have practically no voice in the local Parliament. Only the *Ritterschaft* (feudal landowners) and the *Landschaft* (town landlords) are represented in the Landtag. A list of the votes polled and the seats won at the General

Election (1908) in Prussia will show at a glance the unrepresentative nature of the three-class system :

	Votes.	*Seats.*
Old Conservatives .	354,786	152
Free „ .	63,612	60
Centre . . .	499,343	104
National Liberals .	318,589	65
Radicals . .	120,593	36
Socialists . .	598,522	7
Poles and others	226,248	19

A grosser insult, not only to the manual labourers, but to thousands of professional men, could hardly be imagined.

It is sometimes asserted that the exclusion of the masses from political power and the checking of the growth of democratic spirit have worked well for international politics. At the beginning of 1910 Bethmann-Hollweg declared that Prussia, for Imperial reasons, " could not and would not allow herself to be towed into the waters of parliamentary government," and Professor Eugen von Jagermann, of Heidelberg, in the *Deutsche Revue* (January, 1911), speaks of the dangers from a national standpoint of the parliamentary system, especially in Germany, where there is no independent Upper House as in England, and no Federal Supreme Court as in the United States. The same sort of thing has been heard in England more than once. It is said that the Prussian system with all its drawbacks has its

"good points"—that it makes for continuity of policy and places the interests of national defence above the fluctuation and intrigue of party. But to denounce the existing political conditions in Germany is not to defend the worst features of the English party system. No plea for the anti-parliamentary government of Prussia will alter the fact of the present widespread dissatisfaction with it. A highly educated community, though its members may have been drilled into obedience from their infancy, will not always remain submissive to such anti-modernism either in politics or in religion. How can a nation seething with political grievances be strong imperially? It has evidently never occurred to the defenders of oligarchical Germany that the State will achieve much more if the people are organised on democratic lines and if men are allowed to rise according to their natural ability. Those who have learned nothing but obedience cannot bring to the Fatherland a high personality, an individual manhood, and yet the State can only be strong inwardly and outwardly when every man feels that he is a co-operator in its political and economic life.

Unless all by-elections for the Reichstag since 1907 are to be dismissed as affording no indication of the probable results of the 1912 elections, it is probable that the Volkspartei, the Radicals and the Social Democrats will hold more seats than the Conservative Centre. Nothing could show more clearly

the Government's embarrassment than the vacillation of Bethmann-Hollweg as to what his appeal to the electors will mainly be based upon. At first he declared that his *Wahlparole* would be "vigorous prosecution of a colonial policy"; after the Moabit disturbances, the only scandalous feature of which was the barbarity of the police, he said that he would ask all patriotic electors to unite to keep down the "red flood," and his latest pronouncement is that his election cry will be: "Our protective tariff is in danger." The last is the call with which he will try to rally the electorate, for it is a plain statement of fact. If the more democratic of the National Liberals throw in their lot with the Socialists and Radicals against the reactionaries and the "Black-Blue Block" is broken up, the Emperor will find some pretext for dissolving Parliament. What will happen then the present writer does not pretend to be able to foresee. Perhaps the National Liberals will cry, "Peccavimus!" and promise not to offend again.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIALISM, PROTECTION, AND FREE TRADE

At the end of last September the German Socialists held their annual meeting at Magdeburg. Exactly twenty-one years have passed since Bismarck's brutal and reactionary laws against Socialism were seen to be defeating their own ends, and the Social Democrats were allowed to hold their meetings without serious molestation. It was in 1890, the year in which the Socialists polled 1,427,300 votes, that these laws ceased to exist. The political situation in Germany to-day carries us involuntarily back to the domestic difficulties of that time, or, more correctly, to the times immediately preceding it. The three decades that have passed since the Kulturkampf, the anti-Socialist laws, and the struggle to kill Free Trade, have seen the Socialists make gigantic strides in every direction. Their organisation to-day is almost perfect. That class-consciousness that revolutionary Socialists hold as one of the fundamental articles of their faith is intenser among the masses to-day than at any preceding period. But Capitalism has also made

gigantic strides under Protection. This protected Capitalism and the growing Imperialism are moving along parallel lines. Hence World Politics and Protection is now the rallying cry of the rulers of Germany from the Emperor downwards. Vast industries have been freed from outside competition by a tariff wall and a monopoly of the home-market has been secured. The manufacturer is thus subsidised by the State to send his wares to all the markets of the world. But foreign capitalists enter into competition with him. He invokes his own Government to help him to open new markets. Of course, he is enthusiastic for a strong fleet, and wants to see his Fatherland a great world-power, mighty and universally feared. Still more enthusiastic for an Imperial policy are the capitalists seeking fields of investment. Capital concentrated in banks is as much interested as the *Schlotbarone*, the factory kings, in the importation of raw material and the exportation of manufactured articles. It is thus one of the great propelling powers of Imperialism.

Protection, Militarism, Colonial Expansion, all make up the German world-politics of to-day. The big capitalist drags with him the smaller, who considers tariff encouragement of local industries an essential part of a national policy. He drags with him an army of dependents—officials, clerks, middlemen—who are all interested in the prosperity of large businesses, in "good times." Trade is brisk—

World Politics and Protection are glorious things, and the agents and distributors, and even the workers, are ready to down all opposition to them. But the policy has a reverse side. It can only be carried on at the expense, ultimately, of the consumers, who form the great mass of the people. Not only does the gap between capitalist and worker become wider, but the State becomes more and more an agency for this concentrated capital, more and more a co-operator in the work of finding markets and spheres of investment. Taxes increase, all consumers are affected, all sources of income must contribute to the payment of interest on the State loans which have been raised for the purpose of providing armaments. Then comes the reaction. Food is dear, and the masses are in revolt. Junkertum sees itself face to face with a strong opposition. A rapidly growing Socialism and a rapidly growing Imperialism confront each other.

A highly developed and protected Capitalism, as it exists in Germany and the United States, is bound to be Imperialistic. The bourgeois, like the Socialist, becomes an Internationalist, but his own nationalism is not less intense. All parties which are interested in Protection stand in clear-cut antagonism to the Socialists. The Conservatives recognise this. The Chancellor has just declared that he will, at the coming election, make Protection the chief plank in his platform. He hopes in this way to unite all the

parties against Social Democracy. In consequence of the gerrymandering of the electorates these parties must gain a majority of seats, whatever increase there may be in the Socialist vote. But will they be able to form an anti-Socialist Block? Possibly a new tariff will be the outcome of the struggle, and we shall see, as we have seen before, Conservatives, National Liberals, and Centre engaged in a fierce wrangle about the new duties. One interest will demand an increase, another a decrease. There will be revisions, adjustments, readjustments, and international agreements. For the protected producer is never satisfied. One of the leading Conservatives, Freiherr Wangenheim, at a meeting of Agrariers in Königsberg last December, advocated an increase in the duties on corn. This at the very moment when the indignation of the masses at the high prices of meat and bread has almost reached its limit!

In Germany, as in the United States, Protection leads to monopoly, and monopoly means the fleecing of every wage-earner. The simple times when a man with a family could live, if not in comfort, at any rate free from much of his present-day anxiety, on fifteen or sixteen shillings a week, passed away when the industrial system and the protective tariff and taxes for the fleet were introduced. It is not here contended that those times, when the labourer, with due humility, "submitted to those placed in authority over him," and worked uncomplaining from

sunrise to sunset in the fields, were good times. The "present unrest" is infinitely better. But what is worthy of note is, that the same state of affairs exists wherever the capitalist protects himself from external competition, and it is a state of affairs against which, in all countries, the masses are beginning to rebel. The whole atmosphere of Germany is heavy with this revolt against the tariff. Look at the clear evidence of this statement. Since the General Election of 1907 the Conservatives (Protectionists) have had to defend eleven seats. They have retained five and lost six. In sixty other by-elections for the Reichstag they have not won a single seat. Only in one by-election, Meseritz-Bomst, did the Protectionist poll show an increase (88 votes). In comparison with the figures of the General Election, the Conservative-Protectionist vote showed a total decrease of 31,449 in five electorates which they had previously held:

	Decrease
Landsberg-Soldin	4358
Eisenach	2624
Oletzko-Lynck	10,018
Zschopau-Marienberg	10,091
Labiau-Wehlau	4358

The National Liberal Protectionists have also lost about a dozen seats which they carried in 1907. The power of the Agrariers and the high cost of living, both of which are largely due to the tariff, are sufficient proof to an immense number of the electors

that Protection works for the benefit not of the people as a whole but of the few. When the prices of meat recently were almost prohibitive, the landowners were gloating over the increased profits, and indignantly declaring that if the duties were suspended the very ends of a protective tariff would be defeated. One of the leading journals in the Empire said that the Chancellor, in refusing to admit foreign meat free of duty, was simply showing himself once more the business agent of the Prussian landowners.[1] A heavy tariff is a yoke which can be more easily framed than shaken off, and the men most strongly in favour of it are those who have the most to say about the "rights of property." What about the rights of the man whose only property is his wages? He suffers the most under Protection, for he has nothing to sell but his labour. The English Tariff Reformer is never weary of asserting that Protection means increased wages for the workers. It has not secured for the German worker a very large return for his labour. The Prussian Taxation Department has just issued the "official summary" of the number of persons rated for income-tax during 1910. As employers must furnish the Department with a list of their servants and the wages paid to them, the figures may be regarded as correct. The returns for

[1] "Bethmann-Hollweg zeigt sich also wieder als Geschäftsführer der preussischen Agrarier."—*Bremen Nachrichten*, 18th November, 1910.

incomes under 1350 marks (shillings) per annum show:

Income.	No. of persons.
£45 to £51	1,341,497
£51 to £60	1,111,000
£60 to £67½	804,709

In a country where nearly all industries are protected up to the hilt, over three million persons are earning an average of about a pound a week. The number of those whose incomes are below £45 a year —not taxable—has been variously estimated. It is generally put down at about five millions.

To assert, as some of the English Protectionists do, that the reports about the dear loaf and the consumption of horse-flesh are only bogeys, is nothing more or less than cheap twaddle due to ignorance or wilful misrepresentation. I can speak from experience, for I have bought a good many loaves in both countries, and I pay sixpence (50 pfennige) in Germany for a loaf of white bread, which is a trifle smaller than one which costs me fourpence in England, while as regards horse-flesh, "Täglich frisches Rossfleisch" ("Fresh horse-flesh daily") and "Rossfleischverkauf" ("Horse-flesh sold") are advertisements that can be seen every day in the newspapers. No men in Germany have studied the influence of a tariff on the prices of food more deeply than Professor Brentano and Herr Bergrat G. Gotthein, a member of the Reichstag. The former stated last November

that the annual extra cost to the people of a tax on wheat and rye is thirty million pounds, of which, he estimates, one-sixth goes into the Imperial treasury. The same month Herr Gotthein said in a speech at Hamburg that no civilised people has such heavy burdens to bear as the Germans, and that these burdens are largely the result of Protection, which demoralises those protected and injures the community as a whole.

In the Reichstag, on 24th November, 1910, Baron von Schorlemer, the Prussian Minister for Agriculture, declared that Great Britain would be in a deplorable position in war-time because she had not fostered, by import duties, the local production of food-stuffs. But even Germany imports vast quantities of wheat from Russia and meat from Denmark. The duties on these provisions simply mean that the people pay more for them. The fact that in war-time Germany would get her food from continental countries and not be dependent on sea-borne produce has nothing to do with Free Trade and Protection. It is purely geographical. Great Britain cannot have the advantages of her insular position without the disadvantages. One great advantage is that so far she has not been obliged to maintain a large standing army, and the disadvantage is that she must maintain a supreme fleet.

Some Free Trade English M.P.'s, after presenting their constituents with an ugly picture of German Pro-

tection plus horse-flesh and black bread and long hours and hordes of beggars, turn round and say: "Yes, Germany is prosperous, but it is not on account of Protection, it is in spite of it." These politicians cannot have the case both ways. Germany is not both prosperous and suffering from poverty or trade-depression. German industrial development is probably without parallel; but it is due to the progress of technical science. It is true that wages have risen enormously during the past few years, but for this the workers have principally to thank their trade unions. The point to emphasise is that the profits arising from the development have not materially helped the mass of the people. And the workers know it, and they want their share of the wealth they create. It is partly this fact and partly the exclusion of the masses from political power, not actual hunger, that is at the bottom of the unrest. The revolt against existing political and economic conditions is a sign of progress.

Will there be a Free Trade majority in the next Reichstag? Much speculation is centring round this question. The Agrarier Union (Bund der Landwirte) is in a state of wild trepidation, which is intelligible enough after the recent by-elections. This highly protected organisation has just issued a pamphlet, *Our Protective Duties Menaced* ("Drohende Gefährdung unserer Schutzzölle"), in which they admit that "desperate efforts" are being made to reduce the

duties on meat and corn, and they call on Protectionists to sink all minor differences and unite. If, however, the Socialists at the forthcoming elections follow different tactics from those which have characterised their campaigns hitherto, Free Traders are bound to win a number of seats. If the Social Democrats declare that they will support a Free Trade Liberal in all electorates where they have no prospect of success themselves, the tariff is, from that moment, seriously threatened. At previous elections the comrades have not acted in this way. Class loyalty has been the first consideration. For this reason they have insisted on nominating Socialists who had no chance of election and whose nomination had no other result than the bringing of Agrariers or National Liberals to the second ballot. The proceedings of the party at Magdeburg, when the Revisionists of Baden were censured for supporting the State Government, showed the attitude of the majority of Socialists to mere reformers. It must be remembered, however, that a considerable minority defended the Revisionists. What the latter really did was to prevent the Centre from holding the balance of power, and until the Centre—a political party based upon principles that are not political, but religious—is broken, the comrades can achieve no practical result. For the Centre to-day is the only party in Germany, outside the Socialist, that has any influence over the workers. But judging from a recent speech by Herr Ledebour,

a member of the Reichstag, and from the remarks of other responsible Socialists, it is probable that at the 1912 elections seats which may be won for Free Trade will not be jeopardised in cases where there is no hope for Social Democracy.

It would be grossly unfair to lay the blame for all the present widespread discontent in Germany upon Protection. The strike riots in Berlin, Cologne, Remscheid, and Bremen within one year show how the traditional spirit of obedience to authority is breaking down, but it is the whole Prussian System that is challenged. The masses feel that they are being crushed beneath an unholy Trinity of Protection, Militarism, and heaven-sent Monarchy. There is enough of the mailed fist in the last two without the first. All incomes of £45 a year and over must pay, in addition to the ordinary income-tax, a tax to the town (or municipality) and another to the Church. The three-class electoral system (*Dreiklassenwahl-system*), which excludes the masses from a fair share of political power and strengthens an oppressive bureaucracy, is another source of extreme irritation. But the tariff is a part also, and a very important part, of the Prussian System.

CHAPTER VIII

NATIONAL INSURANCE

BISMARCK'S views on the relationship between the State and the individual were characteristically Prussian. In his speeches and private letters, whenever he refers to the schools, military service, Government monopolies of certain articles of consumption and similar questions, he shows a distinct leaning toward State paternalism. On 2nd April, 1881, he told the Reichstag that he was "no adherent of laissez-faire doctrines of the individualism of the Manchester school, of the principle that every man who is not strong enough to stand on his own feet must be trodden down." On 17th November of the same year the Emperor William I said in his message to the Reichstag:—

"In February last we expressed the conviction that social disorders cannot be healed solely by suppressing the excesses of the Social Democrats, but that at the same time we must take positive measures to advance the welfare of the workers. . . .

"The draft bill for insuring the working classes against accident has already been placed before the Federal States, and it has now been recast in accordance with the discussions in the Reichstag."

The method by which the Government intended to make provision for wage-earners was the establishment of a comprehensive system of national insurance against sickness, accident, and invalidity. But it was found impossible to put all these under one law from the first. The Reichstag passed first, as being the most important, the Bill providing for insurance against sickness. The Acts providing for insurance against Accident (1884) and Invalidity (1889) came later.

The following is an outline of the broad features of the three branches of insurance.

SICK INSURANCE

All persons, without respect to age or sex, who are employed in factories, mines, building trades, transport, or manual labour, and who receive a yearly wage or salary of 2000 marks or less, are legally bound to insure.

Exceptions:

(*a*) Those persons who, owing to the nature of the occupation or to the agreement under which they are working, are only to be employed for one week.
(*b*) Chemists' assistants.
(*c*) Members of the employer's family not working under contract.
(*d*) Domestic servants.
(*e*) Those employed in Agriculture or Forestry.

Those who are not legally liable to insure may be accepted by the local organisations, after doctor's examination and on payment of contributions; but their employers are not bound to pay any proportion of the amount.

The system is so arranged that every person who is obliged to insure belongs to a sick fund (*Krankenkasse*). The individual cannot join any sick fund he likes, but must join that one provided by law for his class of work or his district.

The amount of the contribution is based on the average daily wage for the class of work for which the fund is established, provided the wage is not over four marks or under the average paid in the district. The contribution of the worker must not exceed three per cent of the wage; but he can later, if the employer and the other members of the fund agree, pay four per cent. Of the total contribution the employer pays one-third and the insured two-thirds.

In case of sickness the minimum benefit is free medical treatment. If the insured is unable to follow his occupation he also receives, after the third day, for every working day during which he is sick, a payment equal to at least half the average daily wage of the members of the fund. If the sickness last twenty-six weeks the insured is no longer paid from the sick-fund, but receives the *Krankenrente*, that is, a monthly payment from the Invalid Insurance fund.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE

The classes of workers legally liable to insure are dealt with in five Acts, and the lists, with the exceptions and provisos, are fairly complicated. Most of those liable are included in the following classes :

(*a*) All manual labourers, and all other employees whose yearly salary or wage does not exceed 3000 marks, who are employed in Mining, Saltworks, Factories, Quarries, Wharves and Dockyards, Breweries, and Foundries.

(*b*) In certain cases masons, carpenters, slaters, locksmiths, chimney-sweeps, window-cleaners, and butchers.

(*c*) Post, Telegraph, and Railway employees.

(*d*) Those employed in warehouses and cellars, and those engaged in loading and packing.

(*e*) Those employed in Agriculture and Forestry whose yearly wage or salary does not exceed 3000 marks.

(*f*) Those employed for wages on German ships, or engaged in a seafaring occupation, or employed as pilots or in German harbours.

Contributions.

The fund for Accident Insurance is provided by—

(*a*) Employers' Unions.

(*b*) In certain special cases, the Empire or the Federal States.

(*c*) In certain cases, local councils and other public corporations.

Disbursements.

The benefits to the insured are:

(*a*) Free medical treatment.

(*b*) In case of the complete incapacity of the insured 66⅔ per cent of his annual wage while the incapacity lasts. In case of partial incapacity, a proportionate amount is assessed.

(*c*) In case of death, a payment to the family of the insured equal to one-fifteenth of the yearly income, minimum 50 marks. The widow till death or remarriage, and each child till fifteen years old receive one-twentieth of the yearly wage.

INVALIDITY INSURANCE

The following must insure:

(*a*) All persons, male or female, German subjects or foreigners, who, as manual workers, assistants, apprentices or servants, are employed for wages, irrespectively of the amount of the wage.

(*b*) Commercial employees, overseers, assistants, apprentices (except chemists' assistants), teachers; so far as the wage or salary is not over 2000 marks per annum.

(*c*) In certain cases, seamen.

Government officials who have already made other provision equal to that required by the Act are exempt.

Contributions.

The fund is made up partly by Imperial subsidy and partly by contributions paid by employers and workers in equal shares. There are five classes of contributions based upon the amount of the worker's wages (*Lohnklasse*).

Class	I.	850	marks annually	pays	14	pfg. weekly
„	II.	350–550	„	„	20	„
„	III.	550–850	„	„	24	„
„	IV.	850–1150	„	„	30	„
„	V.	1150	„	„	36	„

(1 pfennig = ½d. approximately.)

Disbursements.

(*a*) The Government adds 50 marks yearly to the amount for which the worker was originally insured.

(*b*) The amount of the "original insurance" (*Grundbetrag*) is based on the yearly wage (*Lohnklasse*), and varies from 60 marks to 100 marks yearly.

(*c*) For every week for which the insured has contributed the yearly payment is increased. This addition varies from 3 pfennige to 12 pfennige for each week, according to the *Lohnklasse*.

Invalidity pay (*Invalidenrente*) is allowed only to persons whose capacity for work, in consequence of age, sickness, or other infirmity, is permanently reduced to less than a third. The so-called Old-age

Pension (*Altersrente*) is paid out of the Invalidity Insurance fund. But the amount is calculated on a different basis from that applied to Invalidity pay. Those claiming the *Altersrente* must have completed their seventieth year. The amounts paid are :

(*a*) 50 marks yearly from the Imperial Treasury.
(*b*) 60 to 150 marks yearly according to the *Lohnklasse.*

PROPOSED EXTENSIONS OF INVALIDITY INSURANCE

When the Invalidity Insurance Act was passed, in 1889, *Privatbeamten*, that is, commercial employees and assistants, protested strongly against their being compelled to contribute to this form of insurance. The Central Union of Commercial Employees (Zentralverband der Handlungsgehilfer) and the German Technical Workers' Union (Deutscher Technikerverband) declared that it was altogether opposed to their interests. The Act was made applicable only to commercial employees earning 2000 marks or less per annum. But the *Privatbeamten* are now clamouring to be included in the Invalidity Insurance. A Bill is at present before the Reichstag extending this insurance to commercial employees, with certain exceptions, whose annual salary does not exceed 5000 marks.

INSURANCE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT

" The providing for the unemployed is undoubtedly one of the most pressing, but also one of the most

difficult problems of present-day society. It is not here a question of vagabonds and beggars that shirk work, for they can be dealt with in labour colonies and institutions where they will be forced to work and by proper training brought back to an orderly life. The question here concerns those victims of our economic development who would gladly accept work if they could find it. When hundreds of thousands of able-bodied men lie idle it is not only a serious encroachment upon our nation's weal, but much more serious is the loss in moral strength and stability which the whole people suffers." (Franz Hitze, *Die Arbeiterfrage und die Bestrebungen zu ihrer Lösung*, 1902, p. 157.)

Denmark is the only country where the State has carried through a complete scheme of National Insurance against unemployment, but there the magnificent organisation of the workers in trade unions proved of great assistance to the Government.

In 1893 the Canton Berne (Switzerland) appointed a commission to draw up a scheme for insurance against unemployment, and a system, considerably altered and amended in various ways since, was introduced, under which a fund, made up from three sources:

(*a*) the town treasury,
(*b*) workers' contributions,
(*c*) voluntary donations,

was established. In 1901 Ghent (Belgium) elaborated a scheme for helping the workless, the principle fol-

lowed being the supplementing by a grant from the town treasury of the allowance made by the trade union or the benefit society.

The cities or municipalities in Germany that have so far tried to mitigate the distress caused by unemployment are: Cologne, Strassburg, Munich, Dresden, Cassel, Düsseldorf, Lübeck, Karlsruhe, Leipzig, Elberfeld and Barmen, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Altenburg, Erlangen, Mayence, Mulhausen i. E., Freiburg i. Br., Charlottenburg, and Schöneberg.

In Munich in 1909 71,000 M. was paid to the unemployed between the middle of January and the middle of March. Strassburg paid 6300 M. in the winter of 1907–8, Schöneberg paid 55,000 M. in the winter 1909–10. In the winter of 1908–9 Düsseldorf spent 500,000 M. on relief works, which was about 300,000 M. above the actual value of the work.

As early as 1896 the Municipality of Cologne had organised a fund ("Stadt Kölnische Versicherungskasse gegen Arbeitslosigkeit im Winter") for insuring masons, carpenters, and others employed in the building trades who happened to be thrown out of work in the winter months. This fund is administered by a committee on which the municipal council, the Labour Exchange, the workers insured, and the voluntary contributors are represented. The details of the system have been considerably modified since it was first introduced. Originally employers of labour and other citizens contributed £5000 to form

an insurance fund, and the municipality voted an additional £1250. The third source of contribution was the amount paid by the insured workers. To become entitled to the insurance money the employee must—

(*a*) Be at least eighteen years old.
(*b*) Have a regular trade or occupation.
(*c*) Have lived in the district for at least twelve months.
(*d*) Have contributed from 3¾d. to 5d. weekly for thirty-four weeks.

And he cannot receive the insurance money if he—

(*a*) Is unemployed through illness or accident (because the Imperial insurance covers these cases).
(*b*) Is on strike.
(*c*) Has been dismissed through his own fault.
(*d*) Has refused work.
(*e*) Has knowingly sent in false returns to the council.

If these two sets of conditions, negative and positive, are fulfilled, the insured receives, if unemployed during the months December to March, two marks a day for the first twenty days and one mark a day afterwards till the end of the season.

Strassburg was the first German city to introduce a system for all trades and all seasons. There the Town Council supplements by 50 per cent the amount paid by the trade unions to their unemployed members.

This subject has received a good deal of attention in Bavaria. A commission appointed by the State Government drew up a lengthy report in 1909, which was, on the whole, favourable to the principle of using public money to assist the workless. For some months the Munich Town Council has been considering a system for helping the workless. It is proposed to create a municipal fund from three sources :

(*a*) a contribution from the city,
(*b*) contributions from employees,
(*c*) voluntary subscriptions,

and to pay three marks a day to unemployed married men and two marks to unmarried men, during certain periods, not to exceed eight weeks in any one year. Great powers are to be left to the magistrates in deciding who are to receive benefits under the proposed scheme.

But it is in Schöneberg, a suburb of Berlin, that the most comprehensive of the German municipal schemes for assisting the workless is now to be found. In 1910 the corporation appointed a committee of fifteen, under the presidency of Herr Stadrat Hermann Leidig, to investigate and report upon the unemployed question. A scheme was submitted and adopted, and came into force at the beginning of 1911. Until a system of national insurance is introduced, or until Greater Berlin adopts a system of unemployed insurance, but at the latest until

31st March, 1913, the municipality grants an annual sum of fifteen thousand marks to assist those out of work. The principle of assistance is similar to that adopted in Strassburg—the municipality supplements by 50 per cent the amount paid by the trade unions to their unemployed members; but the amount paid by the municipality is not to exceed one mark daily to any one person. All male workers and employees who are not members of unions, but who are liable to contribute to the National Invalidity Insurance Fund, may insure at the municipal savings bank. In case of unemployment they receive from the municipality 50 per cent of what they withdraw from the bank under the insurance clause, but this supplementary amount shall not exceed one mark daily. The Labour Exchange, representing both employers and workmen, has proved of great service to the municipality in the administration of the system. Only those unemployed are entitled to payment out of the fund who—

(*a*) Have not been dismissed through their own fault.
(*b*) Are not on strike.
(*c*) Have not refused suitable work. (The decision of the Labour Exchange as to whether the work offered is suitable or not is final.)
(*d*) Report themselves to the Labour Exchange daily during unemployment.

Male employees who are liable to the Invalidity Insurance, but who do not, for any reason, come

under the preceding provisions for pecuniary assistance during periods of unemployment, may obtain, between 1st October and 31st March, tickets entitling them to receive meals at the public restaurant.

To some of the above schemes the term "insurance" is not strictly applicable. Only the State can elaborate a scheme of compulsory insurance against unemployment. Herr Liedig well says that though there are individuals who regard regular systems for supporting the workless as altogether unnecessary, it is generally found that these individuals themselves are living in comparative comfort. As the individual worker, he continues, has no influence whatever on the fluctuations of the labour market, justice demands that the community which approves of the existing economic conditions should do something for those injured by them.[1]

The question of including unemployment insurance in the existing national system has been before the Reichstag several times during the past ten years. On 31st January, 1902, a resolution was carried praying the Chancellor to appoint a commission consisting of Members of the Reichstag and the State Parliaments, and of employers of labour, to report on the question of unemployment and the best means of providing against it. The Federal Council, however, opposed the appointment of a commission, and prayed the Chancellor to obtain from the Imperial

[1] *Die Arbeitslosenunterstützung der Stadt Schöneberg*, pp. 17, 18.

Statistical Department particulars concerning the proposals hitherto made and the data and statistics collected with a view to counteracting the effects of unemployment. Herr Molkenbuhr, one of the Socialist Members of the Reichstag, proposed to bring unemployment insurance within the provisions of the Invalidity Insurance. Others have suggested that a special fund might be created and administered in conjunction with the Accident Insurance. Dr. Moritz Wagner points out that one difficulty in the way of this proposal is the fact that only certain specified workers are included in the Accident Insurance, whereas any scheme for helping the unemployed must include all workers. After discussing and criticising a great many suggestions, he says :—

" All these considerations have convinced me that general systematic provision for the workless based upon fairly uniform principles is not to be looked for through workers' unions either at present or indeed, for that matter, in the distant future." (*Frage der Arbeitslosenfürsorge in Deutschland*, p. 73.)

The prevailing opinion is that the only adequate solution of the unemployed difficulty will be the creation of an Imperial system of insurance. In September, 1899, the German Radical Party (Deutsche Volkspartei) decided that " Insurance against Unemployment " should be part of its political programme. The state of the National

Exchequer seems to be blocking the way to the immediate incorporation of insurance against unemployment in the existing schemes; but it is likely that, in spite of all "impossibilities," the matter will be thrashed out with characteristic German thoroughness as soon as the present financial difficulties have disappeared.

CHAPTER IX

SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION

If it is true that one of the commonest cries of the German Radical politician is "Look at England!" it is equally true that educationists in England and Australia are constantly crying out "Look at Germany!" But the German school organisation is part of the German system, reflecting the national characteristics and harmonising with the national temperament. The tendency towards scheme, co-ordination, is seen here just as it is seen in the national insurance and the military training. This tendency, fortunately, cannot be transplanted in its entirety to other countries. They must adjust their educational organisation from time to time in accordance with practical requirements and in the light of their own existing institutions and their own historical development.

As the Federal Constitution of 1871 did not bring the schools under Imperial control, each State has its own school-system. In 1875, however, an Imperial School Commission was established. This Commission represents all the States, and has helped considerably

to mould the various systems in the direction of unification.

The Prussian schools, like those in most other European countries, were originally in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church, and their main end was the formation of a good religious character. A knowledge of Latin, especially ecclesiastical Latin, was the principal medium through which this end was to be reached. After the efforts to free not only the schools but religion in general from the pressure of the Catholic Church had been partially successful, the schools passed into the hands of the Reformers. The Bible became one of the principal subjects of study. As in England until quite recently, boys were encouraged to look upon a high position in the Divinity class as something specially worth aiming at. A knowledge of Latin and Greek and Divinity was the hall-mark of culture. But scientific discovery and the growing intercourse between nations were slowly working to break in upon both clerical and classical influence in the school.

As early as 1794 the Prussian Government issued regulations concerning public instruction. The main features of these regulations were the recognition of the principle of State control and compulsory attendance. The three following sections are of interest :—

1. Schools and universities are institutions which belong to the State and which have for their

aim the instruction of youth in useful knowledge and science.

43. Every Prussian subject who cannot, or will not, provide the necessary instruction for his children in his own home, is required to send them after their fifth year to the public school.

50. The school discipline must never be so strict as to effect injuriously, even in the remotest degree, the health of the children.

The influence of the great Swiss, Pestalozzi (1746–1827), also made against Clericalism. He was one of the pioneers of Naturalism as opposed to the arid, soul-withering Formalism which he found in the schools. The child, he insisted, must, above all things, be helped to develop its individuality, not set to learn by rote and to repeat day after day Bible texts and Catechism. He was visited by Fichte, Fröbel, the father of the kindergarten, Karl Ritter, and other German philosophers and educationists, and his influence spread irresistibly over Prussia.

Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824) and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) were also among the early advocates of curtailing the influence of the Church and the cleric in the school. For a little more than a year (1809–10) Humboldt was at the head of the Prussian Department of Public Instruction, and even in that short period he did much to organise and improve higher education.

But the complete reorganisation of the training colleges and of the elementary schools dates from the "General Regulations" issued on 15th October, 1872, by Adalbert Falk, Prussian Minister of Public Instruction. Falk himself was strongly anti-Catholic, and he declared his intention "to free the school entirely from the influence of the Church," a feat which he certainly did not accomplish. Nevertheless the Regulations introduced important improvements into the Training Colleges. They raised the miserable salaries of the teachers, increased the number of teachers, provided for special courses of instruction in educational theory, and for the erection of physical and chemical laboratories in the Colleges.

THE AIM-POINT OF GERMAN EDUCATION

"The traditions and temperament of a people have to be considered in relation to any really thorough educational inquiry. This will be best illustrated by contrasting, for example, the German educational atmosphere with the American, and will throw some light upon the sense in which the term *range of inquiry* must be understood. The German organisation is throughout on a military basis, America on an industrial; the one country is aristocratic in its traditions, the other democratic. Social movement in the one is mainly, if one may so speak, in well-defined horizontal strata, and translation upward is subject to some resistance; in the other there is free movement vertically."—G. H. Knibbs, F.R.A.S., Australian Government Statistician.

Mr. G. H. Knibbs was one of the Commissioners appointed a few years ago by the New South Wales Government to visit Europe and the United States and study the various systems of education, to report on them and make such recommendations to the Government as they deemed advisable. Running through the Commissioners' Report is the central idea above stated—that the spirit guiding educational effort is a reflex of the mind of the people, and that the principles which underlie institutions are of vastly more importance than their mechanism. Nevertheless, no plea of national idiosyncrasy should blind us to the fact that some nations are, as nations, better educated than others, and bad educational systems and institutions should not be defended on the ground that the mind of a people is individualistic or socialistic, commercial or artistic, aristocratic or democratic, as the case may be. The outstanding characteristic of the German School system is co-ordination, organisation; but the perfectness of the organisation is due to the universal recognition of the value of education as a condition of national development. There are not wanting able critics in Germany who declare that education has become too schematised and methodised, and that more scope for free play would prove beneficial. On one point there is no room for doubt—neither the English people nor the Australian will ever have a co-ordinated system equal to Germany's until they recognise as

fully as the Germans do the value of education to the Empire. That recognition is, as the lawyers say, a "condition precedent."

The principle underlying German education is the maintenance of class distinctions and the organisation of all classes for purposes of Empire. The goodness or badness of the principle is not here considered. To understand the education of a country we must have regard to its ideals, its history, and its institutions, and not to the subjects taught in the schools. Nearly ten years ago Baron de Haulleville, of Belgium, writing on the Germans in Brussels, said :—

"The elementary schools of Germany are, on the whole, the best in Europe. Children there learn to fear God and respect authority. . . . Combine the marvellous system of technical education with this education in the elementary schools and with disciplinary training, and you have the secret of the present power of Germany, political and economic, with its future inevitable consequences."

In education, as in all other departments of public and private life, the Englishman has a strong aversion to cut-and-dried theories, to plan and formula. His schools, like his political Constitution, show a slow continuance, irregular growth, precedents being modified from time to time to suit particular cases, and his belauded spirit of compromise playing a conspicuous rôle. Private enterprise and freedom of contract are dear to the English heart. Educational

chaos is preferable to hasty legislation. German schools and educational institutions, on the other hand, are organised on national, if not democratic, lines. And unless *national* opinion in Great Britain and Australia undergoes a change in regard to educational outlook and policy the consequences of inferiority may prove nationally serious. We cannot blindly copy Germany or any other country, but we can admit the need of reform in the direction of making it difficult for the bogus "D.D." or "M.A." to undertake the work of teaching our youth. However strongly we may insist on the principle that the State should not lightly tamper with individual liberty, still we *have* made public provision for educating our children, and having gone so far we should take care not only that State teachers are properly trained and State schools properly equipped, but also that private schools and teachers are prevented from defrauding both parent and child. The present go-as-you-please attitude towards education in England and Australia is not true individualism, it is merely the encouragement of quackery, and now, when we are called upon to face the superior industrial and commercial training of the German, its effects on the welfare of the Empire are being keenly felt. Especially is Germany superior to Great Britain in scientific and technical education. In England a knowledge of Latin and Greek is still regarded as the hall-mark of culture, and many men who pass for educated have

neither sympathy with science nor appreciation of its value to the State. Such has been the influence of the "Great Public Schools" which have done so much, we are told, to create the "public school spirit" and to build up manly character, that the whole English national outlook in regard to science has been affected. For the country has to a large extent been directly governed by alumni of these schools—in some of which science subjects are still known as "Stinks"—as well as indirectly influenced by their class. In Germany the Ministers and the leaders of industry and commerce have, as a rule, had a good all-round education in a State institution, and know the supreme value of science to the nation. The building up of manly character, truly, is the end of all education. But it cannot be built up to its highest on prejudice against the spirit of progress.

To sum up—as compared with the German aim-point in education, Great Britain and Australia are especially defective in their—

(*a*) Provision for the training of teachers.
(*b*) Outlook in regard to science.
(*c*) Control of private schools.
(*d*) Control of the youth of both sexes after they leave the primary school.

TRAINING OF TEACHERS

In any system of education the most important item is the equipment of the teacher. In Germany

the State takes the greatest care to see that all teachers are efficient. Private schools are under strict Government inspection. In England and Australia attendance at school is compulsory up to a certain age, but any person can open a school. There is no inquiry made as to the teacher's qualifications or the suitableness of the school-buildings. This second point is of the greatest importance. School hygiene—the lighting, heating, and ventilation of the room, use of suitable furniture, and especially of proper seats—is a matter requiring serious study and attention. In Australia, where, in proportion to the population, the State spends more on education than Germany does, the absence of adequate provision and regulations for controlling private schools has to some extent frustrated the efforts of public men to make the school system national and efficient. In New South Wales the number of D.D.'s, M.A.'s, and B.A.'s who have bought diplomas from American degree-factories and started "colleges" has become a matter of public scandal. Others have prefixed the title "Reverend" to their names, and their speciality as educational experts is "careful attention to the moral and spiritual welfare of the children." German methods cannot be, and ought not to be, carried intact to England or Australia; but something can easily be done to make it difficult for bogus "Reverends" and "M.A.'s" to thrive on the innocence and weakness of childhood. An unlicensed plumber is liable

to severe penalties for making an alteration to a drain or water-pipe, but any man can style himself "Reverend" or affix the letters "M.A." to his name and undertake the work of educating our boys and girls, and light-heartedly depreciate the greatest asset which the State possesses!

The German schoolmaster has been carefully prepared for his work. The two principal training institutions are the Preparatory Training Colleges (*Präparandenanstalten*) and the *Seminarien*. Pupils generally leave the primary schools in their fourteenth year. Those who intend to take up teaching as a profession then enter a Training College for a two years', or, in most cases, a three years' course. Then, on passing an examination, they enter a *Seminar*. In Prussia and Württemberg the course is for three years, in Bavaria two years. The aim of the *Seminar* is, as stated in the Prussian official regulations, "to give the student such a groundwork of general culture as will fit him to become an expert teacher in the State schools." At the end of the course the student undergoes an examination, partly written, partly oral, the subjects being: Theory of Education, Religion, German, History, Modern Languages, and School Method with special reference to the subjects taught in the Primary School.

The German system of training teachers recognises above all things that instruction is not education, but only a means to it, and that mere book knowledge

is no substitute for width of mental horizon, sympathy, inspiring personality; that these do far more than mere erudition in the way of building up character. Such special training as the German teacher receives is almost a guarantee of efficiency, but a university degree in itself implies nothing of the kind. It is regarded as specially important that the teacher should possess a good knowledge of:

(*a*) Theory of Education.
(*b*) History of Education, particularly in Germany.
(*c*) Psychology and Ethics in their bearing on education and child-study.
(*d*) Elementary Physiology, and Physical culture in relation to education.
(*e*) School Hygiene.

The pupil-teacher system under which children give instruction to children is at variance with all sound educational theory, and utterly fails to realise what is involved in the expression "educative process."

THE KINDERGARTEN

The Right Reverend Dr. Vaughan, one time Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, New South Wales, is reported to have said that his Church wanted complete control of its children until they were seven years old. Granting the premises—that the Catholic Church is the only true Church, and that proper religious training is the most important part of the child's education—Archbishop Vaughan

was perfectly right.[1] Friedrich Fröbel, the great pupil of Pestalozzi and the founder of the Kindergarten, insisted time after time, with all the vigour of his powerful and original mind, that the education received during the first seven years profoundly affects the subsequent career of the child, and that therefore the importance of devoting the most serious attention to the child during this period cannot be overestimated. Fröbel's views were clearly set forth in his *Menschenerziehung* ("Education of Man"), published in 1826, though his first kindergarten was not founded until eleven years later.

In Germany infant teaching is looked upon as a matter requiring special study, serious preparation, and educated teachers. Some idea of this seriousness may be gained from the latest report of the Berliner Verein für Volkserziehung, Pestalozzi Fröbelhaus (Berlin Institution for Educating the People). The course of instruction for kindergarten teachers lasts two years and embraces the following subjects:

1. Psychology.
2. Theory of Education.
3. History of Pedagogy.
4. Theory of the Kindergarten.
5. Hygiene.
6. Theory of Instruction.
7. German Language.
8. Fröbelian occupations.
9. Drawing.
10. Manual work.
11. Singing.
12. Gymnastics and games.
13. Kindergarten practice.
14. Physical care of children (bathing, cooking, foods).

[1] Cf. Schopenhauer, "Psychological Observations."

Though the founder of the Kindergarten was himself a German, the system was not at first received with favour in Germany. In fact, it was suppressed in Prussia. It was, however, reinstated, chiefly through the influence of the Baroness von Marenholtz-Bülow. There are to-day in Saxony alone about three hundred kindergartens, while Bavaria also has a very large number of infant schools organised on kindergarten lines (*Kleinkinderbewahranstalten*).

The Pestalozzian principle of education is that the child's faculties are developed by *exercise*, the Fröbelian is rather that the child's self-activity (*Selbstätigkeit*) must be developed through his play by the directive effort of a teacher who has studied child-psychology.

In Germany the tendency is to avoid a too slavish and mechanical acceptance of Fröbel. It is rightly pointed out that the great pedagogue himself always insisted that there should be freedom and progress in education as in other matters.

It is recognised that kindergartens should be true to their name, and large playgrounds with trees and shrubs and gardens well laid out are a feature of those in the larger towns.

The kindergarten system is not to be estimated according to the knowledge, the number of facts which the child learns, but according to the mental and moral habits exemplified in the "garden" and impressed on the child; it is this rousing of interest, of

alertness of mind, that will ultimately lead to independent and vigorous thinking. The essence of the system is to be sought in its ethic.

PRIMARY SCHOOLS

The New Regulations (1872), so far as they affected the *Volksschulen*, aimed at the amalgamation, wherever possible, of two or more one-class schools into a single school with several classes and several teachers. The subjects to be taught are given in Regulation 8:—

"The subjects taught in the Primary School are: Religion, German (including Speaking, Reading, Writing), Arithmetic, with the elements of mensuration, Drawing, History, Geography, Natural History, Singing; and for boys, Gymnastics, for girls, Domestic Economy."

Slight additions and alterations have been introduced from time to time since 1872. At present the child begins school on the completion of his or her sixth year. The leaving age is indefinite. The Regulations contemplate an eight years' course, and then a large number of the boys enter the Continuation Schools.

Two further points deserve special mention. In some places forest schools, opened from May to October, have been erected for weak children and those suffering from chronic diseases. The first forest school was built in 1904 by the Charlottenburg

City Council. Since then the movement has become very popular. Mülhausen and München-Gladbach followed in 1906, Elberfeld in 1907, Dortmund and Lübeck in 1908, Husum in 1910, and this year new forest schools will be opened in Fürth, Dresden, Berlin, and Munich. In Mülhausen no fees are charged; in the other places the fees vary, but are small, and in no case do they cover the cost of administration. Secondly, in most primary schools there are special "help-classes" for backward boys and girls. Well-directed effort to help a large number of such pupils will give better results than cramming a few brilliant boys for examinations. The whole question of the education of weak-minded children and those of anti-social tendencies is receiving wide attention in Germany. Men specially qualified, by nature and by study, for the work of training these children, are held in high repute. The teaching is along individual lines, for each child presents peculiarities and special difficulties.

In Prussia most of the *Volksschulen* are free, but in some districts a small fee (about sixpence a month) is charged. Even the books needed are given to the children in cases where parents sign a written declaration that they are too poor to buy them.

CONTINUATION SCHOOLS

Evening schools, intended to help young students to extend, or at least consolidate, what they had

learned at the primary schools, date back to the eighteenth century. Continuation Schools (*Fortbildungsschulen*) are now found all over the German Empire, and are a well-organised part of the educational system. In Prussia since 1884 these schools have been administered, not by the Department of Public Instruction, but by the Department of Trade and Industry. In the Commercial Continuation Schools, where six hours' instruction is given weekly, German, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Drawing are taught. In those schools with four hours' weekly instruction the only subjects taught are German and Arithmetic. Throughout Saxony attendance at the continuation schools is compulsory. In Prussia the practice in regard to compulsion varies in different districts. Under Section 120 of the Regulations issued by the Department of Trade and Industry the municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are allowed to make rules compelling apprentices and male commercial employees under eighteen years of age to attend a certain number of lessons monthly, and fining employers who prevent their assistants from attending. In nearly all cases the employers co-operate heartily with the schools. The State-subsidy to the school is generally conditional upon the enforcement of compulsory attendance by the municipality. A Bill is now before the Prussian State Parliament conferring power to enforce attendance on municipalities with 10,000 inhabitants, and to

make the regulations applicable to females as well as males.

England may well consider how far such schools are a great national asset. Nation must fight nation on cultural grounds. Whether so much regulating and compulsion will run counter to English character is a question for English statesmen to deal with. Personally I may say that all this method and discipline and regimentation is distasteful to me. Yet I have seen enough of England to know that a large proportion of the rising generation is not educated at all. Thousands of boys leave school too early, and they do not subsequently become equipped to play any part as units of the national life, except, perhaps, as drags upon the bodily and mental health of the community.

THE MIDDLE SCHOOL

The *Mittelschule* stood intermediate between the Primary and the High School. The same subjects were taught as in the *Volksschule*, but the instruction was along more advanced lines.

Through the new Ministerial Regulations issued 3rd February, 1910, to come into force this year, the Middle School is almost completely reorganised. These Regulations say that the developments of recent years "in the provinces of manual labour, skilled industry, and trade, demand a higher and better training for boys and girls," that the Middle

School is "for practical work and for training those who are entering upon an industrial life," and that "the instruction in all departments shall look to the materials and relations with which the student will be concerned in his or her later life." In the newly organised schools only one foreign language is taught, not two, as in the High Schools, and the preference is given to English, and not, as heretofore, to French, "because Germany has considerably more intercourse, commercial and industrial, with the nations that speak English than with France." Boys are also taught modelling, working in pasteboard and in metal, book-keeping, and the most useful elements of mercantile arithmetic. Many commercial men are now advocating the addition of shorthand and typewriting to the list of subjects.

THE GYMNASIUM

"The special aim of the Gymnasium is undoubtedly to provide the necessary preparation for the study of sciences at the Universities" (K. V. Raumer, *History of Pedagogy*). But apart from this aim the Gymnasium provides "a higher culture" (*eine höhere Bildung*) for many students who do not proceed to the University. The curriculum has undergone various slight alterations during the past twenty years, but classical study remains the outstanding feature of these institutions. In May, 1901, a new *Lehrplan* for the Prussian Gymnasien was drawn

up. According to the present arrangement Latin receives 68 hours a week, Greek 36, Natural Sciences 18. In Bavaria Latin receives 66 hours, Greek 36, and Mathematics and Physics 33. The Gymnasien remain, in fact, classical schools, though science, which at one time received short shrift from the humanists and philologists, is being more and more recognised as an essential part of the equipment of a truly educated man or woman.

THE REALGYMNASIUM

This institution represents the efforts of those educationists who, while appreciating the value of the old classical studies, wanted to see more stress laid upon the modern, the scientific, side of instruction. A prominent place is still given to Latin, but considerable attention is also given to Modern Languages, Mathematics, and natural science. Herr Ehrhardt says :—

" At the basis of the instruction and the curriculum is the effort to provide for the requirements of practical life, without, however, fully abandoning the historic principles of the higher culture. The Realgymnasium therefore stands in an intermediate position between the Gymnasium and the Oberrealschule " (*Unser Schulwesen*, p. 103).

THE OBERREALSCHULE

This institution is marked off from the two preceding by the complete omission of Latin and Greek

from its curriculum. The subjects to which, according to the syllabus in use in the majority of these schools, most attention is given are: Mathematics, French Language, German Language and History, Natural Science.

In accordance with an Imperial decree dated 26th November, 1900, the *Oberrealschule* is to be considered as equal in value to the *Gymnasium* and the *Realgymnasium* "from the point of view of general culture."

"The aim of the decree is to extend the privileges of institutions with a non-classical curriculum. This is the best means of giving these institutions a higher standing and of improving their attendance. The decree should also work to encourage the study of science and practical subjects."

To the *Oberrealschule*, and to every secondary school, scientific laboratories are attached with up-to-date apparatus for teaching chemistry and physics.

The fees charged by these three institutions vary throughout the Empire, but they average about 105 marks a year.

GIRLS' SCHOOLS

Originally the daughters of the gentry received from the teachers in the nunneries a fair general education according to the standard of the times. These institutions were abolished by the Reformers,

and for a considerable time the higher education of girls and women was completely neglected. Paulsen says that this neglect partly accounts for the fact that German society was, as compared with that of Paris, a society of men until well into the eighteenth century. The beginning of the nineteenth century, which brought with it so many "reform movements," saw also a growing desire on the part of women for a share in the culture of the times, and a number of "high-class daughters' schools" and private schools for girls sprang into existence. The German Association for the Organisation of Higher Girls' Schools (Deutscher Verein für das höhere Mädchen-Schulwesen) was formed in Weimar in 1872. This Association now has branches all over Germany, with a total membership of over 5000. There are to-day nearly 400 public and over 1000 private Higher Girls' Schools with a total attendance of considerably over 200,000 scholars. All the private schools are of course subject to strict Government supervision.

Herr Karl Ehrhardt says:—

"In order to do justice to the claims of the various social classes [1] there are Middle and Higher Schools for girls side by side with the Primary School. The characteristic of the Girls' Middle School is the introduction of only one foreign language into the

[1] "Um den Anforderungen der verschiedenen Stände gerecht zu werden"—a characteristic German notion.

curriculum. The Higher School receives girls who have attained the required school age, provides a nine years' course, and seeks, partly by teaching two foreign languages and partly by giving general instruction of a deeper nature, to impart a higher culture" (*Unser Schulwesen*, p. 117).

The subjects to which most time is devoted in the higher schools are: German, French, Religion, Singing. Others which claim somewhat less attention are: English, History, Natural Science, Drawing, Geography, and Needlework.

TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS

These "schools" are really universities devoted exclusively to practical science and technology. The great advance of science during the nineteenth century, and its influence on industry, agriculture, and commerce required the establishment of such institutions. These technical High Schools confer a degree, the Doctor of Engineering, and that fact alone places them on a level with the universities. There are five faculties or departments: Architecture, Building Construction, Mechanical Engineering, Chemistry, and General Science (including Mathematics and Natural Science). Those who hold the Maturity Certificate of a *Gymnasium*, *Realgymnasium* or *Oberrealschule* are admitted as students.

The ten Technical High Schools in the Empire are in Aix, Berlin, Dresden, Braunschweig, Darmstadt, Hanover, Karlsruhe, Munich, Stuttgart, and Danzig.

UNIVERSITIES AND EXAMINATIONS

No attempt can be made here to trace the historical development of the German Universities. "The Universities," says Herr Ehrhardt, "are the crown of our whole German school-organisation." That is what universities should be in every country, and their use to the nation depends very largely on the thoroughness of the work done in the secondary schools. It is this co-ordination which before all things characterises the German system. The University is not a mere teaching, examining, and degree-conferring institution, it belongs to the State and is the focus of the national science and culture. I cannot recall the name of any great German scientist or philosopher that has not passed through the University. In England we had Spencer apparently despising university degrees and Darwin declaring that his time spent at Cambridge was wasted "as far as the academical part of the studies was concerned." Lord Palmerston once referred to Germany as a country of "damned professors." Almost exactly half a century later one of the greatest educationists in France, M. Ferdinand Lot, said Germany has "a supremacy in science comparable to the naval supremacy of England." How long can that naval supremacy be held under conditions of scientific inferiority?

The value and efficiency of the University depend

on the preparatory work done by those who enter it. In the English and Australian Universities there is too much elementary teaching. In Germany this work is done in the *Gymnasium* and *Realschulen*. The University is only the pinnacle of a highly developed system. Students who go there have already learned the elements of their subjects, and they can proceed almost at once to study the most recent tendencies in all branches of science and literature. The University is a teaching and examining institution, but it should be concerned chiefly with research. The development of the genius for research, especially in science, has done more than anything else to place Germany in the forefront of the nations.

The present English and Australian system of matriculating is inferior to the German system of Maturity Certificates and Arbiturienten examinations. No one with any knowledge of these tests will deny their severity. The student who has passed the Arbiturienten examination has certainly shown that he is capable of getting the best out of the University lectures if he likes. This thorough initial equipment makes it unnecessary to hold numerous later examinations.

The qualities and aptitudes which are most valuable in pupils cannot be fully tested by a written examination. This fact is being more and more recognised by educationists in all countries. Examinations,

written and oral, are, and probably always will be, necessary for certain purposes, but they are not the be-all and end-all of education. Schools should not be turned into cram-institutions for preparing boys and girls for show. One of the worst features of the excessive attention to examination results is that it helps to kill the teacher's individuality—he has his eyes always on the examiner and the examiner's fads. Besides that, the system is a waste of the scholar's energy.

FURTHER NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Mother Tongue.

"Wir müssen als Grundlage für das Gymnasium das Deutsche nehmen. . . . Der deutsche Aufsatz muss der Mittelpunkt sein, um den sich alles dreht" (The German Emperor, December, 1890). "The mother tongue must be made the foundation of the Gymnasium. . . . The German language must be the middle point round which everything revolves."

For many years, both in England and Australia, there have been complaints that boys and girls are unable to express themselves clearly and fluently in their mother tongue. The average German boy can, I feel convinced, speak and write his own language better than the average English or Australian boy can speak and write English. The fault seems to be due mainly to the teaching in the schools, and in particular to the teaching of far too much formal

grammar; but it is also partly due to the abnormal position occupied for years by Latin and Greek in the secondary schools and universities. In 1905 English was made a compulsory subject for students wishing to matriculate at Sydney University. Latin had always been compulsory.

"Care as to the proper development of the mother tongue, based upon a recognition of the reaction of precision in expressing one's thought upon the power of clear thinking, is a feature being recognised with increasing clearness in educational circles."[1] This is certainly true of the German schools. I have often been struck with the German boy's power of explaining clearly what he means, and I have especially noted the range of his vocabulary. No doubt in England there have been changes for the better during the past few years. But no less a critic than Matthew Arnold complained several times in his official reports of the inadequacy of the average English boy's vocabulary. Quite recently an inspector stated that in the highest class in one of the Board Schools the majority of the boys could not form sentences showing the correct use of a number of fairly common words. In Germany it is fully recognised that a mastery of one's own language is the foundation of future progress.

[1] G. H. Knibbs, F.R.A.S.

Modern Languages.

There is no country where foreign languages are so much studied as in Germany. A glance at the leading features of the methods in vogue for language-learning may therefore be of interest. The number of methods or systems now in use throughout the world is legion; but they may all be brought under three main heads:

(*a*) The grammatical.
(*b*) The natural-conversational (Berlitz).
(*c*) The phonetic.

The first so-called method is mnemonic and not linguistic at all. It is rapidly falling out of use simply because it has failed to see in a modern language a living thing, but has regarded it as a collection of dry bones. The second method aims at teaching a foreign language as a child learns its mother tongue. It lays great stress on the unsatisfactory results given by all translation methods. This method contemplates the employment of only native teachers, and claims that it thus offers a substitute for a sojourn in the foreign country, with the advantage that the lessons are specially arranged and graded for the learner. The phonetic method aims at securing exact pronunciation on scientific lines. Vietor's *Language Teaching must be Reformed* ("Der Sprach-unterricht muss umkehren") appeared in 1882. This was not, of course, the first scientific treatise on

phonetics, but it attracted more than usual attention. What is aimed at is thorough scientific practice in the vowel and consonant sounds of the language to be learned. Taught by a master of the science of phonetics, it is the best of all the methods for giving a good pronunciation. Phonetic practice also improves the student's voice and helps him to reproduce sounds and thus speak his own language clearly.

The tendency of language-teaching in Germany may be summed up thus:

(*a*) Teaching at first is purely oral.
(*b*) The foreign tongue is used as much as possible from the first lesson.
(*c*) It is recognised that translations are nearly always defective, and that they sometimes convey false impressions.
(*d*) The instruction is made concrete by means of pictures and by the study of the life, customs, and history of the foreign nation.

With regard to the place which Modern Languages should occupy in the elementary schools opinions differ. The study of three or four foreign languages at once does not help much to develop the mind of a boy or girl. There is too much repetition of elementary ideas. On the other hand, the Germans believe that Modern Languages are of great value both culturally and commercially, and that their study helps to bring nations together and to keep men and women in touch with the world's progress. The study of the

ancient classics cannot do this. Moreover, a scientist or technologist to-day can hardly hope to keep abreast of the times without a fair knowledge of English, French, and German.

Classicists are fond of quoting a statement made by Professor A. W. Hofmann, the eminent chemist, in an address given at the Berlin University in 1880: "All efforts to find a substitute for the classical languages, whether in mathematics, in the modern languages, or in the natural sciences, have been hitherto unsuccessful." This contempt for the cultural value of modern literature comes from centuries of tradition. Such an outlook is narrow and unhealthy. In Germany this is being insisted upon more strenuously every day, and notwithstanding the centuries of prejudice in favour of Latin and Greek, it is seen that classical men with no serious knowledge of science and modern literature are not competent critics of their cultural value.

Corporal Punishment.

This absurd and anti-educational method of maintaining discipline is still common in the English and Australian schools. It is unknown in France, and in Germany is passing every day into greater disfavour. It is not a very uncommon thing to read in the English papers of a schoolmaster or schoolmistress being prosecuted for inflicting too severe punishment on a schoolboy. Any teacher that resorts to the cane

has missed his or her vocation. School-discipline must be secured by training the will, by directive, not repressive effort. Masters who are greatly feared are never respected, and consequently are bad teachers. What is wanted is direction and expansion, not coercion. Respect for their teachers and for one another the scholars must have; but much of what has been so highly praised as "discipline" has been in reality nothing more or less than the crushing of the pupil's individuality. Very few leading educationists in Germany to-day believe in corporal punishment at all, and hardly any believe in it as an aid to teaching. The "education of the will"—an unsatisfactory phrase, but I know of none better to express the meaning—is what the German teachers aim at, and they have been trained to aim at it in the right way. The young scholar is helped to get all he can out of his personality. Herr W. Mader, a well-known German school inspector, who was educated in France, states that there the teacher is not permitted to inflict corporal punishment, and yet discipline is quite as well maintained as it is in Germany. "Until we abolish corporal punishment in the schools we are not truly a civilised people, however much we may surpass all other cultured States in some respects."[1]

[1] "Türmer," March, 1911.

Patriotism.

If any Germans have grown up without a real love for their country, without feeling that it is their duty at all times to defend the honour of the Fatherland, the fault certainly does not lie with the schools. *Vaterländisches Gefühl* is an expression that often occurs in official regulations and in general criticisms. This *feeling* is not the same thing as the Briton's pride in the Empire. For the German, Deutschland stands for him. He is part of it.

Paulsen says :—

" It may be seen everywhere throughout the course of history that a timid and weakly foreign policy is always coupled with repression and stagnation in the domain of domestic affairs, whilst vigorous self-assertion of a nation in the world always goes hand-in-hand with the endeavour to make room for the free development of all the inward forces of national life " (*German Education*, p. 251. Translated by Lorenz.)

The " vigorous national self-assertion " here referred to is instilled into the German boy and girl as soon as they can understand the meaning of the expression. Sir George Tryon, speaking last year at the 154th anniversary celebration of the Marine Society, said :—

" Some time ago I was opening an exhibition connected with one of the largest Church schools in the South of London, and I asked the Vicar whether

he thought that patriotism was taught. 'Well,' he said, 'it's a very difficult question. The managers don't like it. It approaches too much to party politics.'"

It is not a difficult question in Germany. Nor is the patriotism instilled into the boys and girls mere respect for kings and queens. They are taught to regard the Fatherland as having the same claim upon their affection as their parents have. 'In England patriotism has been so often identified with national vaunting, and a few privileged and titled mountebanks have so often arrogated to themselves all concern for the Empire, that the term has become a by-word. I have seen one wall-sheet used in some English schools for the purpose of impressing patriotic ideas on the youthful mind. The reasons "why we should be patriots" are:

1. On account of our Sovereign, who rules with justice, equity, sympathy, and kindness, over a contented and happy people, and over an Empire on which the sun never sets.
2. On account of our laws, which are, on the whole, the best in the world, and to the rich and the poor are alike just.
3. On account of the liberty which we enjoy. This has been won for us by our forefathers after many hard struggles, and is the growth of ages. We have liberty of opinion, liberty of speech, liberty of worship, and liberty of the Press.

The reasons here given are vulgar, and inculcate a spirit of narrow prejudice. Besides, they contain statements which are not true and lay the foundation of a dangerous Jingoism. What is wanted is to give the pupils such teaching as will broaden their minds and to insist that solidarity depends not only upon national feeling, but upon a desire to perfect the nation's institutions.

I am far from defending all that is taught in Germany under the name of patriotism. The potentialities of *Deutschtum*, the German "mission" and the Imperial outlook, are sometimes impressed upon the rising generation in such a way as to create national narrowness and prejudice. However that may be, the poorest German and the severest Socialist critic of German institutions feel that Deutschland is after all their Fatherland, and that they must give it all they have, their lives if necessary, in return for what they have taken, or want to take, from it. Herr Robert Seidel, of the University of Zurich, who would probably be one of the last men that any one acquainted with his writings would call a Chauvinist, says:—

"A pressing need of the democratic State is systematic instruction in ethics and civics, that our youth may learn to know the rights and duties of a free man and to love liberty and Fatherland."

Such instruction need not lead to Jingoism, which is equally dangerous and equally vulgar on each side of the North Sea.

Sports and Physical Culture.

Gymnastic exercises are a prominent feature of all the German schools. In Saxony the aim of this part of the school programme is thus stated in the official regulations: "To promote and develop the health of the children by regular bodily exercise; by strict discipline to accustom the children to order, good behaviour, obedience, and self-control." Grace of carriage, rhythm of movement, and muscular strength are regarded as essentials for both boys and girls. Gymnastics is taught by specialists, and the halls used for this purpose are well provided with apparatus—horizontal bars, ladders, rings, racks, trapezes, and swings. The arrangements for teaching gymnastics in most of the other States are similar.

But these set exercises are part of the school discipline, and stand in an altogether different category from the outdoor sports, with their fierce emulation, which are, and I hope always will be, such a characteristic of school-life among the English-speaking peoples. A good indication of the different point of view on this question is found in the fact that in some of the German schools football was discouraged, because some of the boys had been hurt. I have also been told that, apart from accidents, some of the boys injured themselves in training. But this is no argument against football as a sport. We are not going to

abolish our tramways because men are occasionally run over.

Whether Waterloo was won or not on the Eton cricket or football fields may be a debatable question. Those brought up at the Universities and "great public schools" of England generally underrate the "rank and file" turned out by the schools where the sons of the workers only learn the three R's. But there is more than an element of truth in Wellington's remark. Any one who notes carefully the effect of sport on the English-speaking peoples will admit that field games evoke a spirit of comradeship and loyalty that can never be the outcome of gymnastic and indoor physical exercises.

Drill and fencing and turns on the bar have never given the German the ease and suppleness of the Englishman or the American or the Australian. Let those who wish to test this statement compare the movements of the German sailor with the British or American tar. The Teuton is regular, stiff, automatic, the Briton full of swing and as lithe as a willow twig.

Great attention should be given to this question of sport in the schools, and here I should like to put in a plea for teaching boys boxing. With good reason has this, one of the noblest of all sports, been called the manly art. It is a branch of athletics which exercises every muscle as no other branch can. It is a mental and moral as well as a physical discipline, demanding not only strength but, in a much greater

degree, skill and courage. This sport trains eyes, hands, feet, mind. It teaches a boy to take and to give punishment and to control his temper. Those who are fond of boxing will be clean in body and mind. This sport should be taught in the schools, and public exhibitions of it should be encouraged because they will stimulate the young spectators to learn the art themselves.

Some critics of the German higher schools complain that they stuff and cram the brain without developing the will and making manly characters, that they do not teach youth to have some conscious aim in life above the acquisition of a competency. So far as the criticism is well founded the defect complained of is traceable to the blind obedience which has been given for so many years to the theorists and the pedagogue. The encouragement of sports and games and the appointment of those who delight in them to positions in the schools would help to correct the bad tendency. In all countries and ages the followers of athletics have been the men to come forward in the hour of danger.

Sport in the above sense differs from systematic physical culture as part of the curriculum. This culture is based upon physiological science, and is taught by scientific specialists. Both are important elements of education.

Schundliteratur.

For some time schoolmasters, clergymen, and others have been fighting hard to prevent the circulation of *Schundliteratur*, that is, of books or pamphlets of the "Nick Carter," "Buffalo Bill," and "Deadwood Dick" school of fiction. I have already seen two public exhibitions of these books which are said to be almost incredibly popular among the German youth of both sexes. One Berlin publisher of *Schundliteratur* admits an annual turnover of two and a half million marks and a net profit of forty thousand marks from one threepenny edition of *Buffalo Bill*. In fact, the money earned by the publishers seems to constitute a large part of the public grievance. From what I have seen of the books I should divide them roughly into three classes: (*a*) "works" of adventure; (*b*) ghost stories; (*c*) erotic stories. With regard to the last, some of the booklets I saw were coarse, with suggestive illustrations, and only men lost to all decency would put them into the hands of boys and girls. The existing law in Germany has full power to prevent the circulation of such stories or pictures. A good many centuries ago, one who was not easily shocked said that "the greatest respect is due to boys," and the same maxim is doubtless accepted by Herr Wedekind and the thousands who have flocked to see "Spring's Awakening." But it is much harder

to express an opinion on the other two classes of *Schundliteratur*. What about ghost stories? Many scientific and educated men believe in ghosts and apparitions, and many German novels, sold at prices quite prohibitive to the schoolboy, owe a wide circulation to their clever presentment of a sensational spiritism. In the case of adventure it is also difficult to say where to draw the line. A boy who will devour a short story of the "Deadwood Dick" series probably has better taste and a more active mind than one that could enjoy wading through some of the namby-pamby published for children.

In 1908 an essay by Dr. Ernst Schultze was published in all the important German newspapers. The yearly turnover of all *Schundliteratur* in Germany was estimated by Dr. Schultze at fifty million marks. Since then a good deal has been done to check the circulation of these books, and the sale has gone down. In Leipzig and Hamburg the sale of such books in the streets was prohibited, while in Göttingen, Bremen, and other places they have been boycotted and defence committees have been formed.

The best way to solve the problem is to give boys and girls a taste for better literature and to produce good books at cheap rates. Another matter which should never be lost sight of is that the rich man's *Schundliteratur* is also injurious to the community. As far as children are concerned, they should be encouraged not to spend too much time in reading

books of any sort, but to get out into the open, to engage in sports, to make excursions into the country.

The first German reading-room for children was opened a few months ago in the Market Hall in the Arminius Platz, Maobit, Berlin. Good books, many of them well illustrated, are provided, and the room is nearly always crowded.

CHAPTER X

RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN GERMAN SCHOOLS

THE question of religious instruction in our own schools has for so long been a stumbling-block to educational progress, and has engendered so much bitterness, that a short note on religion in the German schools may be of interest. It is almost impossible to pick up a daily paper in any part of the Empire on any given day without finding some reference to the controversies on "Religion in the Schools." It will therefore be seen at once that a full account of the differences between sect and sect, or between preachers and teachers, would fill a fair-sized book.

Every student of German institutions has noted the prominence accorded to religion in the schools, and high officials seem determined to maintain it in its pride of place. The Kaiser's own views were expressed as far back as 1890, when he declared that, as King of Prussia and Chief Bishop of his Church, he would regard it as his "most sacred duty to take care that the religious sense and the spark of Christian spirit is cared for and increased

in the school." These sentiments of His Majesty are not likely to excite much wonderment. Apart from the fact that religion has always received unstinted support from "the powers that be," and that this support has always been faithfully earned, a king who, in the twentieth century, believes in the doctrine of "divine right," may well be expected to look with approval upon the present efforts of the clergy to instil piety into the mind of the Prussian youth. Nor should the opinion of the officials, or departmental heads, on such matters be accepted as necessarily right. In this, as in everything else, the official mind is notoriously inexpansive. Has the system of religious instruction in the German schools worked smoothly in practice? That is the really important question, and the answer to it must be an unequivocal negative. When religion interferes in State institutions, friction always arises unless the inhabitants of the particular country are unanimous in their religious belief. Germany, as regards her State schools, is no exception to that rule. Whether the discord is due to sectarian rivalry or to disagreement between the religious bodies and the teachers, it is an ever-present element, and the greatest sufferers are the children.

In many districts in Prussia where Protestants and Catholics are about equal in numbers, *Simultanschulen* have been established. These are sometimes referred to by English writers as "undenomi-

national schools"; but the term is misleading. *Simultanschulen* are schools where Protestant teachers give religious instruction to Protestant children, and Catholic teachers to Catholic children, while the history lessons are said to be so arranged that they cannot give offence to adherents of either faith. The system has never worked well. For years the Prussian educational authorities have been listening to grievances from one or other of the two great Christian Churches. Many efforts have been made to remove, or at any rate to smooth, these differences, but all without success. The last Act, passed a few years ago, decreed that where the *Simultanschulen* already exist, they may continue, but that new ones shall not be erected. Like all laws that try to effect a compromise between religious opponents, the Act has failed to please either side.

The Evangelischer Lehrerbund (Protestant Teachers' Union), at its annual meeting in October, 1910, laid down nine "guiding principles" of religious instruction, of which the four following are the most important :—

(1) "The right to demand religious instruction in our primary schools (and to the same extent, of course, in the high schools) belongs to the parents who send their children to the school. In this matter neither the right of the State nor that of the Church stands first, but the rights of the parents and the children."

(2) "This right is asserted not with a view to violating the rights of those holding different beliefs, but solely to protect itself from the latter."

(3) "From this standpoint not only may religious instruction be claimed, but definite dogmatic instruction. We do not, like the contending theologians of the seventeenth century, want to teach the Gospels as a hard and fast law, for this is contrary to the spirit of the Gospels themselves, nor, in opposition to the spirit of the educationist, do we want to set an abstraction in the place of a living religious faith. But we will maintain, with unshakable determination, the faith to which the Reformers bore witness, and will not fall behind their ideals, and surrender the religious progress which they fought for and won."

(4) "The charge that we are compelling the children of other people to receive such instruction as we wish to impose, though they do not desire it, is untrue, and, as far as such children are concerned, rests upon perversions of facts. It is not the Church but the State that demands that no child shall grow up without religious instruction, and it leaves a free choice among the various religions."

Now the Protestant attitude on this matter has never been definite and satisfactory, and these

"leading principles" have given rise to much discussion and much opposition. Exactly what the Catholics want in the way of religious instruction in the schools we know. Exactly what the Protestants want we do not know. The Deutscher Protestantenverein (at Darmstadt in April, 1906) opposed dogmatic teaching altogether, and demanded that the books of religious instruction used in the schools should be brought up to date. This view certainly clashes with (3) above. But neither the Protestantenverein nor the Lehrerbund says how it proposes to distinguish dogmatic from non-dogmatic teaching. Take a very simple case. It is not by any means inconceivable, nowadays, that a scholar in one of the upper classes, especially in the high schools, should ask, Is Jesus Christ the Son of God? What answer could be given that would avoid dogma? At the Berlin World Congress for free Christianity and Religious Progress (August, 1910) Professor Tröltsch, of Heidelberg, speaking "On School and Church," advocated a system of "free" religious instruction "in harmony with natural science and critical historical knowledge," and not based on dogma and ecclesiasticism. The life and person of Christ were to be the basis of moral teaching. Yet he admitted, in a later address at the same meeting, that "the person of Jesus, the life and the strength of Christians, is threatened with destruction by historical criticism."

Many of the ministers of religion, as well as some of the teachers, have asserted that all instruction to children must at first be dogmatic—that the child must accept without question the statements made by his instructors. This assertion contains a most vicious principle, and it is not warranted by the facts. All scientific exponents of education, whatever may be their differences on other matters, are agreed on one point—that the child should be encouraged to discover things for himself, and should be asked to take as little as possible on the authority of his teacher. When he is told that four times five are twenty, he is given cubes and made to prove for himself, by further calculation and rearrangement, the truth of the statement. In Geometry and other subjects practical proof is now regarded as an essential preliminary to the theoretical parts of the study. This is nothing more or less than the "natural mode of education" that Schopenhauer, nearly a century ago, was ever insisting upon.

"We should make children gradually acquainted with things and the circumstances of life, and above all we should guide them to a clear grasp of reality, and teach them to obtain their ideas directly from the real world, or to form ideas consistent with their own observations. We should not encourage them to take their ideas from books and fables or from what others tell them. Up to their sixteenth year

they should be kept from all instruction that may lead them into error, that is to say, from philosophy, religion, and generalities of every description" (*On Education*). Those who support dogmatic teaching on the ground that all the child's instruction must at first be taken on trust, know themselves that, so far from their dogmas being capable of subsequent verification, they are rejected by some of the best thought of the age. The statement (4) of the Evangelischer Lehrerbund, that neither the teachers nor the churches are to be charged with forcing religion upon the parents who do not want it for their children, that it is a regulation of the State, is no answer at all to the general objections raised to the whole system of dogmatic instruction, and it sounds a trifle hypocritical to those who know how the ministers of religion and many of the teachers have for years been asserting that morality will be endangered if religious teaching is excluded from the schools.

In all parts of the German Empire we find the same antagonisms, and the same bitterness. In the "free" town, Bremen,[1] the recent discussions in the local Senate, in which the principal speakers were Professor Dr. Bohm, Dr. Meyer, and Herr Holzmeier, showed both the strong views held by supporters of

[1] One of the earlier opponents of dogmatic religious instruction in the Bremen schools was Pastor Friedrich Steudel. Few advocates of a purely secular system of education have denounced so strongly the evil results of filling a child's mind with religious dogmas.

the present system and by opponents, and the impossibility of giving religious instruction without introducing dogma. In Oldenburg the direct control or the general influence exerted alike by Protestant parson and Catholic priest over the teachers became so intolerable that the latter presented a petition to the Landtag praying that the "instructions" might be altered in such a way as to curtail the power of the clergy in the school. The petition was fully considered last December (1910), and after encountering fierce opposition from the Centre and the Agrariers the teachers' prayer was granted, and new "instructions" will be issued. The Liberals and Socialists supported the teachers. In the small duchy of Meiningen there has been similar trouble between clergy and teachers. Baden recently appointed a Commission under the presidency of Rev. Rohde to review the whole question of religious instruction in the schools. The Commission last January published its report, in which important changes are recommended, especially in the way of simplifying the creedal parts of the lessons, the parts to be committed to memory. But the report has not given entire satisfaction. Some critics strongly object to the retention of the doctrine of the Trinity as part of the religious course.[1]

In Saxony a state of open warfare between the clergy and the schoolmasters existed for several

[1] See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 21st January, 1911.

years, and it has not yet entirely ceased. During the first few months of 1909 " The Conflict concerning Religious Instruction " formed the subject of columns of matter daily in the local Press, while the question was also debated at public meetings and in numerous pamphlets. Interest in the discussion was not confined to Saxony. The *National Zeitung* thus reviewed the situation :—

" As was to be expected, the Evangelical Synod has determined to have a finger in the pie, and its opinions do not accord with those of the teachers. The latter claim the complete control of spiritual affairs in the school, and they want to shelve dogma in favour of a system of instruction which, while based on the Christian view of life, will nevertheless remain free and not bound down to the letter. They further want to relegate to the background those parts of the course of instruction committed to memory, and to substitute the Bible Reading Book, or the so-called School Bible, for the whole Bible. The teachers admit that the person of Christ must, as before, form the central point of religious teaching, but they object to the emphasis laid on the so-called truths of salvation, and they desire to set before the young the personality of Christ rather as a religious-ethical standard."

In October, 1910, a " School Union for the Reform of Religious Instruction " was formed. Pastor Dr. Kautzsch, addressing the Union recently on " Religious Instruction and Dogma," admitted that there

is a growing opposition to dogmatic religious instruction in the public schools, and Pastor Kruspe in *Schule und Dogma* (1911) expresses the same opinion.

Several teachers who were not entirely opposed to religious instruction in the schools told me that under the regulations the teaching in this subject tends to become catechetical and formal, because there is too much committed to memory.[1] No doubt this is partly what the Catholics aim at in their religious teaching, but among Protestants there is a growing feeling against it. Chapter XV, Section 6, of the Regulations governing the instructions in the Bezirksschulen (District Schools) of Dresden gives the details of the course to be followed in regard to Biblical History. A review of the whole programme need not be given here; but the following is a synopsis of the Old Testament lessons for Class VI, that is, for boys and girls aged eight to nine, and three one-hour lessons are given weekly :—

(1) The Creation; (2) The Fall; (3) Noah; (4) Abraham's journey to Egypt; (5) Isaac's Marriage; (6) Jacob and Esau; (7) Moses' Birth and Flight; (8) Moses at Horeb; (9) The Exodus from Egypt; (10) The giving of the Law; (11) The Golden Calf; (12) Moses' Death; Joshua; (13) Ruth; (14) Hannah and Samuel; (15) Saul becomes King; (16) David and Goliath; (17) David becomes King.

[1] The *Berliner Morgenpost* (30th April, 1911) makes the same complaint, and adds that it is a notorious fact that many of the teachers are obliged to teach doctrines which they do not believe themselves.

Now a large part of this programme of "Bible History" contains teachings contrary to both history and science, and the schoolmasters know that and the clergy know it. Yet the latter want it taught to children as historically and scientifically true, and they simply meet all opposition with the statement that the lessons have a *spiritual* value; they seem to forget that afterwards either the children will unlearn these "valuable lessons," at the cost of much mental distress, or else when they find out that what they were taught never was really believed by their teachers they will grow up with a readiness to acquiesce in the current professions of belief and with low estimates of mental sincerity. The State would gain more by following Fenelon's advice: "Never pour into the mind of a child—that reservoir so small and so precious—any but the most exquisite things" (*Traité de l'éducation des filles*). Some years ago in New South Wales I heard a complaint that the teacher in one of the public schools had given the Scripture lessons in an irreverent way, and made the boys laugh. I am not going to defend or denounce this teacher. It seems to me that it would be difficult for an unbeliever to make a serious attempt to teach some of the stories of the Old Testament as if he really believed them without laughing at his own efforts—that is, if he had any sense of humour at all.

Let us look now at Bavaria, after Alsace-Lorraine,

the great Catholic State of the Empire. Dr. Ernest Horneffer, the well-known writer on educational matters, said last March that in Munich the number of parents who wanted their children withdrawn from the religious lesson in the school was increasing every day. He expressed the opinion that what the liberal associations in Munich are striving for is the dissemination among the people of a free ethical culture as opposed to the dogmatic teaching of the Churches, which falls so far short of the religious ethical demands of the times. Moral instruction for the young, instead of the present dogmatic religious teaching, is meeting with more and more support. It is in this city that Dr. Kerschenstein, the founder of the system named after him, has been so successful with his " model Schools " or nature schools, as they may justly be called. The aim of the system is to develop the child's individuality, to waken independent thinking from the very first by bringing before him " real objects, not mere copies or representations " (*die Dinge selbst, nicht deren Abbildung*). The children observe nature in the open air, in gardens and fields and aquariums. Physics and chemistry are taught by making the children carry out experiments for themselves in the laboratories. Every effort is directed towards the prevention of a waste of the learner's energy, towards creating a love for the work. Yet these schools have been attacked by Herr von Hertling, of the

Bavarian Parliament, and by other members of the Centre. Some of these gentlemen have sneeringly referred to the schools as "play institutions" (*Spielanstalten, Dilletantenwerk*), while others have called them "cram houses" (*Stopfanstalten*). Both classes of detractors can hardly be right. But what is the real cause of the veritable delirium of vituperation that has been let loose upon Dr. Kerschenstein and his system? Many of the Catholic attacks show the reason too plainly to leave any room for doubt. It is because moral teaching, the inculcation, by example rather than by precept, of respect for the rights and feelings of others, has taken the place of formal religious instruction.

It may at once be conceded that the clergy are sincere in their desire to safeguard the moral welfare of the school-children. But most of them are also sincere in their desire to teach them religious dogmas. For when the teachers in Saxony and other places agreed that the children should receive "systematic moral instruction," most of the pastors declared that there was "no substitute" for the religious lesson, and that its withdrawal was a "menace." Here, as in England, there are advocates of "simple Bible teaching," but there can be no such thing in fact. The "simple Bible teaching" of the man who accepts plenary inspiration is entirely different from that of the believers in a progressive revelation who, when confronted with certain teachings in the

Old Testament, declare that the scholar should be made to grasp the great principle that all morality is progressive. Would the believer in plenary inspiration teach that God's morality is progressive ?

Peace seems as far off as ever. Nor is it likely to reign in the school until the educational system is entirely secular. If men are obliged to pass through a long and complicated course of special training, in order to understand how to teach religion, it is quite clear that teachers in the State schools are not competent to give religious instruction to boys and girls. This would remain true even if the religious organisations were of one mind in regard to what ought to be taught. But they are not of one mind, or anything approaching it. And this instruction, it must be remembered, is of vital importance to the moral and spiritual welfare of the child. It should not be entrusted to laymen untrained and sometimes actually sceptical concerning the higher truths of theology. When we are dealing with Geography, History, Mathematics, we find that the authorities are practically agreed as to who should teach these subjects and how they should be taught. But in the matter of religion, where there is no such agreement, only neutrality on the part of the State can be considered fair to Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and even Freethinkers. What is meant by neutrality is quite clear to any fair-minded man. It simply means that the Church

must do its own teaching, and do it in its own and not in the State's institutions. It would not, as some have asserted, exclude all English literature containing allusions to the Christian religion any more than it would exclude from the Latin class every piece of Roman poetry in which the word "Jupiter" occurs.

The number of sects, or divisions, in the Protestant communities is not diminishing. Religious instruction in the schools stood on a different basis, in regard to fairness to all the citizens, when the Bible represented the personal convictions of all. Then the school belonged to the Church rather than to the State. When natural science and historical criticism had hardly emerged, much less reached the masses, and when, consequently, the present-day objections to "Bible history," and in some respects even "Bible morality," did not exist, men and women could conscientiously teach the "history" and "science" and "morality" of the Bible as real history and real science and real morality. But it can do nothing but harm to the child now to teach him as history what trained investigators teach as legend, or to put into his hands as a sacred record a book containing a world view that will later clash with what knowledge he acquires in the laboratory or the museum of natural science. And to explain away what is clearly irreconcilable with this knowledge will not kindle that enthusiasm for truth which is,

after all, the only morality. For most educational experts admit that the Scripture "history" taught to boys and girls in the German schools can be of no use to them in after life. If it is taught as fiction, a blow is dealt at the Church, taught as history a blow is dealt—and this perhaps is even worse—at the character and instincts of the child. It is indeed, as the clergy affirm, teaching for which there can be no substitute, and therefore it lies outside the scope of the teacher of secular subjects. If the five or six hours spent on religious instruction every week in the primary schools were devoted to nature-study in the fields and occasional visits, by the older children, to factories and hospitals and slums, so that they might see a little of the lives of the poor—never seeing, of course, anything actually revolting—they would grow up morally stronger than those who have passed no end of examinations and gained cartloads of prizes in what is called Divinity. A curious objection urged by the opponents of specific moral instruction is that it is a bad thing to preach at children. This is true. But it is not proposed that children shall be taught a lot of formal moral twaddle by formal moral people. Here are a few definite items on which stress could always be laid by the teacher in his dealings with the child:

(*a*) Personal cleanliness.
(*b*) Courteous manners.
(*c*) Love of animals.

(*d*) Recognition of the fact that marks and prizes are altogether secondary in comparison with a sense of honour and humanity.

(*e*) Moral character of infinitely greater value than intellectual culture.

(*f*) Readiness to recognise worth, without regard to race or creed.

(*g*) Toleration to those who hold different beliefs.

There is no need to preach at children in order to inculcate these principles. The whole atmosphere of the school is the morality of the school. The Church has its own problems to solve.

CHAPTER XI

MIND AND MANNERS

Two things are proverbially dangerous—to generalise and to play the part of prophet, to say what place any nation or individual is destined to hold in the future. But speculation on tendencies and probabilities is always interesting. It is also legitimate. If we would read the destiny of the German people we must make an effort to understand the mind of the German people. We shall then see more clearly the forces at work in the Fatherland.

In his penetrative and indeed brilliant study of German national character, written almost exactly a century ago, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn coined the word *Volkstum* to express "all that a people has in common, all that constitutes its inmost spirit, its life and emotion, its national thought and feeling, its love and hate, its longings, forebodings, and beliefs" (*Deutsches Volkstum*, 1810). If *Volkstum* embraces all this, it must be an impossible task to analyse the mind of any people so minutely as to present a complete picture to a foreigner. And the difficulty is especially great in the case of the Germans,

for there are few peoples so secretive, so disinclined to take outsiders into their confidence. They are not disobliging or inhospitable to the stranger within their gates, far from it; those foreigners who have visited Germany and sought information about the schools or the system of State insurance, know how readily and gladly full particulars have been given. But they cannot in this way pierce the veil of what the Germans themselves call their "deepness and inwardness" (*deutsche Tiefe und Innerlichkeit*).

It has often been remarked by students of German history that the rise of Prussia to a world power has proceeded silently, almost unobserved. Bismarck and Roon were at work night and day planning the lines along which Germany was to become united. How many publicists in the other European countries during, say, the early 'sixties, knew as much about Bismarck as he knew about them? In how many of the dispatches, speeches, and books of the time, even those that professed to review current European politics, do the names of Bismarck and Roon appear?

Englishmen who have not been able to make a first-hand study of the economic conditions of the German Empire, or of German feeling towards England, must sometimes be puzzled to estimate the evidence submitted by various visitors to the Fatherland. Tariff Reformers pay a flying visit to Germany, and find that the mass of the people

are comfortable and happy under Protection. Free Traders, in about the same space of time, find that wages are smaller, the hours of work longer, and the standard of living lower than in England. Mr. Robert Blatchford, who calls himself a Socialist, writes in the Conservative *Daily Mail* at the beginning of 1910: "I believe that Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire." A few months previously Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, one of the British Labour members, told us in the Liberal *Daily Chronicle* that during a recent visit he had seen "little bits of a navy," and that it is absurd "to talk about war between the two countries as inevitable." In the famous *Daily Telegraph* interview the Kaiser was made to declare that, while he himself was friendly to Great Britain, many of his compatriots were distinctly unfriendly. But in the lively debate in the Reichstag which followed the publication of the interview, the Emperor's statement was indignantly repudiated by all parties in the House. What is the reason of these diametrically opposite views? They are not entirely due to the bias, political or otherwise, of the visitor or journal advancing the proposition. Both Mr. Blatchford and Mr. Macdonald are sincere men, and both have the confidence of a certain section of the public, but neither has earned his living in Germany, mingled with nearly all classes of the people in their public and private life, and come into close contact with the

officials. Only in this way can the foreigner come to understand what the Germans mean when they speak of their *Tiefe und Innerlichkeit.*

German writers have often remarked that they are not liked as a nation, by foreigners, and they have been at some pains to account for the fact. For a fact it certainly is. And it is due to some extent to this " depth and inwardness." Foreigners, and particularly the Latin races, feel, often, I am sure, quite unjustifiably, that there is ever something behind the German's outward expressions of friendship and goodwill. The dislike, too, may be referred partly to the Teuton's good qualities. Gladstone once said that the Australian worker wanted to exclude Asiatics, not on account of their vices, but on account of their virtues. From the Gladstonian point of view there was much truth in that. The family traditions of the great man had doubtless taught him to regard willingness to work long hours for small wages as the greatest of all virtues. In a somewhat similar way the pushing, plodding, early-rising, studious polyglot Teuton will often do business where the representatives of other nations fail, and his success will not make him a favourite with the men whom he has out-distanced. I am convinced, however, that this does not account for all the dislike —distrust is at the root of much of it. The labyrinth of semi-official statements contradicted to-day and reaffirmed to-morrow, this much-lauded German

diplomacy, what is it but a form of this "depth and inwardness"? For there is a touch of Iago in every true Prussian.

Germany, like all other European nations, is made up of different racial elements. A Prussian differs in many respects from a Bavarian. There is, however, one word which seems to sum up German instinct, German psychology, or whatever we like to call the sum of national characteristics. That word is Order. This Order impresses all visitors, even those who claim no minute knowledge of German *Volkstum*. It is the characteristic that has been called the Machine Mind. Germany is probably the most perfect national organism in the world. It is no explanation of this routine mind to say that the Germans have been drilled into it. A people cannot be drilled into a thing for which they have no natural aptitude.[1] Compulsory military training and a good deal of official regulation of life exist in many other countries. Whence comes the capacity to organise, to obey, to become a machine? As well ask why the Italian is emotional, the Frenchman volatile, and the Englishman practical. The German is a plodder. It is part of the national psychology. The English mind is individualistic, the German mind

[1] Mahan well says: "Individual liberty, possibly intensifying natural characteristics, has made it impossible to organize the community in Great Britain as it is in Germany."—*The Interest of America in International Conditions*, p. 65.

collectivistic. Probably no one is more competent to speak on this point than Professor Myer :—

"The Englishman, especially in his social and political life, stands firmer on his own feet than the German, whose will is influenced by feeling, and whose individuality, in social and political life, often fails to assert itself unless it is supported by others of the same type. The individualism of the German's soul thus becomes, in the social world, a stratum of social rank, a corporate-individualism" (*Deutsches Volkstum*, p. 16).

It is this corporate-individualism that helps to explain both the extreme respect paid to officials and the widespread desire of young men to enter the Civil Service. The typical machine mind wants to be addressed with some sort of a title, and it wants something safe, comfortable, involving a minimum of work. In this respect Germany is much the same to-day as it was before it became industrialised. The *Volkstum* is fixed. In other countries a man drops his official status when he leaves the parquet, and is worth no more than his personality is worth ; but in Germany the official is always an official, always addressed by his title and estimated according to his position in the Service. An important matter is this title. Regulations concerning positions in the Service always state the title by which the official concerned shall be addressed. "The holder of the office shall have the title——" Uniform and

title go well together. The Emperor recently decreed that the professors at the new Science Research Institute in Berlin should be allowed to choose their own style of uniform. Their choice has just been announced. The uniform is to be green with a deep gold border. Original Research ought surely to thrive in green and gold. To say that academical institutions, not only in Germany but in England and Australia, are not subject to the influence of titles and decorations, is a singular aspersion upon their loyalty.

A nimbus is cast round the head of the bureaucrat, and it has its effect both on the public and on the man who wields his petty authority. It is a demoralising effect. Instead of being the servant of the people, the official becomes their master. The dividing-line between the desire to dominate and the inclination to grovel is a thin one. In a small town in Westphalia about twelve months ago I was in a shop making some purchases when a military petty officer walked in. Though the shop was crowded, the man behind the counter served the officer before any of those who had been waiting; and not only so, but he did not even give the gentleman in uniform the trouble to push his way through the crowd, but walked round to the front of the counter to find out his requirements. I had been told more than once of similar cases, but until I actually saw this incident I had always thought that the statements I had heard were inventions or, at any rate,

exaggerations. Such deference to bureaucrat and uniform is equally degrading to groveller and grovelled-to. Officials come to regard themselves as constituting a class of their own, and such indeed they are. They have become tyrannical and intolerant of contradiction. I had personal experience of this official tyranny on several occasions. In one small town where I lived for nearly ten months the taxation commissioners demanded payment of a church tax. I wrote and said that I was surprised at their demand, as I had no religion. Two days later a collector came to say that I was liable and would have to pay or a distraint warrant would be issued. Whereupon I laughed—good-naturedly, I hope—and told him that I certainly would not pay, but he could take my overcoat. His amour-propre was apparently deeply wounded at my daring to laugh at Prussian law incarnate. However, he left without either the money or the garment. The next morning he returned with a colleague carrying much more gold lace. I again told them to distrain upon my overcoat, which was worth several times the amount of the tax. No, they wanted my watch. I said that I would not give it to them, but would offer no resistance if they took it. They then told me I was liable to two months' imprisonment for *Beamtenbeleidigung*.

> "The ponderous syllables, like sullen waves
> In the half-glutted hollows of reef rocks,
> Came booming"

but harmless. I found out afterwards that *Beamtenbeleidigung* is, "according to the statute in that case made and provided," a special offence—insult to an official in the discharge of his duty. But the polysyllabic threat moved me not, and once more the myrmidons of officialdom departed empty-handed. That night I sent to head-quarters an account of what had occurred, adding that on principle I would not pay a pfennig to any church, and that I had written to the nearest British consul for advice. Shortly after the same officials called in a very different frame of mind to say that the tax had been—cancelled! A curious thing that they did not save themselves so much trouble by making sure that they were legally entitled to the money before trying to collect it. Curious, too, such an undramatic unclosing of the "mailed fist" which had been shaken so threateningly at an insolent Ausländer guilty of *Beamtenbeleidigung*. It was also an instructive instance of what Max Weber has called the Metaphysics of Officialdom (*die Metaphysik des Beamtentums*), that overweening consciousness of authority which hates above all things to be thwarted. In one of the larger towns, to give another illustration of this *Metaphysik des Beamtentums*, the taxation department demanded payment of income-tax on nearly three times as much as I was earning. Though I was well aware that the Government wanted money for Dreadnoughts, this was a little more than

I could stand. When I pointed out that the charge was excessive, I was told that those who come to Germany must obey the German law—which I happened to know was the case—that the amount stated in the notice was what I had been rated at, that I should be compelled to pay, and there was an end of the matter as far as the department was concerned. But I did not pay. Weeks later I received an amended notice for the correct amount. This departmental bluff is due to a sense of collective power, and to the fact that official domination is meekly submitted to by the mass of the people. A solicitor practising in Dortmund told me the other day that the taxation department had no right whatever, legal or moral, to attempt to collect a Church tax from a British subject. It is disheartening to find the officials in the nation which stands at the head of European culture descending to conduct to which the Republic of Liberia would not stoop.

The last case of alleged *Beamtenbeleidigung* that came under my personal notice occurred a few months ago at Bremen. The lady of the house where I stayed did not wish to have her girl (twelve years old) vaccinated, and had obtained a certificate from a doctor—a friend—to say that vaccination would be prejudicial to the child's health. As a matter of fact the girl was very strong, and an official called to say that the schoolmistress declared she was the healthiest child in the class, that the certificate

would not be recognised, and that the mother would be prosecuted. "You can do what you like," replied the mother; "I shan't have her vaccinated." "I'll prosecute you also for *Beamtenbeleidigung*," said the man in uniform, "if you talk to me like that." The supporters of the present bureaucratic system dread greatly the introduction into Germany of the evils of party-government.

A good instance of the way officials strain the letter of the law was reported by *Vorwärts* last December. The police regulations of 15th November, 1908, prescribe that, at the burial of a deceased person, "no speech or address whatsoever shall be delivered by anyone, not being a duly qualified clergyman, unless special permission be first obtained." Under these regulations two men were prosecuted at Hamborn for having, at the burial of a friend, placed wreaths on the coffin, and at the same time used the words: "Farewell, trusty comrade! in the name of the Freethought Society I deposit this wreath." Three courts solemnly considered whether a "speech or address" within the meaning of the by-laws had been delivered at the graveside. Finally the men charged with this desperate breach of the law were acquitted.

The printed instructions and notices to be seen at nearly every street corner with the eternal warning, "Es ist verboten" (It is forbidden), have afforded no end of merriment to visitors, and been the subject of much innocent comment. These instructions are

a part of the routine mind made manifest in officialdom. Not long ago I was walking along the bank of the Weser, when I counted four notices within a distance of about thirty yards, two notifying, as usual, that certain acts are "forbidden" (*verboten*), one that something or other is "not allowed" (*nicht gestattet*), and the fourth that some other line of conduct is "proscribed" (*geächtet*). In each case the Act or Regulation, Clause, Section, and Sub-section are all clearly set out.

Organisation, drill, order, discipline, have not made the German instinct, they have only reacted upon it. Government does not determine the liberty of any people. It is merely the visible form of a nation's political mind. Written constitutions cannot guarantee freedom. Article 12 of the Prussian Constitution says that every man shall have perfect freedom in the matter of religious confession. But a few months ago in Friedrichshagen (Berlin) a number of parents wished to have their children withdrawn from the religious lessons in the high schools. Their request was not granted. The strange inconsistency, too, of officialdom was seen in the answer to the application made by one of the parents, named Tautz. He was allowed to withdraw his son from the religious lesson, but not his daughter. Similar cases of enforced attendance at religious instruction were reported from Brandenburg.[1]

[1] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15th September, 1910. See also *Das Freie Wort*, October, 1910.

The Socialist Party, the most powerful of its kind in the world, is an expression of the German instinct for organisation and thoroughness. An English Socialist says that the German Social Democrats have so drilled and dragooned their members that they will readily "fall in" on the word of command from the oligarchy, which, instead of denouncing them, ought to thank them for the work they are doing. Gustave Hervé, the French anti-militarist, said that the party was a huge machine for collecting subscriptions. Such statements are not reasoned criticisms, but they contain the kernel of truth that cannot always be found in reasoned criticisms.

One of the supreme boasts of the Englishman is that he "muddles through somehow." But the German could not muddle through even if he would. Muddling through denotes an ability of a certain kind which is altogether foreign to the type of mind that is everlastingly organising, calculating, planning, foreseeing. Those English Imperialists who say that Germany is creating a fleet with "feverish haste" have had little to do with Germans. It is just the fact that "feverish haste" is a thing of which the Germans are incapable that makes them dangerous.

The characteristics of the routine mind are seen in a thousand and one different spheres of life. German studiousness is a phase of it. A student who can think and study for months to arrive at the "ultimate metaphysical conceptions of time and space" must

have some special qualifications to start with. No other country can point to such an array of classical scholars as Germany has produced. But she has not yet given a Jebb to the world of scholarship. No other country has so many great chess-masters to its credit. Germans will pore for hours over a chess problem or spend weeks analysing variation in an opening. But no German Morphy has yet appeared.

> "Why, universal plodding prisons up
> The nimble spirits in the arteries."

There is, however, a long credit side to the account. Why is German trade making such strides all over Europe? Ask any Spanish merchant, and he will answer that the German manufacturer trading with Spanish houses corresponds in Spanish and submits his estimates in Spanish currency. The German commercial traveller is a polyglot, and he has, further, a good knowledge of the technical sciences in which his firm is most interested. He spent several years at a *Sprachinstitut* and in private study after he had left school.

I have visited the poorest quarters of the large German cities and never come across the human wreckage that I have seen in France and England, and to a less extent in Sydney and Melbourne. I never met with masses of dirty, ragged children in the schools or in the streets. On leaving a railway

station the traveller is not surrounded by a mob of boys each of whom wants the job of carrying his bag for a penny. Recently the doctor's reports on the schools in Bradford showed that only about 22 per cent of the children could be considered perfectly clean. But rags and dirt in Germany—*es ist verboten*, if not by a written at least by an unwritten law. In many parts of the country I have noticed that the flower-beds in the public parks and gardens are not enclosed, and yet it never seems to enter the heads of the children to pluck the flowers. Indeed, one thing that strikes the visitor is the obedience, the orderliness of the children. Not only do they obey their parents unquestioningly, but they respect their elder brothers and sisters. Too much so, it seems to me. I rather prefer—up to a point—the self-assertiveness of the young Australian.

Political corruption is unknown in Germany, and this because, however much political discontent there may be, there is no political disorder. The administrative mechanism of the country is one organic whole. All the functions of legislative and executive government are connected—perhaps more so than in any other country. Among a highly educated people, used to discipline, uniformed and ticketed, it is no easy matter for either a superior or an inferior officer to slip off the rails.

Closely connected with this fact of Germany's being one organism in a somewhat special sense is

another fact. Germany has had continuity of government and policy—in some respects an objectionable thing, but it has saved her from the humiliation of seeing at the helm of state the *arrivistes*, the little men who hold up the red flag, or the democratic banner, to-day and trample it in the dust to-morrow. Nor is this change of attitude due altogether to a desire to hold on to place and pay at all costs. It comes from the intoxication brought about by the sense of authority. The fruits of this intoxication have been reaped by all democracies from Cleon to Briand.

Honesty is a characteristic of most people who are studious and plodding. It is a characteristic of the German people as a whole. During the two and a half years that I have spent in Germany no one, with the exception of the officials who illegally demanded payment of the Church tax, has ever tried to cheat or overcharge me. I can only say that I have had very different experience in all other countries in which I have lived—in Australia, in England, and in France.

The German system of insurance for old age and for invalids seems to have produced better results than those shown by English individualism, which, before the old-age pensions were granted, had nothing to offer the aged poor but the horrors of the workhouse or a combination of charity and soup-kitchen. One of the Englishmen who visited Germany under the auspices of the Tariff Reform League wrote :—

"Socially and politically their [the German people's] freedom is questionable, and over everything connected with their lives and labours there is a restraint which would be intolerable to an Englishman."

While the truth of this statement is undeniable, it is also undeniable that in Germany the State-insured worker feels that he is, however obscurely, a member of the social organism and that he will not when sick, incapacitated, or aged, be allowed to sink into hopeless and helpless misery.

Cases of food-adulteration are very rare in Germany. It is forbidden! But it is also forbidden in England. Yet every day the English newspapers contain reports of prosecutions for selling margarine as butter, or ground shell as cocoa, or for watering milk. Some English politicians stated recently that in Germany roast corn is exhibited in the shop windows and sold as coffee. They can do no possible good to the Free Trade cause in England by such a statement, for any one with the most elementary knowledge of the German law knows that such fraud is practically out of the question.

Travellers on the German railways do not stand up at the carriage window to prevent others from entering, or strew the seats with their baggage in order to secure three or four times the space to which they are entitled. *Es ist verboten.* The printed regulations are in every compartment. The traveller

knows that the railways are not kept going on his three or four marks, or if he doesn't know it the guards soon remind him of the fact.

The Germans have never tried to make Sunday a day of darkness and desolation for all who do not go to church. Those of them who do not want to go to a concert or to take a trip on the river themselves have never tried to prevent others from doing it. In England a number of people are now agitating for the closing of places of amusement on Sunday, and even some of those places that are at present open can only charge for admission by means of a subterfuge—by pretending that entrance to the hall is free, but the seats must be paid for. The Australians say that their country is the freest in the world, but in the matter of enforcing rules and regulations for "Sabbath Observance" they have been more tyrannical than either the English or the Germans. Tyranny is tyranny, whether it arises from laws made by democracies or from the regulations issued by a paternal oligarchy.

It will always be a matter of debate how far the credit side of the account sets off the other side. There are certainly few countries where the Benthamite principle, "each individual is the best judge of his own interests," is set so completely at naught as it is in Germany.

CHAPTER XII

PROTESTANTISM IN GERMANY

GERMANY has never been given to that sincere but nauseating evangelicalism that seems so dear to the heart of the English-speaking man and woman, and which finds a vent in revivals, camp-meetings, and street-corner addresses. Besides this, the overwhelming majority of the German Protestants are members of a State Church. These two facts help to explain why there never have been in Germany any "free church" preachers corresponding to men like Spurgeon and Parker, men filled with an abnormal passion for saving souls and exercising an influence over lower middle-class, respectable England, out of all proportion to that which their intellectual gifts warranted. But even in England now one hears on every side the orthodox complaining that this pietism is gradually being watered down. The truth is, what is known as "Protestant" Christianity seems to be breaking up throughout the world. In England, the United States, North Germany, Scandinavia, and Australasia—the countries where the majority of the people are known as Protestants—we hear and read

every day of "religious unrest," "present-day difficulties," "decay of old beliefs," "dearth of suitable candidates for the ministry," and "empty churches." But if this is true of all those countries it is especially true of Germany. This is not a partisan statement or a matter of opinion. It is a simple statement of fact which anyone can verify from the religious Press of Prussia and Saxony.

At the beginning of 1910 in Berlin so many people applied to be removed from the membership of the State Church that several extra clerks had to be engaged to cope with the increased work. Pastor Falck, writing in the *Berliner Morgenpost* last February, said that the revenue from Church taxes for 1910 showed a decrease in Prussia of from four to five hundred thousand marks, and that during the year in Berlin alone about ten thousand persons had formally notified their *Austritt* (withdrawal from the Church).

It was in the nature of things that this break-up should come. A religion which allows the right of private judgment must branch off into as many sects as there are varying judgments. But besides the disintegration from the exercise of private judgment by men who, however narrow-souled, still honestly believed in plenary inspiration, for some years the Higher Critics, especially in Germany, have been at their deadly work, and the results of this work are now filtering through and down to the masses. And it is useless to tell the masses that when criticism has

done its worst nothing essential has been touched, that Biblical inspiration is still true in a relative though not in an absolute sense. When they see nearly everything for which the Church once fought so hard, nearly everything which she once maintained by force and "punishment" abandoned, they do not understand the assertion that the Higher Criticism should "only strengthen people's faith" in the same sense in which a trained dialectician or theologian understands the words.

They naturally ask why in that case the clerics did not embrace the Higher Criticism from the first instead of fighting so vigorously against it. They begin to feel, in a word, that it is not the "liberal" theologians that have liberalised Christianity, but the science of the day and the life of the times.

The few really orthodox German Protestants still remaining admit this. They say that the old note of conviction is absent from many of the sermons of to-day, that it is only to be found now in some country bethel where a parson with more earnestness than scholarship preaches to peasants or illiterates. The views of these orthodox Protestants were summed up by the President of the Evangelical School Congress which met at Elberfeld on 2nd June, 1909. In his telegram to the Kaiser he said :—

"Notwithstanding the many disintegrating tendencies which confront us in these times, we hold fast to the Christian faith of the Bible, handed down to us

by our fathers, deeply convinced as we are that, in maintaining and furthering evangelical teaching for the young, we are rendering the greatest service to the State and the Fatherland."

"We hold fast to the Christian faith of the Bible." How many learned theologians in Protestant countries to-day can make that statement without giving so many explanations that no simple-minded believer knows exactly where they stand? The above declaration of faith contains something at least tangible. We can easily understand how orthodox believers of the old school of Biblical Christianity feel towards the apologist who throws overboard so many doctrines that they were taught to regard as distinctively Christian and yet proclaims louder than ever that all that is fundamentally and truly Christian is still safe in the hold. Well they may ask: Are any or all of the following essential—the Creation, the Fall, the Virgin Birth, Performance of Miracles, the Resurrection? For here in Germany Christians, or professing Christians, with any pretensions to scholarship, have for decades been so diluting every doctrine, so reconciling, and "re-stating essential positions," that many of the rank and file are in a state of utter bewilderment as to what the "essential positions" are.

A few days after the School Congress the Westphalian Evangelical Union held its twenty-second annual meeting in the quiet little town of Schwerte.

One of the principal speakers, Herr Zollner, said that in view of an ever-growing heathenism Protestants and Catholics should try "more and more to act together in a spirit of brotherly harmony." In an address on "The Problems of the Union in the face of present-day Indifferentism and Materialism," described by the "Protestant" papers—not the specifically religious journals—as "powerful," the Rev. L. Segemeir admitted that Protestantism in Germany was anything but happy in the year of grace, 1909.

How is the situation to be faced? We have had in Germany during the past four or five years some good heresy-hunts worthy of Presbyterian Scotland's palmiest days. Three of the principal figures in the drama have been Rev. Pastor Traub, of Dortmund, Rev. Dr. Jatho, of Cologne, and Rev. Heydorn, of Schleswig-Holstein. The orthodoxy of these three pastors has been suspected for years. About the middle of 1909 the Rev. Pastor Traub was definitely charged by the Evangelical Church Council with preaching doctrines contrary to the orthodox faith, and in particular with denying the physical resurrection, the divinity of Christ, and the performance of miracles. The case attracted wide attention, and columns of space were devoted to it in the local and other papers. The *Dortmund Anzeiger* said:—

"It neither concerns us, nor is it our intention, to meddle with the theological wranglings of this or that

church. It is, however, open to any one to state facts, and it is a fact that belief in miracles was inconsistent with the scientific knowledge of even a hundred years ago, and since then this view has become more and more prevalent, and has found its way even into theological circles. . . . There is scarcely any room for doubt that the Protestant Church is confronted by a grave crisis."

The Rev. Pastor Traub has not lost his position. He is still preaching liberal Christianity and editing *Christliche Freiheit.*

The Rev. Dr. Karl Jatho has been under suspicion since 1905, but no proceedings were taken till the end of 1910, when the Prussian Protestant Consistory formally charged him with preaching erroneous doctrines. Dr. Jatho, who has been called "Der Irrgeist vom Rhein" ("The heretical spirit of the Rhine"), has been asked to give definite answers to six questions:

1. Whether he understands by the term "God" only an endless process of existence and growth.
2. Whether he has been rightly charged with asserting that all religions are equally entitled to respect.
3. Whether he teaches that men are born, not as poor sinners, but as children of God and full of the divine beauty.
4. Whether he teaches that the worship of Jesus

Christ is only a form of hero-worship, and that Christ has no significance apart from history.

5. Whether it is a fact that he does not believe in eternal life in the form of personal immortality.
6. Whether he is determined to adhere to his teaching.

Dr. Jatho's replies to these questions cannot be given here, but his views may be fairly summarised. He does not believe in an external, creating God. God's power is manifested in an eternal creation. The Bible account of the origin of the world has been finally destroyed, and miracles can no longer be accepted. The development of philosophical and historical investigation and of natural science demands that men shall proceed along new paths. Every historical religion is a revelation of God. Christianity is not exceptional in this respect, and Jesus is not the crowning finality of the kingdom of God. Every age must create its own Christ anew in accordance with its new ideals and hopes and aspirations. Further, Dr. Jatho cannot find that immortality with the continuance of personal identity after death is taught, in either the Old or the New Testament. Lastly, he withdraws nothing and makes no promises for the future. Over four thousand of Dr. Jatho's supporters have sent a petition to the Consistory threatening a *Massenaustritt*, that is, that they will resign in a

body from the State-church if he is deposed. The Deutscher Protestantenverein, which represents a kind of "New Theology" in Germany, and has the strong support of such advanced liberal Christians as Herr Karl Schrader, member of the Reichstag, Rev. Dr. Kirnss, Rev. Dr. Max Fischer,[1] Dr. F. J. Schmidt, Dr. Hackmeister, and many other learned doctors, has issued a proclamation declaring that the Rev. Dr. Jatho is at heart a most devout Christian, that he has earned the gratitude of thousands for his noble work in Cologne, and that those who are persecuting him are in every sense as narrow and intolerant as the Catholics who introduced the oath against modernism.

"The proceedings against Dr. Jatho," say the signatories, "are a menace to the liberal-minded members of the congregation and to the pastors in the churches. We see before our eyes the danger that the principles followed by Rome may be set up as a standard in our own Church."

This last sentence really contains in a nutshell the principle involved in both the above cases. Where is the half-way house between Dogma and Free-thought, between Rome and Reason?

The case of Rev. Heydorn, who is said to be greatly beloved by his congregation, has not excited so much interest as the other two, probably because his

[1] Dr. Fischer is himself the latest victim of the heresy-hunt now going on all over the country. He has just (May 25th, 1911) been cited to appear before the North Berlin Consistory for a heterodox sermon preached last Easter.

Liberalism has been a little less extreme. He simply denies the divinity of Christ and the Virgin Birth. For some months the Kiel Consistory has had his case under consideration, but on 24th March, 1911, it was decided that no further action should be taken "for the present."

Such is the working of Liberalism in Protestant Germany. Revs. Traub, Jatho, and Heydorn are well-meaning and doubtless want to purify Christianity from what they consider accretions, but their opponents assert that no one can see the end of this process of purification, that all the vague exhortations "to deepen the religious consciousness" and to cultivate the "Higher Self" are no substitute for the Gospel, and that a few years ago such phrases would have been rejected with scorn by any self-respecting believer. Advanced Protestants reply that it is one of their essential principles that there can be no finality in matters of faith, that there is a continuous development, and that each age, as well as each individuality, must satisfy its own judgment and its own conscience. But what appeals to the laymen with it all is the evident uneasiness of the leaders of life and thought in the Protestant Churches.

The dead-set that is being made against Dr. Jatho by many Protestants at the moment when they cannot find words strong enough to express their indignation at the anti-Modernist oath which has done so much to accentuate the differences between the two great

divisions of Christendom—differences which always constitute a very real and living issue in the religious life of Germany—seems to the outsider like something in the nature of a comedy—or is it rather tragedy ? Of German Protestantism, if of anything, may we say *Ueber allen Gipfeln—Unruhe.* All appearances point very clearly to the final struggle so often predicted, Rome versus Freethought.

CHAPTER XIII

ROME AND GERMANY

SOME years ago a witty German defined Ultramontanism as the doctrine that the kingdom of God is of this world and the centre of the kingdom is Rome. It is, in a word, the political side of the Roman Catholic system, which is a religious Imperialism aiming at a religious hegemony over the world. Such a religious world-sway is impossible without political power. Two facts must be clearly grasped by all who would understand Ultramontanism: (1) it is a world-view; (2) it is a world-view suited to a type of mind that is very common in all countries. To the man who must have a spiritual monarch the Pope is as good as any other. "*Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi,*" said Gambetta. The enemy of whom and of what? The enemy of those who want to think for themselves on all matters, secular and spiritual, of those who are strving to secularise education, of those who will not bow to any form of Infallibility whether embodied in a person or in a book. But these men have always constituted a minority in every community.

Roman Catholicism is a *Weltanschauung*, a world-view. The spiritual Cæsar, the Pope, represents Christ, who is the son of God, upon earth, and only through Christ can men save their immortal souls. If the premises be granted the rest follows without difficulty. The system is logical. When, nearly forty years ago, the Emperor William I was received by Bishop Kettler in front of the cathedral at Mayence, a pious German Catholic is said to have exclaimed: "There stands the Temporal before the Eternal." The same idea was expressed less concisely by Bishop Kopp at the great Catholic meeting in Neisse (Silesia) in 1899:—

"The Pope is the greatest moral power in the world. The Papacy has the greatest moral influence on earth and that is why it is more appealed to, for the settlement of international disputes, than any other power. The Pope regards it as an ideal ambition to be able to take upon himself this rôle in the world, not from lust of power, but because he feels that he is the representative of the heavenly Prince of Peace."

For centuries this idea has been beaten into the minds of millions of men and women from their earliest years. They regard politics from the Church point of view because this is the point of view which the Church has taught them, and they have no clear conception of any other. Such men and women want to save their souls. Consequently even where there may have been a tendency to free-thinking the

confession-box soon brings the disobedient, broken and penitent, back to the standpoint of Mother Church. Roman Catholicism will always wield a power which is dangerous to nationalism and which Protestant Christianity can never hope to exercise. The good German Protestant wants to see his countrymen both national and religious, but he offers them in religion the right of private judgment. The result is seen to-day in the rapid disintegration of German Protestantism as a coherent body of doctrine. The Catholic, on the other hand, wherever he is, is an Internationalist, looking away from the changeableness of all earthly dynasties to a spiritual ruler in Italy, to the representative of God upon earth.

The religious and the political claims of the Catholic Church cannot be separated, for whatever political party the good Catholic may be inclined to support individually, he will always think of his soul before his politics. What has Protestantism to offer in opposition to Rome? It has no traditions worth mentioning. It tries to adapt itself to every nation, to every contemporary need, to every fresh scientific discovery, while at the same time adhering to the dogmas of a written revelation which every man is free to interpret for himself. Some Protestants proclaim themselves believers in a "progressive revelation" and assert that the "creeds" are the enemies of a living faith. But they will never give definite details when asked how much of the original

revelation is left intact. They speak of "religious unrest" and in the same breath declare that the Higher Criticism has strengthened their faith. Such a religion, with no central authority, no kernel of dogma and tradition, can never build up a *Weltkirche*. German Protestantism stands to-day a hopeless, a pathetic failure.

The waves of Rationalism, or Modernism, are beginning to shake the central citadel also. "The Revolt against Rome" is become one of the commonplace phrases of the day, but it expresses something very real. The necessity of imposing an anti-Modernist oath on the Catholic clergy shows that Rome is feeling "the form and pressure of the time." This oath compels all Catholic priests to declare their allegiance to the traditional dogmas of Roman Catholicism and to promise to teach only such doctrines as are contained in the decisions of the Ecumenical councils and the recognised creeds of the Church. Exactly what results this latest step will produce in Germany it is at present impossible to say. Reports of resignations of theological professors and priests were fairly frequent during the first two or three weeks of December (1910), but the reports appeared in anti-Catholic journals, and some of them were afterwards contradicted. In very few cases were any names mentioned, so that definite details are still hard to obtain. But, however small may be the number of those who have refused to take the oath,

one thing is certain, and it is this thing that is of the greatest importance—a vast number of priests *have* taken the oath. How many of these men have felt inward dissent, and how many have taken the oath light-heartedly, no one can ever know. And herein lies the special danger of all dogmatic instruction, of all creed, catechism, and formulary, Catholic or Protestant. It leads to insincerity, to simulation in outlook upon the world of thought, indifference to the existence of a great gap between what has been taught and what is actually believed. The loose manner in which theologians, Catholic and Protestant, proceed to reconcile this contradiction constitutes the most serious impeachment of the whole organised Christian religion.

There is good reason to believe that Catholic Germany is racked with vast inward discontent and unrest. We see this from the speeches and writings of many leading Catholics; Catholic newspapers and other publications are full of controversial matter. It is not that the unrest is always clearly expressed in the letter, but it can be read between the lines, and in that way it speaks with even greater eloquence. Sometimes, however, the signs of revolt are clear and articulate. One of the greatest authorities on the early history of the Church, Dr. Koch, of the Catholic Divinity School at Braunsberg, was recently compelled to resign his position for having published a book entitled *Cyprian and the Roman Primate*, in

which he shows that St. Cyprian had no notion of a Papacy or of the doctrine of Infallibility. Last June Professor Schnitzler was similarly treated for publishing a short study, *Did Jesus Christ Found the Papacy?* His answer to this question is a straight-out negative. Professor Schnitzler criticises strongly Rome's method of dealing with history. Another book which has attracted much attention in religious circles is *Cologne, an Inward Danger for Catholicism*, by a priest.

"Out of the mighty spiritual struggle of the last centuries," says the writer, "out of the recoils and reactions of the competing world-views which those struggles, with their manifold points of contact or difference, produced during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, another spirit has slowly and gradually been evolved. Men have grown weary of principles. A levelling down of differences, an intentional disregard of ideas the most deep and essential, has created an atmosphere of natural indifference to the distinctions of dogma, which can no longer assert its old rights except in cases where the call of religion is still subjectively experienced. . . .

"It is a time of confusion and whirl, of self-deception, of haranguing, of concessions and tactics, a time in which antagonistic principles—the true and the false, the right and the wrong, reforms and excrescences—wrestle together and flow confusedly in different directions. Such a situation, it may be asserted with the utmost confidence, has nearly always preceded the great heresies, and in such times

the noblest men at first have not been able to make up their minds" (*Köln eine innere Gefahr für den Katholizismus* (1910), von einem Geistlichen, pp. 10, 11).

And much more to the same effect. Be it said, however, to the credit of the writer and his fellow spiritual guides, that they are honest enough not to make any pretence that such a state of affairs ought only to strengthen people's faith.

The aspirations and the methods of working of political Catholicism in Germany have rarely been better described than by the Rev. Father Hansjakob, of Baden, and for some years a member of the State Parliament. In a book published this year, *In the Catholic Ministry, Reminiscences of a Member of the Baden State Parliament*, he says that the Centre has the masses behind it because the words "Defence of Religion" are inscribed on its banner, just as the Social Democrats have won the masses by the cry of "Social Reform." Yet, in spite of that, he does not regard the Centre as a true "people's party," either in the Reichstag or in the State Parliaments. The essence of political Catholicism is, according to Father Hansjakob, the insisting always that it is in the right. It must never admit error, even though religion itself may suffer from its obstinacy. It must never give way till all enemies and opponents submit, no matter what sacrifice must be made meanwhile. It is this political Catholicism that throws

overboard any friend, however hard he may have worked for the cause, and forgets all past services, as soon as such a supporter refuses to follow it blindly.

" Strong, firm faith and loyal affection is due to the Church that all error may be avoided. We never hear a word about gentleness, brotherly love, kindly guidance to one who does not co-operate with it in every detail, or who has happened to go astray. Such a one merely becomes the object of constant irritation " (*In der Residenz: Erinnerungen eines badischen Landtagsabgeordneten*, 1911).

Towards the end of 1910 Prince Maximilian, who is the brother of the King of Saxony and also a duly ordained Catholic priest, wrote in *Roma e l'oriente* an article discussing the possibility of a union of the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Greek Church. If the Prince's article was not Modernist it was certainly liberal. He said that the question must be approached in a spirit of brotherhood and charity, and that the Catholic Church will not further the efforts for union by insisting upon " submission." He hinted that the Greek Church is suspicious concerning the disinterestedness of the Pope's desire for union, and believes that ambition and lust for power have given rise to the desire. Truth must be served, he asserts, by investigation, " and not by superficial and half-sincere apologetics." Naturally, the Vatican strongly condemned the article and demanded a

retraction, and the "strained relations" between Pope and Prince which resulted from this demand caused unusual interest in Germany. Official pressure from Rome, however, proved too much for the royal priest. But Maximilian is not the first prince that has had to "withdraw and apologise" when Mother Church has spoken.

In a country like Germany, where the bulk of the population is Protestant, but where there is also a very large Roman Catholic element, it is almost impossible for such an organisation as the Roman Catholic Church, making such claims to control men's consciences, to avoid conflict with the State. If the authority of the Church is the authority of God, then she is justified in declaring, "He that despiseth me despiseth Him that sent me," and all men must listen and bow to such teaching under grave penalties —in this world where there is power to inflict them, and in any case in the world to come. The history of Catholic opposition to purely civil marriage in Germany shows how easily conflict may arise. The Roman Catholic Church regards marriage not as a secular but as a divine institution. It is one of the seven sacraments. "The maintenance of Christian marriage" (*die Aufrechterhaltung der christlichen Ehe*) is still one of the planks of the Centre's platform. But the law of the 6th February, 1875, makes civil marriage compulsory throughout the Empire, and clergymen are forbidden, under severe penalties,

to perform any marriage ceremony unless a certificate has been produced showing that the parties have already been civilly married before the Registrar of Births, Deaths, and Marriages. Where the conscience of the Church or any other institution, human or divine, is inconvenient to the State, and especially to a State like Prussia, something must give way.

The oath against Modernism also shows how easily a clash of consciences may be caused. Dr. von Heydebrand, one of the leading Prussian Conservatives, said in the House of Representatives on 7th March, 1911, that while the oath seemed to be a matter which belonged to the province of the Catholic religion, it really encroached upon the province of the State. In the same debate the Prime Minister (Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg) said that whatever opinion Catholics or Protestants may hold in regard to questions of Church and State, whether believers in a State Church or advocates of the complete separation of Church and State, of one thing no one can have the slightest doubt—the administration of the anti-Modernist oath is stirring Germany to her very depths. The effect which the recent decrees of the Roman Curia would have upon the religious denominations and the religious peace of the community could not be ignored by the State. He had, he declared, informed the Curia through the Prussian Minister that the responsibility for any conflicts that might arise would fall upon the Vatican alone. On the same

occasion Herr von Trott zu Solz, the Prussian Minister for Public Instruction and Worship, said :—

"Our solicitude for the maintenance of religious peace is our reason for imposing upon ourselves greater reserve in appointing Catholic priests to the State service. Recent experience has shown that conflict may arise when a Catholic priest is also a servant of the State."

The same Minister, replying to Dr. Wiemar on 17th January, 1911, declared that every public servant holding any ecclesiastical office who, when called upon, refused to take the oath, would be protected by the State and guaranteed against loss. The same month Herr Schrader stated in the Reichstag that the administering the oath was illegal because the constitutions of all the federal states guarantee freedom in science and teaching, and give every German the right to express his opinions freely in speech or writing. The oath would take away this right from the Catholic clergy in Germany. The Catholic journals themselves are not unanimous as to what the oath means and what it does not mean. Some have asserted that no attempt whatever is made to hinder the science of theology or textual criticism of the Bible (e.g. *Das Volksblatt*, Stuttgart, 29th December, 1910). But one section of the oath says quite plainly :—

"I condemn methods of judging Holy Scripture and of interpreting it which depart from the traditions

and beliefs of the Church and from the rules of the apostolic see, and which are based upon Rationalist principles."

A trained dialectician might reconcile the two statements, but a layman cannot. The oath also demands a denial of certain scientific doctrines or theories which, whether true or not, are taught in most of the German schools and universities. Is it thinkable that Germany will leave to Roman Catholic priests who have sworn an oath against these principles an essential influence on the school and the instruction of youth ? A similar question might be asked with regard to the Protestant clergy. The only answer is : the school and the Church must be completely separated.

In January this year the papers published a letter from the Pope to Archbishop Fischer, of Cologne, in which His Holiness says that professors of theology will not be forced to take the oath against Modernism, but nevertheless he is convinced that all those who wish to show a manly independence of the opinions of the men who hate the Catholic faith will not ask to be dispensed from taking the oath. Dr. von Muhlberg, the Prussian Minister in Rome, is reported to have said that the action of the Roman Curia has given grave offence to Protestant Germany, and that the antagonism between the Prussian Government and the Catholic Church has reached an acute stage. If the protests from the Protestant

Press indicate Protestant feeling in Germany, there can be no room for doubt as to the general indignation at the policy of the Vatican.

In the *Neue Rundschau* for March, 1911, Herr Karl Jentz, at one time a Catholic priest, deals very clearly with Catholicism and its claims, and the effect on the community of the administering the anti-Modernist oath. The claim of the Church to be the sole repository of God's truth is "absurd arrogance," a block to culture and progress and a source of injury to the State.

It is well known that there has been an impression at head-quarters for some time that Modernism in Germany is widespread, and it is generally believed that the oath has been drawn up especially to meet German conditions. However that may be, Rome, in making this attack upon freedom of teaching in Germany, would have had a more awkward situation to face had not the Catholic Centre so much political influence that the Conservative government is absolutely dependent upon its support. Some months before the oath was framed this dependence was seen in the weak and spineless manner in which the Government supporters dealt with the Borromäus Encyclical.

Ultramontanism is a world-view, and those who lose sight of this fundamental principle estimate Roman Catholicism from a wrong standpoint, and all their denunciations are simply waste of energy—nothing

more or less than a beating of the air. It must be judged according to its essential as a *Weltanschauung*, and not according to the expositions of party-leaders. Should not the only true Church of Christ rank above all States and all parties ? At one time it did so rank. But the growth of definite nationalities in Europe, and the revolt against authority in the sixteenth century, inflicted a deadly blow on the Catholic system, and made its representatives the sworn foes of all national effort. The third Chapter of the Vatican Council says that men owe absolute obedience to the Pope, not only in faith and morals, but in all that appertains to the discipline and government of Empires. And men owe this obedience "at the peril of their eternal happiness." The struggle which began over three centuries ago is being fought as desperately to-day as ever, but it is being fought on other lines. The demands of natural science were at first met with persecution, then with mere negative assertions. To-day the Church is trying to make science subservient to dogma by claiming the right to control the school and the teachers. The Catholic Centre asserts loudly enough that it is struggling for "truth, right, and freedom," but this only means "truth, right, and freedom" as the Church understands them. In the province of Westphalia (especially in Dortmund and Hamm) I found that a book entitled *The Good Catholic Maid* is very widely in circulation among Catholic young women. There

is not much encouragement here to "prove all things":—

"If you hear statements which are opposed to the teachings of the Church, you know without investigation that as a matter of course they must be false, for the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth (1 Tim. III.), and all those who teach differently from the Church are seducers who err and lead into error (2 Tim. I.). Be on your guard against them. Avoid unnecessary intercourse with those whose religious belief is different from yours. Don't make such people your friends. Be on your guard against making acquaintances even which might lead to a mixed marriage" (*Die gute Congreganistin*, pp. 74, 75, by B. Stormann, Priest, published with the approval of the Bishop. 12th Edition).

What the Catholic Church is in favour of is certain "higher truths" which must be removed from criticism, and in this respect Protestantism, when strong and organised, had much in common with it. When Kingsley said that "truth for its own sake had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy," Newman immediately denied the statement, and the controversy between the two combatants ultimately led to the self-analysis of the *Apologia*. And if men are to be allowed to brand dogma as truth and to set an iron ring-fence round it, Newman was right.

"At present Rome is more powerful, spiritually, in Germany than in Italy. This was also the case in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries." It is nearly

thirty years since Döllinger made this statement in the Munich Academy of Sciences. But he could not foresee to what extent the yoke of Rome would again be laid on the political life of Germany, how irresistible would become the revolt against her spiritual despotism, and how great would become her difficulties with her Modernists, those who will not accept her dictum without examining the authority on which it rests. The opening of the twentieth century had this in common with all preceding periods—it saw the attempt of Rome to sweep away, conscientiously but with absolute intolerance, every form of free-thinking in spiritual matters. But it has also seen the spiritual conflict between Modernism and Medievalism bear fruit. The cases of Houtin and Loisy in France, of Dr. Koch and Professor Schnitzler in Germany, show the effect of the infiltration of modern ideas upon the minds of the priesthood. The *Historische-politische Blätter für das Katholische Volk*, 1910 (Heft 7, Band 146), contains an article on "The Present Crisis for the Church in the West," by Dr. Alois Wurm, who asserts that the views expressed are those of Pius X. The writer admits that it is as clear as daylight that the Church in Europe is at present engaged in a desperate struggle for its very existence, and that the "modern spirit" has made such progress that it is doubtful if the Church can now stem the tide. What is the remedy? To devote Herculean efforts to the work of converting China,

whose four hundred millions may some day be able to force a stiff-necked Europe to bend to the yoke. The article is pathetic, but it contains the true Ultramontane spirit. When men's souls are the stake played for, European culture and science and all that they stand for may be handed over to a yellow or a black race in one sudden deal.

CHAPTER XIV

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF BERLIN

"THERE I was once again in the metropolis of German intelligence, as Berlin is so fond of styling herself. True, Germany has only one city which wins for itself at the first glance the right to be called great, and this one city is Berlin. What streets, squares, buildings! We are reminded of Paris or even of Rome. Yes, but it must only be a glance, you must not look close unless you want to lose that impression immediately. For close observation—how empty these streets are, how barren these squares, how utterly wanting in solidity these buildings! They appear to have been built simply to sell—the earth need not shake to disturb them, they will soon fall down of themselves."

When Hebbel wrote these words in 1851 there were in Germany only two "great cities," that is, cities with a population of over one hundred thousand. The census taken on 1st December, 1860, revealed only one city with over two hundred thousand inhabitants: Berlin, 632,749. To-day there are forty-seven "great cities," and twenty of these have a

population exceeding two hundred thousand.[1] It is this abundance of large centres of population that prevents Berlin from absorbing German interest to the same extent that London absorbs English interest or Paris French.[2] Leipsic, Dresden, Munich, and Hamburg are nearly as important as Berlin for those who want to know Germany. The great variety of city life is one of the outstanding characteristics of the present German Empire.

Much water has flowed down the Spree since 1851. The public buildings in Berlin in 1911 will stand much more than Hebbel's bare glance. What would he say to-day if he could see the new Town Hall in Stralauer Street? Most of Berlin's edifices look as if meant to last for ever and a day, as if, indeed, nothing short of an earthquake would have any serious effect upon them. These buildings, like the most modern in Hamburg, look almost too impressive to be artistic. They always seem to me to assume the airs of a pompous Prussian grenadier.

Berlin is a city of spacious squares, broad streets, and monuments of all sorts, with horses and swords

[1] Hamborn (Ruhr) is the youngest of Germany's "great cities." The population now (Census, December, 1910) is 102,800. In 1871 is was 2700.

[2] Dr. Fritz Berolzheimer (*Deutschland von Heute*, p. 397) says that Berlin will soon hold the same relative position among German towns as Paris among French towns. There are, however, many grounds for taking a contrary view. As long as Germany remains a federation cities like Munich and Dresden will have an independent political and cultural importance. The most recent returns also show that Hamburg is not losing ground relatively.

and kings predominating, while occasionally a cannon is thrown in by way of variety—all of them things very dear to the Prussian heart. The streets, even the side ones, are straight and wide and clean. Everything is solid, masculine. The city's appearance would be relieved by a touch of Parisian femininity and London irregularity. The general impression of the whole is summed up in the word which the Germans themselves are fond of applying to their capital—*herrlich* (lordly). All the pictures I have seen of it, and all the descriptions I have read, are made small by the reality. Yet, as the old Roman says, there is no felicity perfect from every point of view. Berlin's lordliness is to some extent discounted by the presence in the city of a dirty-looking stream of water which winds its way round every nook and corner like an ugly snake, and is spanned by a lot of bridges, most of them even uglier than itself. This stream, the tributary of a tributary, the Berliners call a river. Any Australian will be able to form some idea of this "river" when I say that the sight of it would for ever reconcile Melbournians to the Yarra.

I have been told that there are more monuments in Berlin than in any other city in the world. Whether that is so or not I cannot say, and in any case I shall not attempt to describe them here, for they have very little attraction for me. But the first day I saw the enormous statue of Bismarck (unveiled 1901) in front of the Reichstag, in Königsplatz, I could not

help remarking what a wealth of Germanism speaks out from it. From base to summit the height is about forty-five feet. The Iron Chancellor, in the uniform of a cuirassier, grasps with his left hand an enormous sword, with his right the charter of the Empire. Several bronze figures surround the pedestal: in front, Atlas bearing the globe—symbol of world-sway; on the left Germania holding a leopard in subjection with one foot—invincible power; behind is Siegfried forging a sword; on the right, a female figure resting against a Sphinx looks into the book of history—fields still to be won. Of the smaller front reliefs one shows the German Michel asleep on the bear's skin and being roused by a female figure that points to the nations of the world and their armies in the background; the other represents Germany as the youthful Hercules ambitious to display his strength. The whole may be described as *Deutschtum* in bronze.

Berlin is above all things modern. This is the first impression—it is a made city. Streets and squares do not grow long and broad and regular. This modernity, however, is almost the last thing that flatters the pride of the Berliner. He likes to talk of his city's art and culture and richness in historical associations. A few days before my visit I read in one of the important Berlin dailies that the German capital is "the middle-point of all art and culture."[1]

[1] "Der Mittelpunkt alles Kunst-und Kulturlebens."—*Freisinnige Zeitung*, 5th February, 1911.

A book from the pen of an American German appeared last year which "reveals America to herself by interpreting Europe." And what is Europe? Neither London nor Paris, neither Rome nor Vienna, but Berlin, "the luminous heart of Europe," the head of European culture and the centre of modern art, as well as the typically representative city of Europe's older civilisation. Such is Berlin in the estimation of the North German and his descendants in North America. Berlin, whose culture and art are about a century old and whose political importance dates from Bismarck. Even the Emperor in his eulogistic speech on the great city on 21st November, 1908—his first effort after the *Daily Telegraph* storm—celebrating the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the City ordinance, did not go quite so far as some of his subjects and admirers.

Fortified, expectant, I visited the Kaiser Friedrich Museum. Pictures and galleries are not much in my line; but speaking as a layman with little expert knowledge of art and artists, I prefer the Louvre to all the Berlin galleries put together. I asked an artistic-looking gentleman at the Museum if it was superior to the Louvre. "Well," he replied, very seriously, "I should not like to say that; but it ranks now above anything of the kind in Dresden or Munich." Which struck me as being remarkably modest in a North German. However, *Deutschland steht an der Spitze der europäischen Kultur*—Germany

is at the head of European culture. The Germans say so themselves. And Berlin is at the head of Germany. Hence the German capital is "the middle-point of all art and culture." The logic of the thing is irresistible; but it has a tendency to become wearisome. There is a Chauvinism of culture as well as of politics, and the one is as offensive as the other. Vulgar pride of Empire and the pride which arrogates to itself the leading position in the world of intellect are near relatives. Some of the Berliners are in a fair way to make their city the capital of Philistia.

To those used to the gloom and depression of the English, and still more the Australian, Sunday, the large towns of Germany on the first day of the week afford a delightful and refreshing contrast. Here are seen on a fine Sunday morning happy bands of "Sabbath-breakers," parents and children, filing their way in all directions to the suburbs to enjoy a game of football or a romp in the parks, some with hampers intent on making a day of it, others flock to the Zoological Gardens—one of the finest in the world—which they can see now for half-price (threepence). The prices of admission to the theatres are also reduced, so that thousands who would otherwise have no opportunity of doing so are enabled to see the best plays and hear the best music. Many of the churches even have notices affixed to the door announcing free concerts in the afternoon or evening. Some of those—Protestants as well as Catholics—who

go to church in the morning go to the theatre in the evening. The crowds seen on Sunday are mostly composed of the workers and the lower middle class, and they are always well behaved. Rowdiness and drunkenness in public are almost unknown. In regard to the right to spend Sunday in one's own way there is more liberty in Germany than in either England or Australia. Germany is neither Sabbatarian nor democratic; Australia is both. About a month before I left Sydney the proprietor of the Athenæum (music-hall) was prosecuted for allowing the place to be used for a public concert on Sunday, and efforts were also being made to stop the band concerts in the Town Hall. A few weeks before that a fruiterer was fined five shillings for selling fourpence worth of fruit on Sunday. Democracy and liberty are not synonymous terms. There is at present in Berlin a widespread agitation to compel all employers to grant their servants one day's rest in seven, and *where possible* to make that day Sunday. With that I am in complete agreement, but it is a different thing from Sabbatarianism. I have not yet heard one single person in Germany suggest that places of amusement should be closed on Sunday. This at any rate every one who has visited German cities must admit—the people always look bright and happy on Sunday. Who could say that of the people of Melbourne or Sydney or even London? Those who have lived in France and Germany can easily

understand why foreigners hate our Sunday. Churchgoers in English-speaking countries say that the Sunday is being filched from them, but they should remember that they are only a section of the whole community. The dreadful result that is to follow the introduction of what they call the "continental Sunday"—which many of them do not know from personal experience—only exists in their own imaginations.

Another term which the Germans are fond of applying to their metropolis is *Weltstadt;*[1] but Berlin is not a world-city like London with its representatives, high-class and low-class, of all colours and from all parts of the world, a large proportion of them British subjects—Sepoys and Bengalese from India, Cingalese from Ceylon, Kaffirs from South Africa, negroes from the West Indies. It is not only that Berlin is not the centre of the world's commerce; neither the streets nor the shops nor the people have the cosmopolitan air of London people and London things. It is essentially and wholly German. Even in comparatively small Bremen one hears far more English and nearly as much French spoken as in Berlin.

Nicholaus Delius, the Bremen poet, who died in Bonn over twenty years ago, and who was one of the

[1] There is nothing insular about the Berliners. The *Lokal-Anzeiger* (7th May, 1911) says that "Berlin is becoming more and more *the* cosmopolitan world-city."

earliest of the great German Shakespeareans, shows in many of his writings a deep-rooted antipathy to Prussia's capital. In his sonnet "Berlin bei Nacht" he tells us, in that vein of humorous paradox of which he was so fond, that the best time to see the city is some night when the moon and the stars have disappeared and nothing whatever can be distinguished. To-day the night-life of Berlin is *the* life of Berlin. Many interesting things can be seen there at night, whether by moonlight or gaslight. The stranger who passes a week in the city, living in a first-class hotel and driving through the Charlottenburger Chaussee, only sees a part of what is to be seen. Night-life is in fact a feature of nearly all Prussia's towns that have a population of over fifty thousand. In many of the smaller centres of population are dancing saloons and *Damenkneipen*, where the gaiety lasts all through the night. Yet one may see all these sides of the life of Berlin and then miss much that is of interest to the student of human nature as she is in big cities. A long way from the bright and lively West, in Fröbel Street, in the poor north-east, is the City Shelter. It is worth seeing on a winter's night between nine and ten o'clock. In the month of January this year 133,544 men slept in the Shelter, and in February 125,633—the highest numbers yet reached for these months. For the year ending 31st March, 1911, the number of the homeless accommodated was for the first time over a million. I made

my way to the Shelter one evening just after I had taken a long walk down the Chaussee. It was a chilly night, but this evidently did not trouble the fine folk streaming in motors to the theatres and other places of amusement. They looked happy. With their cosy furs they could defy the "rude breath" of winter. Some of them perhaps had just been regaled on caviare at twenty-four marks a pound. Then I came to the Shelter and saw the homeless and hungry lining up. There are contrasts in Berlin—light and shade. A few days before the night of which I am speaking I read in one of the magazines an article, "Why People become Socialists." The writer gave five reasons, but he was satisfied that the last one stated, "a feeling of pure spite against the existing order of things," accounted for the majority of cases. Count von Schwerin, President of the German Reichstag, in his Easter greeting to the German people (16th April, 1911), gives a glowing account of the social, economic, and political progress of Germany in forty years. He says that such progress is without a parallel in the history of any other people, and that a few days previously a foreign diplomat who knew the whole world told him that the thing that struck him most in Berlin was, that he had never seen a single poor person, one actually in want, such as he had seen again and again in the streets of rich cities in other lands. I don't know whether the Count and the foreign diplomat and the writer of the article

just referred to have ever visited the Shelter on a winter's night. It is an institution not mentioned in any of the guide books. There is deep, binding, biting poverty here, but it is kept in the background. It may be that there is not so much human wreckage here as there is in London even in proportion to the population. That is partly due to regulation and organism which again is part of the national character. But the Berliners are far too prone to underrate the extent of the poverty that is found in their city.

A few weeks ago sixty armed policemen rounded up the *Scheunen* quarter in the north-east, visiting the notorious drinking saloons and cafés. This is sometimes called the "slum quarter" by English visitors; but the expression is misleading, for these streets, Grenadier Street, Dragoner Street, and others are fine broad thoroughfares with really nothing of the slum proper about them. But some of the beer-shops and restaurants are the resorts of foreign criminals, principally Russians. A number of aliens were arrested who had already been expelled from Germany, but had returned and had either not registered at all or had registered under false names. London is not the only city pestered by alien criminals, nor is the mere formality of registration a certain check upon these undesirables.

Half a century ago Europe's, indeed the world's, great pleasure-city was undoubtedly Paris. "Gay Paree" was the embodiment of amusement in every

form. The women were beautiful and possessed the indefinable charm sufficiently expressed in the word *Parisienne.* The nights were long but not tedious. The Bordeaux flowed free, and the triumph of French cooking is to be seen in the word which it has imposed upon hotel-keepers throughout Europe, who one and all advertise their unequalled " cuisine." The Berlin host to-day tells his guests that the cooking in his city is quite equal to the French, but no Frenchman will admit this. Some eighteen months ago I boarded with a young Frenchman who was continually exclaiming at meals, that is, every time the good lady's back was turned, " *Oh, la nourriture allemande!* " in tones of unmistakable disgust.

Paris is still " *Gay Paree,*" and the Parisiennes are as attractive as ever; but as a pleasure-city pure and simple, Berlin runs it close to-day. Many different reasons are given for this change. Some say Berlin has become Americanised; some say it is due to the industrialisation of Germany which has brought wealth and materialism in its train, and altered the view-point, not only of Berlin, but of every other German city; while others tell us that national pride in the Empire's metropolis demanded that it should keep pace with the other European capitals in amusements and gaiety as in other matters. Old-stagers have told me that thirty years ago even Vienna, to say nothing of Paris, put Berlin completely in the shade. To-day we find the Viennese declaring

that there is only one city where real enjoyment can be had, and that city is Berlin. In all that goes to make up personal attractiveness, probably the best type of Berlinnerin is superior to the best type of Parisienne; but when we strike an average, we are forced to the conclusion that for natural grace and seductiveness, the girls of Paris remain unequalled.

Zukunft stated not long ago that Berlin is the greatest theatre-city in the world. But here again Berlin is not Germany, as London is England, or Paris France. Munich, Düsseldorf, and Leipsic, all rank much higher as theatre-cities than any provincial city in England or France. *Zukunft's* statement is probably true, if what is meant is that more high-class drama can be seen in Berlin than in any other great city; but it can hardly be meant to convey the impression that the mass of the people supports drama of that kind. Formerly the highest ambition of a German actor was to appear on the boards in the Burgtheater, Vienna, and the Viennese say that good drama is still far more highly patronised by the poorer classes in their city than by the corresponding classes in Berlin. Germany draws largely upon France and England for her drama. In the matter of Shakespearean production, the "private" Deutsches Theatre has done the community unforgettable service. *Much Ado about Nothing*, *Comedy of Errors*, *Hamlet*, *Julius Cæsar*, *Othello*,

Midsummer Night's Dream, have all appeared during the past twelve months. They are not sensationally staged; but no effort is spared to give the true interpretation to these masterpieces. Max Reinhardt's first great Shakespearean success was attained in the *Midsummer Night's Dream*. So much so that Mr. George Sylvester Viereck says he discovered Shakespeare. But we are used to these statements by this time from the Germans, or the American-Germans.

In the number of its hotels and restaurants proportionately to its other business establishments, perhaps Berlin may justly claim to be the world-city, and the cry is, Still they come. There are at present many enormous buildings in course of erection, and the majority of them are to supply further the ever-growing demand of tourists and bagmen for up-to-date hotel accommodation. Some time ago I read a statement by Sir Harry Johnston, that a first-class meal may be obtained for three shillings at many of the best hotels in Hamburg and Berlin—a remark which led to some controversy in the English papers where any statements about the price of food in Germany will soon provoke angry comment, or warm approbation, according to the particular politics of the journal. But I can confidently assert that here at Aschinger's, the world-renowned "Blue and White," I can get a very good meal for half the money mentioned by Sir Harry Johnston. The

company is not of the true de Vere stamp? Well, visitors who want that must, of course, pay extra. And yet at Kempinski's, and the Kaiserhof, and the Adlon, you will find that the upper ten also suck their teeth, and spit on the floor—sometimes.

Berlin has a greater rage for dancing than any other city in the world. *Berlin ist die tollste Tanzstadt der ganzen Welt.* The Berliners say so, and this time I believe they are right. There are dozens of firms whose employees make an excursion to some part of the suburbs once or twice a month (on Sundays) especially to enjoy a few hours of the "gay and giddy." In fact, the dancing rage is a characteristic of all the cities of Prussia.

Mr. Viereck says he could tell "strange things of the Friedrichstrasse, of uncouth passions and fantastic desires." No doubt he could. So could everybody else that has lived any time in the city. These "strange things," these "fantastic desires," are in evidence in the daytime as well as at night. But the reader has probably already heard too much of the sex question in Berlin. It is an interesting question, it is entertaining, it is elemental; but one gets tired of it with Morgenkaffe, Mittagstisch, and Abenbrod. Militarism, a not too high ideal of womankind, and the absence of free political institutions perhaps help to push it too much to the front in Prussia. There are other questions. It has been called the "eternal problem," and it is to be

hoped that it will remain true to name, for if it is ever solved the world will become dull for many Germans. When first I heard the expression *le vice allemand* I thought it was nothing but French slander; but I hadn't been in Berlin a week before I concluded that the "vice" was well named. And when the Frenchman calls the Berliners *coureurs de femmes* he might add *et d'hommes*. Berlin is a city of sin and the diseases of sin, but it is doubtful whether reminding people of the fact every five minutes will help to lighten the burden. In April, 1902, the *Hygienische Rundschau* published some startling statements about prostitution and sexual disease in Prussia. The statements were based upon reports sent in by doctors who had been requested to state the number of persons whom they had treated for these disorders on a given date. Only sixty-three per cent of the doctors answered the questions, and the number of patients was revealed as 40,902. The *Rundschau* calculated the number of persons attacked in Prussia alone at five hundred thousand annually. Towards the end of 1910 a Socialist paper stated that ninety per cent of the male population of Berlin had at some time or other suffered from some form of sexual disorder, and that in one-third of these cases the disease was of a serious nature. That estimate may be much too high. But if Professor Ehrlich's 606 can effect the cures claimed for it, he has conferred a greater boon on

his countrymen than all the von Kösters and von Tirpitzes that ever lived.

Yes, Berlin is a wicked city, but there are oases in the desert. It is full of strange sects and brotherhoods—Seventh-Day Adventists, Anabaptists, Nazarenes, and others—every one of which little communities is the true disciplehood. There is nothing strange in the appearance of the brethren, nor are they noisy like the followers of General Booth. One Sunday in March I paid a visit to a house in Bernhardstrasse, near the Wilmersdorf-Friedenau Station. Over the door is the sign "Christliche Gemeinschaft Sank Michael" (St. Michael Christian Brotherhood). The brothers' meeting does not last long. They greet one another, sing a song, a short address follows, and the service is over. There is sincerity in all these little bands of heroes. They bear manfully the jeers of the world. One poor fellow named Naumann, a Seventh-Day Adventist, when doing his military service refused to work on what he considered the Lord's Day. A clash of consciences. He is now in jail, and seems likely to remain there. Which reminds me of a case I read of the first time I was in London. One of the Peculiar People refused to send for a doctor when his son was dangerously ill. He was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for manslaughter, after a terrific lecture from the Christian judge on the heinousness of his offence. Yet both these offenders

were true to what they believed to be the command of God. Both had abundant scriptural authority for their conduct. It is the men who sent them to jail, the men in power, who are to blame for putting the Bible into the hands of children and telling them that it is the word of God. It is not the Seventh-Day Adventists and the Peculiar People who deserve the contempt of the world.

That acute observer and accurate recorder, M. Jules Huret, says that about fifteen years ago snobbism was unknown in Berlin. He seems inclined to blame the Americans for introducing it. Wealthy Yankees have come and displayed their wealth, have insisted on visiting Court, have so aped the ways and airs of the old families that the contagion has now spread throughout the city. He tells us that this snobbery is seen in the desire to patronise the charities which the Empress patronises, in the demand for the same brands of liquor and cigars as the Emperor consumes. I may add that it is also seen in the tendency to wear the upturned moustache and in the crowds that gather in the vicinity of the Brandenburger Tor in the hope of getting a glance at His Majesty. But the snobbery which finds expression in extolling every act and statement of the Kaiser, just as every act of his father was extolled, and as every act of his successor assuredly will be, is as old as monarchy. Offensive as is the upstart American millionaire who comes to the European capital to show off his

diamonds and champagne, there was probably some natural ability—however misapplied—behind the acquisition of his dollars. Nothing could be more snobbish than the Berliners' stereotyped references to their city as the heart of the world's culture. And the Americans cannot be blamed for that.

But let us leave the snobs and Friedrichstrasse for a last glance at old Berlin, for there is a bit of old Berlin still standing, though soon to be numbered with London's "Seven Dials" as one of the things that have been. Running off the Molkenmarkt is the "street" *am Krögel*, which is the oldest thoroughfare in Berlin. It is the same now as it was six centuries ago. Parts of this street are so narrow that only three foot-passengers can walk there abreast. All at once the whole noise of the great city is hushed. We are back in Mediævalism. No motor-cars, no trams, no bicycles. Am Krögel, according to the tradition, was an inlet or creek from the Spree, which was dammed back to form the street in the thirteenth century. We turn through a very narrow passage into a yard called the "Altberliner Hof," where there is a wooden sundial affixed to one of the walls. The Krögel-dwellers say that the dial is five hundred years old, and that in the days before the watchmaker's art was known all Berlin used to come here to find out the time. The occupants of the lane know its history, which boys and girls not yet in their teens can recount

fluently. They all give it in the same words. The little thoroughfare is smellsome, especially at the end where it abuts the Spree. The odours at this quarter are not wafted from Cologne. Outside a house at the corner opposite the lane (Molkenmarkt and Molkengasse) hangs an immense bone, which has given rise to two traditions. One is that it is the original rib that was taken from Adam when his better half was first fashioned, the other declares that it is taken from the stone Roland which stood in Am Krögel in the thirteenth century. On either theory there must have been giants in those days. Here in the same square is also the old city jail where delinquents were formerly executed. When the jail and Am Krögel disappear before the onward march of the great tyrant Progress, not only will the last visible trace of old Berlin history be blotted out, but also the last spot in the great city where the noise of train and motor had never penetrated. A broad up-to-date terrace facing the river is to take the place of the lane. Man shall not live by history alone.

CHAPTER XV

NOTES ON SOME MOVEMENTS

THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

THIS movement is comparatively new in Germany. A formal demand for female suffrage is said to have been made for the first time at a public meeting in Berlin on 2nd December, 1894, when Frau Lily von Gyzicki delivered an address on "Woman's Duties as Citizen." At the beginning of 1902 the "German Women's Suffrage League" was formed with its head-quarters in Hamburg. This city was chosen because in Prussia and some of the other States at that time women were not allowed either to form or join political unions. The work of the League was made still more difficult because many of the existing women's organisations were bitterly opposed to female suffrage. A fillip was given to the movement, however, by the establishment in Berlin, on 4th June, 1904, of the "World's Union for Female Suffrage." In 1905 Leagues were formed in Leipsic, Baden, Hesse, and Württemberg. On 17th February, 1908, the "Prussian Union for Female Suffrage" was formed by the amalgamation of the organisations

then working in Berlin, Frankfort a. M., and Brunzlau. At the end of 1910 the Union had flourishing branches in Königsberg, Danzig, Frankfort a. O., Stettin, Breslau, Zabrze, Kattowitz, Magdeburg, Hanover, Kiel, Altona, Bielefield, Minden i. W., Munster i. W., Dortmund, Bochum, Witten, Essen a. R., Elberfeld, Düsseldorf, Bonn, and Cologne. While these branches were being organised in Prussia, the movement was making good progress in the other States. Unions exist to-day in Bavaria, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, Württemberg, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Alsace-Lorraine.

But in a wider sense than that covered by the expression "the agitation for female suffrage," the women's movement here is strong and spreading daily, though it is not noisy. Many newspapers have a column every day on the *Frauenbewegung*. But the extent of the movement is not indicated only by women's unions and journals devoted to what is grandiloquently called "the political and economic emancipation of women." In Germany more than in England or Australia the agitation is a well-founded criticism rather than a loud protest. The increasing competition of women in every branch of industry, their admission to trade organisations, their trespassing upon what have been called "male occupations," their cultural progress both generally and in the fields of expert and technical knowledge, are outward and tangible things, matters of fact, not of

opinion. In 1882 there were 4¼ million females engaged in professional, commercial, or manual work; in 1895, 5¼ millions, in 1907, 8¼; while this year (1911) the number is estimated at 9⅓ millions. It is too late now to say that woman's place is in the home. The women's movement is closely connected with the economic development of Germany; but it is also part of the spiritual heaving and tossing felt throughout the country and not only inside the world of women. Such expressions as "Man the Monster" and "Tyrant Man," which used to be the watchwords of the agitation in some countries, are not heard here.

It is a bald platitude to say that the ideals of both men and women are changing. The ideal woman of old-time simple Germany was essentially one who conformed to custom, tradition, fashion, who "submitted to her husband in all things" and avoided as the plague any new ideas on religion, politics, or society. The Nietzschean charge that even in her own realm, in the domestic sphere, woman had never done anything original, is the most extraordinary ever made by man against woman.

In Christian countries for centuries man's ideal woman has been the frivolous, vain puppet, and it has always been the tradition that she "must keep her place" and on no account attempt to develop original ideas. Economic conditions forced her to live up to this ideal. In the "upper" classes her

ambitions have been limited to one aim—the securing a husband who could keep her "according to her station in life." In the middle strata of society the situation has been the same with the additional degradation that she has had to ape her sisters in the so-called higher ranks. When we come to the proletarian class we find her at the bottom of the whole social heap—the dependent of a dependent. We have only to recall the brutally plain but meaningful expression, "The Marriage Market," to realise how impossible it is for an economic bondswoman to shake off conventionality and stand before man face to face, physically, mentally, and morally independent.

The recognition by men of woman's *right* in the ordinary sense is far from general in Germany. The fierce controversy now raging over the appointment of women to the control of the Girls' Higher Schools shows the mental horizon of some of the country's learned men. In April, 1906, one hundred and twenty-six headmasters of public Girls' Higher Schools protested against any preference for women in appointments to the leading positions. The protest was renewed in August, 1907, and again in August, 1908. Nor has there been merely opposition to preference for women. Many of the schoolmasters insist on the inferiority of woman as an educative personality for the training of her own sex, while others say that male teachers will not, and

ought not to, accept subordinate positions in a school controlled by a woman.[1]

At the beginning of 1910 a petition signed by about seven thousand male teachers was presented to the Prussian State Parliament, praying that only men should be appointed heads of either primary or middle schools for girls. This prayer was not granted, but another petition has just been presented. There is not the least likelihood that this will meet with more success than the first, but it is a regrettable thing to see men thus belittling the influence of woman in the very sphere in which she has done so much valuable work. The opinion of the really educated public on this question is falling more and more into the balance in favour of the women. Of the public Girls' Higher Schools in Prussia, in 1893, nineteen were under the control of women; in 1901 twenty-seven, in 1911 over fifty.

At the beginning of this year (1911) Dr. Marie Linden was appointed one of the Professors in the medical faculty in the University of Bonn, she being the first woman in the German Empire that has been so honoured. The whole teaching staff of the University approved and welcomed the nomination of Dr. Linden. The Prussian Department of Public Instruction, however, has just notified the University

[1] See Die höhere *Mädchenschule an einem Wendepunkt ihrer Geschichte* (1911), by Professor Langemann. Also an article by Herr W. Brieke in *Die Mädchenschule* (1906, No. 4, p. 61).

that the appointment is not approved by the Ministry, and that the permit to lecture will not be granted. Such are the methods by which the common work of men and women is limited and injured, and the life of the State disharmonised.

In the *Heidelberger Tageblatt* recently (No. 283) Dr. Arnold Ruge, Ph.D. said :—

"This women's movement is a scandal revolting alike to men and women, it is not a proper women's movement, but only an agitation of those who cannot be women and do not want to be mothers. It is a movement of old maids, barren women, and Jewesses, but mothers and those who fulfil the duties of mothers are not found supporting it."

These statements have been put forward so often by the opponents of female suffrage and of women's encroachment upon "male occupations" that those who keep making them probably believe that they are quite true. The statements are not borne out by facts. It has been proved that an overwhelming majority of the women in the female suffrage leagues are mothers.[1]

Here—and the same thing was done in Australia and is still being done in England—those who oppose woman's entry into the field of politics say that she does not understand political questions; but what they really mean is that they do not want her to

[1] See *Heidelberger Zeitung*, No. 289; also *Die Frau* (January, 1911), p. 197.

understand them. From the way in which some men try to drive home this argument it would never be imagined that we still have in our midst sweating and child-labour.

Do those who have been making the laws all through the years understand these questions? At the beginning of this year (1911) the Australian Senate expressed the opinion that the extension of the franchise to women had greatly benefited the political life of the Commonwealth. I commend that opinion to the close attention of those people in Germany and England who are opposed to the "interference" of women in political affairs. Such a resolution as that passed by the Australian Senate should carry more weight than tons of logic and argument.

"Political and economic emancipation." Man has not yet attained that for himself in Germany or anywhere else. But in Germany, perhaps more than in England, the Women's Movement is part of a wider movement, of a realisation by both sexes of the fact that the first condition of ethical action is freedom on the part of the actors, male and female, and that only through such freedom can we ever fill out the communal life.

AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

On 1st March, 1870, speaking on the Prussian criminal law and certain proposed amendments,

Bismarck strongly denounced the opponents of capital punishment. He said that they over-valued their life, that man had an immortal soul, and that abhorrence of the death penalty was nothing but a disease of the time. Germany has seen many changes since 1st March, 1870.

Within my two years here three jurists' conferences have been held in different parts of the Empire. At each of them the question of capital punishment was discussed at great length, and though in each case a majority of the members finally voted in favour of retaining the death sentence for murder, in each case the majority was reduced. On 12th September, 1910, fifty voted in favour of the death penalty and twenty-four against it.

The subject is receiving increased attention daily in the Press, and the last few months have seen the publication of a large number of pamphlets on the question. Many advocates of the death penalty, and in particular some of the Conservative journals, characterised the speeches of the minority at the last conference as "exhibitions of over-drawn sentimentality." But sentimentality is not at the bottom of the agitation, but rather science. The feeling with which a growing number of people are opposing this form of punishment is partly due to the study of criminology and scientific penology, which are driving out of civilised society the older metaphysical conceptions of "guilt and innocence" and demon-

strating that crime is conditioned by social circumstances and pathology. Professor Franz von Liszt, Berlin's greatest living criminologist, thus affirms the unscientific nature of the older view :—

" The conceptions of sin and atonement may continue to live as before in the creations of our poets but they are open to severe criticism at the hands of pure science. At the same time the conception of punishment recedes into the background, and its place is taken by that of reform and surveillance " (*Strafrechtliche Aufsätze*, p. 229).

This feeling is not sympathy with crime, it merely expresses a unity of social consciousness. A disease in the social organism cannot be outrooted by committing an offence upon the organism itself. I have never noticed the effect of this outrage on the social organism so clearly as in two cases, one in Germany and the other in Australia.

During my stay here several executions have taken place. The last that I know of was carried out on 28th January, 1911, in Insterburg, where a servant-woman named Milkoweit, twenty-four years of age, was executed by the method in use in most parts of Germany—decapitation. There is no need to go into the details of the crime. But unless the comments in the Press and all the opinions I have heard count for nothing, I am justified in saying that the majority of the German people felt shocked and degraded by the execution of this young woman.

As the subject is at present so prominently before the public in Germany, I may mention the other case to which I have just referred, because here too the public revolt against the carrying out of the death sentence was even more marked. Some years ago in Brisbane, Queensland, a boy named Horrocks, seventeen years of age, was hanged for the murder of his mate, a lad named Weissmullen. I had an opportunity of judging Australian feeling at the time, and can safely say that ninety-nine per cent of the people of Queensland were disgusted and outraged at the thought of a boy seventeen years of age being deliberately put to death by the law for any offence whatsoever.

CREMATION

Anyone who has read the Prussian Press during the past twelve months must have noticed in nearly every newspaper the almost daily appearance of about a column of matter under the heading "Feuersbestattung" ("Cremation"). If there had been little or no opposition to the movement, of course this public interest in the subject would not have shown itself. But the number of those who want this mode of disposing of the dead made permissive has grown enormously during the past three or four years, while the Catholics as a body will strenuously combat the proposal as anti-Christian, and a less pronounced dislike to it also still lingers in the minds of some Protestants.

The first German Crematorium was erected at Gotha (Coburg-Gotha) in 1878,[1] and others have been erected since at Hamburg, Heidelberg, Jena, Offenbach, Eisenach, Mayence, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim. There are also throughout the Empire over fifty societies, with about fifty thousand members, supporting the movement. A Bill has just (March, 1911) been introduced into the Prussian Parliament to allow cremation throughout the State.

The fierce opposition of the Catholic Centre would lead one to suppose that Parliament wanted to make cremation compulsory and not merely permissive. Formerly the Party laid stress on purely religious arguments; but now it is working against the measure on "both religious and sanitary grounds." The Centremen are always reminding the Protestants that cremation is not contemplated in the Bible; but there is no mention in the inspired volume of railways and telephones and motor-cars, articles of Modernism of which Catholics and Protestants alike make daily use. The curious sensitiveness of the party was seen in the speeches of Dr. Schmitt and Herr Müller, who said that the Bill was a blow aimed at the faith. Their great Press organ, *Germania* (22nd March, 1811), also asserted that the proposal

[1] Dr. Johannes Leonhart says that Friedrich Siemens erected a private crematorium in Dresden some years previously, which was used for the first time in 1872, when the wife of the English ambassador, Sir Charles Dilke, was cremated; but the further use of the apparatus was forbidden by the City Council.

to allow cremation was directly intended to weaken the Christian religion. Exactly in what way it is intended to do so is not stated, but the idea in the minds of the opponents of the Bill seems to be that cremation will gradually break up belief in the immortality of the soul. And yet the question has been often asked, How many martyrs of the Church have perished in the flames and what became of them? But one may also ask, What has become of the wicked heretics who perished by fire? Were the souls of these men destroyed, lost to future punishment? I should be sorry to think that *Germania's* theology is unsound in regard to so important a doctrine as eternal punishment.

With the exception of Dr. C. A. Ewald, who declares that from a purely hygienic point of view nothing is to be gained by cremation,[1] all the German authorities I have seen quoted assert that cremation is a more sanitary method than burial for disposing of dead bodies, particularly in crowded centres of population and in cases where death was due to contagious disease.

Cremation has not yet been legalised in Prussia and Bavaria, but in the other parts of the Empire it is making great progress in spite of all clerical dis-

[1] *Deutsche Revue* (April, 1910), p. 83. Dr. Trusen, medical adviser to the city authorities in Neisse, first petitioned the Prussian State Parliament to legalise cremation. This was in 1855, and the grounds of the petition were essentially hygienic.

approval.[1] In 1910 the bodies of 445 Roman Catholics were cremated in Germany. During the first four months of 1911, 2528 bodies were cremated; during the corresponding period of 1910, 1934.

ANTI-SEMITISM

I noticed the first day I arrived in Germany an advertisement in one of the papers concluding with the words "Keine Juden" ("No Jews"). I soon found out that such advertisements and such prejudice were quite common.

There has been a distinct anti-Semitic party in the Reichstag since 1881, and already over fifty candidates for the coming elections declare that they will make the anti-Jewish cry the main part of their programme. The history of the movement from that date is a record of religious prejudice, social and economic jealousy, personal intrigue and blackmail, the underground engineering of party politicians, and, altogether, forms one of the most unedifying pages in German annals since the foundation of the Empire. In 1878 the Court-preacher, Pastor Adolf Stöcker, founded the Christian Socialist Party. He feared that Jewish influence in Germany would ultimately become so strong that it would injure the Christian

[1] The Bill permitting cremation has now (May, 1911) passed the Prussian State Parliament by the narrow majority of two; but before a crematorium may be erected in any district two-thirds of the residents must vote in favour of it.

faith and German nationalism. About the same time Treitschke and Lagarde also became active workers in the agitation, and later Bismarck, when it suited him for political purposes, lent his support to the movement, but, *more suo*, in an underhand way. The formation of other organisations soon followed — the Anti-Semitic League in 1880, the German People's Union and the German Imperial Union in 1881. In this year the German Reform Party declared that its main object was to prevent Jews from entering either the Imperial or the State Parliament, and from holding positions in either the Government or the municipal service. Even these proposals were too mild to satisfy the extremists. These men, under the leadership of Liebermann and Förster, formed the German Social Anti-Semitic Party at Bochum in 1889, and what was called " the full Bochum programme " had for its aim the " annulment of the principle of equal rights for Jews, and the exclusion of foreign Jews from Germany." The most violent of the Anti-Semites was Hermann Ahlwardt, who was elected to the Reichstag in 1892. The sweeping and sensational charges which he brought against all Jews, high and low, collectively and individually, alienated the more moderate opponents of Judaism. Almost immediately after his election he wrote a pamphlet, " Judenflinten " (" Jewish Guns "), in which he charged a firm with having knowingly swindled the State by supplying

inferior weapons. For this libel he was sentenced to five months' imprisonment.

The Jews are still excluded from the diplomatic and Government services and from certain positions in the army. In March this year (1911), on the discussion of the military estimates in the Reichstag, several members spoke in strong terms of the injustice that Jews suffer in never being promoted to be Reserve officers; but the Government refused to make any promise to alter the scandalous state of affairs under which Jewish citizens have the same duties as Christians, but not the same rights.

A book written (in German) by an Englishman, Mr. H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlage des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* ("The Foundation of the Nineteenth Century"), has perhaps gone as far as any recent anti-Jewish outburst to try to prove that the Jews are narrow, ignorant, and sterile, incapable of genuine religious feeling, materialists by nature. They show their narrowness and materialism by believing that they are the Chosen People. In the Teuton a similar conviction is proof of spirituality and a broad outlook upon men and affairs. The Jews are, further, intolerant and incapable of original thought. But they have one virtue—a sense of the importance of race purity. This book is published at twenty-five shillings, has reached its eighth edition, and nearly one hundred thousand copies have been sold. It is said that the Kaiser has read the two large volumes

through three times. Those who know anything about the Jews in Germany can only smile at the statement that they have given Europe a spirit of intolerance and are incapable of original thought. Mr. Chamberlain is an apologist for everything Protestant and Prussian. How much tolerance the extreme section of the Prussian Protestants is willing to show to Protestant liberal theologians can be seen from the recent cases of Traub and Jatho.

All these attempts to keep back the Jews have driven them to oppose the union of Church and State and thus help the movement for formally leaving the Church (*Austrittsbewegung*). The Jews from Marx and Lasalle down to the time of Paul Singer, have also largely supported Social Democracy. Anti-Semitism does not, of course, account for the Socialism of these men; but it may account for the strong support given to the Social Democrats by hundreds of Jews to-day who feel the stigma of the constant references to Judaism as the enemy of the Teutonic race.

CHAPTER XVI

THE DANISH QUESTION

Of the numerous complicated "questions" in European history there are not many so complicated as that of Schleswig-Holstein when considered in all its bearings. For centuries the two duchies had stood in close relationship to Denmark; but Holstein had always contained a large Prussian element which from time to time had attempted to stir up anti-Danish feeling. There was undoubtedly some genuine dissatisfaction with Danish rule, not only in Holstein, but, to a less extent, in Schleswig. It is, however, none the less certain that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of both duchies distrusted Prussia, though the latter had on more than one occasion sent troops to aid them against Denmark. In 1849 they gave Prussia to understand that they could provide their own men for their struggles and wanted no outside assistance. They dreaded Prussian treachery, which clearly aimed at deriving advantage from the state of chaos in the two provinces. In the early 'sixties Bismarck found his opportunity for using this chaos. At the end of 1862 he had become Prime Minister of

Prussia. He foresaw more clearly than any other man in Europe, with the possible exception of Palmerston, that the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein would be the first step towards Prussian hegemony on the Continent. In his *Reflexions and Reminiscences* he gives the true state of the case in very few words :—

" The German fleet and the port of Kiel as a base for it had been a burning question since 1848, and at the fire which this question kindled German efforts for union gathered and warmed themselves."

On the death in 1863 of the King of Denmark, Prince Frederic of Augustenburg, acting with the strong support of Germany, claimed the duchies. Bismarck's diplomacy throughout shows the man perhaps better than anything else in his career. He who " made wars but never drifted into them," having matured his plans, decided to strike suddenly. He declared that the policy of Denmark was to discriminate unfairly between the Prussian subjects and the other inhabitants of Schleswig and, especially, Holstein. The Danes replied — and the statement represented the facts—that the comparatively small minority of Prussians in Schleswig were constantly working to undermine Danish influence.

Had Denmark been thoroughly prepared she could, owing to the nature of the country, have offered an almost unconquerable resistance to Prussia. But she

was not prepared. The disastrous events of 1864 compelled her to resign the duchies to the crowns of Prussia and Austria; the disastrous events of 1866 compelled the latter to resign all rights in the duchies to the King of Prussia. In 1870 the Danes thought they saw more than a glimmer of hope. The events of that and the following year effectually extinguished the glimmer.

These facts are merely of historical interest now. What is the position to-day? Prussia has been trying for nearly half a century to Germanise the provinces, with the result that there is less German nationalism in them now than there was before 1850. Prussia herself, as in Alsace-Lorraine, has done more than the original mother-country to keep the soul of the provinces anti-German. Far from the Danish national spirit weakening it is strengthening with the years. *Preussentum*, with its official tyranny, rules and regulations, has everywhere stimulated the national energy of those conquered provinces that have come under its control. It is Germany's own worst enemy.

In 1898 von Köller (Lord-Lieutenant of the provinces) asserted with characteristic Prussian bluster that he would introduce the "proper measures" to deal with all attempts to fan the flame of Danish nationalism. He called these measures the policy of the "strong hand" (*die feste Hand*). Many Danes and troublesome foreigners were banished,

foreign servants had to be dismissed, and public meetings were broken up by the police. All of which proceedings were putting back the Germanisation of the provinces for decades. Yet Dr. Heinrich Hahn (Flensburg) says that " von Köller's methods were only too soon abandoned," and that " mildness was taken for weakness " !

To-day Danes hold the seat in the Reichstag and also in the Prussian Three-class House of " Representatives," notwithstanding the efforts made, in the latter case, to weaken Danish influence by gerrymandering the electorates.

In order to counteract Danish energy the " German Union for North Schleswig " was formed in November, 1890. To-day it has ninety-three branches, and receives considerable financial support from the Pan-Germanists in Prussia. Over against this must be set the three strong Danish organisations : the Language Union, formed in 1881, the Electoral League, in 1884, and the School Union, in 1892, each of which has nearly eight thousand members. The School Union was formed because the Government put a stop to the practice of sending children to Denmark to be educated. These children are now sent to Danish continuation schools, and the instruction received is certainly not calculated to make them love Prussia. All the political clubs together number more than twenty thousand members. The Language Union has established 187 people's libraries, 70

lecturing and reading associations, 40 gymnastic and sporting clubs, and 8 Young People's Societies—all of them working to keep alive the national feeling. Religion, though the same as that practised in North Germany, is used for all it is worth to forward Danish influence. The "Union for Furthering Church Life" holds yearly over a hundred meetings, in which men and women speakers from Denmark give addresses. There are, lastly, four large daily papers published in Danish.

In 1896 Hanssen, the representative of the provinces in the Three-class House, declared that no reconciliation proposed by Prussia would satisfy North Schleswig, the aim of the Nationalists being complete separation from the Prussian system and incorporation in Denmark. In 1908 Nissen, another representative in the same chamber, said: "Everything German, everything that comes from the south, is like quicksand blown over our fields."

Young Denmark is increasingly hateful of Prussia and all things Prussian. Its leading Press organ, *Flensborg Avis*, thus stated the aims of the young Nationalists in April, 1910:—

"The ideal of our youth is not only the retention of our language and customs, but, further, the maintenance of the hope of reunion with the motherland."

The struggle between Danish and German nationalism is raging stronger to-day than it has been for

fifty years. At a public meeting recently a Danish Irredentist asserted :—

" Northern Schleswig has never been so Danish as it is at the present moment " (*Deutsche Tageszeitung*, 26th March, 1911).[1]

If Germany became engaged in a war on the European continent she would have on her northern, eastern, and western frontiers three hostile elements to weaken her within her own territory. This is the reverse side of *Pruessentum.*

[1] Cf. the remarks of the pro-German Hansen Blom in his speech on " Die dänische Frage " in Kiel, 31st May, 1911.

CHAPTER XVII

A GLANCE AT THE PRESENT CHANCELLOR

" ALL who are striving for equal rights for all citizens in matters of finance, to deal equally and impartially as between all economic interests, not only in agriculture, trade, industry, and business, but also where the manual labourer is concerned, and all who want to see the people politically cultured in the widest sense, can never take sides with Herr Bethmann-Hollweg, but must necessarily find themselves in opposition to him at all points " (Dr. Paul Michaelis, *Von Bismarck bis Bethmann*, 1911 ed., pp. 70, 71).

The present Chancellor of Germany and Prime Minister of Prussia is a doctor of philosophy, and in any estimate of him as man or statesman that fact must be carefully kept in view. In September, 1910, a writer in the *Hamburg Courier*, who claimed personal acquaintanceship with the Chancellor, declared that Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg's inmost convictions could be summed up concisely thus: " In the beginning God created the Prussian official, and He beheld everything that He had made, and lo! it was very good." In him are incarnate all the best and worst qualities

of the Prussian official drawn from the fine old Prussian landed aristocracy. He is not so one-sided as to desire to lay the violent hand of Progress upon the red-tapeism now being so vigorously protested against all over the Empire, yet on the other hand he sometimes speaks as if he would like to make some alterations in the service, to move a brick here and there in a building which he regards as, on the whole, sacred and inviolate. He is a doctor of philosophy, and such doctors learn, before all things, to look at every side of a question. This was seen in his speeches and general attitude in the Prussian State Parliament in February, 1910, when a new electoral system was proposed for Prussia—a Bill for electoral "reform," which left the Three-class House untouched in any essential particular. He seemed to be on the point of making concessions to Liberalism, then shook his head wisely and withdrew them, again made admissions, then qualified them, declared there was a growing dissatisfaction with certain aspects of bureaucracy, then emphasised all that the Germany of to-day owes to *Preussentum*. "The official is a servant of the State," he said, "not a servant of a party." His defence of the Prussian official has caused him to be styled "the most reactionary Prussian Minister that has yet appeared." The *Bremer Nachrichten* (28th September, 1910) said that he is "a typical product of a bygone period." But what is "a typical product of a bygone period"?

Surely the man who can never realise that he must reckon with the thousand and one factors that make up the social organism which is ever growing. And this is just what Bethmann-Hollweg can never bring himself to realise. Hence his support, which was doubtless quite conscientious, of the Kaiser when the latter asserted that he did not hold the crown from people and parliament, but was an " instrument of the Lord." Germany needs to-day more than ever a strong-willed man to hold the reins of government, but one who can see beyond the narrow interests of agrarian and official, who can and will make those who are paid by the community understand that they are the community's servants.

But Bethmann-Hollweg is not the man for such a task. Stein's *Autorität nicht Majorität* is essentially his theory of government. He wants the nation to remain an army subjected to rigorous discipline, commencing in the school, attending the individual on his military service, and continuing throughout the rest of his life. Whatever " duty " the State imposes the individual must accept without resistance. His teachers and rulers instil into him the doctrine of the divine right of Officialdom. During the time I have been in Germany the list of cases of fine or imprisonment inflicted on journalists and others for commenting on officials' actions would fill several pages. Many of these comments, made under similar circumstances in Great Britain, the United States, or

Australia, would pass unnoticed. And of this caste-system Bethmann-Hollweg is one of the strongest supporters that have yet led the Government. In that support alone he is a deadly enemy of mental freedom and expansion of political ideas and ideals. Hardly anyone will deny this after reading his and his colleagues' " explanations " of the cruel and cowardly acts of the police at Moabit, when an unarmed workman named Hermann, quietly proceeding to his work and not within a hundred yards of the scene of the strike, was knocked down and brutally done to death by the policemen's sabres. No doubt he disapproved inwardly as much as anyone else of what had taken place—for he is not wanting in humanity personally—but *das Beamtentum* must always be defended, or, where complete defence is out of the question, at least let down as lightly as possible.

This is the key to the inner political condition in Germany, and therewith is involved, ultimately, foreign policy as well. On the one side stands Officialdom, which includes Tradition, Monarchy, the State Church, and the Public Servants. On the other stands, or rather kneels, struggling to stand, the mass, the idea of popular sovereignty, the demand for parliamentary government, for ministers responsible to the people's representatives. The section of the people working for this political freedom is, I say, struggling to stand, but every day sees it a little

stronger on its feet. Many who admit all that has been said by the apologists for Officialdom—that the greatness of Germany has been to some extent due to it, that Germany's geographical position requires a strong central monarchy—are also obliged to admit that the present ruling classes are fast losing control of public opinion and of all social classes except the feudal landowners, who, of course, are satisfied with existing conditions because they can overthrow recalcitrant ministries, and because they see the higher officials drawn from their own ranks. The supporters of the other parties want parliamentary ministers because they see in the background some hope of party victory.

Bethmann-Hollweg is the first Imperial Chancellor whose experience is confined solely to the inner political life of the country. He had been a district magistrate, Minister of the Interior, and State Secretary for Home Affairs before he entered the Chancellor's office. In family and education he stands nearer to the East German landed aristocracy than Bülow did. His whole career, his whole reach and attitude on political questions, show the limitations of caste-politics. The Agrarian Union may select an able specialist to deal with certain problems, but they cannot select a statesman with a knowledge of folk-psychology. Bülow had a higher sense of the value of public opinion. This could be proved by taking at random a speech of each statesman on

almost any question; but it is especially noticeable when we compare Bülow's defence of constitutionalism on 17th November, 1908, after the *Daily Telegraph* interview, with Bethmann-Hollweg's eagerness to back every word and syllable of the Königsberg speech, in which the Kaiser flouted Parliament and expressed his contempt for "meetings of the people and opinions of the day." Even Gustav von Schmoller, in his extravagant eulogy of the present Chancellor (*Neue Freie Presse*, 4th June, 1911), admits that his strongly monarchical views and disinclination to allow scope for the play of public opinion show a certain narrowness. Herr Schmoller says that Bülow could not have nominated a better man as his successor; but it has been suggested more than once that Bülow hit upon Bethmann-Hollweg in order to show how indispensable he was himself.

In his speech on the Catholic oath against Modernism the Chancellor once more proved that he is a philosopher—of the class-room. He expressed the hope that the Pope would not go too far in the way of reaction, which may mean almost anything. If he sees as clearly as Bülow that the ultramontane spirit is pressing upon all provinces of public life, upon national independence, upon free cultural development, he has certainly never expressed himself so clearly. In an interview granted to the *Hamburger Correspondent* on 13th July, 1909, the ex-Chancellor said:—

"I decided to resign because the attitude of the Conservatives has brought them into the closest union with the Centre and made the latter the dominant political influence in the Empire. I regard it as one of our greatest dangers that a party based on a religious, non-political standpoint, and representing, even religiously, a minority, should hold the balance of political power in the Empire."

Bethmann-Hollweg's recent speech on Anglo-German relations and the competition in armaments, when he declared that no proposal had ever been put forward by Great Britain for Germany's acceptance or refusal, was in marked contrast to Bülow's straight answer to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that it was impossible to frame any agreement that would be acceptable to Germany because she would thereby be committed to permanent inferiority.

The greatest journalist in Germany, Herr Oscar Schnitz, who has spent a considerable time in England and France studying local politics, tells Germany that she may well congratulate herself that she is not ruled on parliamentary lines if those two countries are. He condemns party government in the strongest terms, and some of his arguments against it are theoretically unanswerable. The Germans are always on very solid ground when they have to deal only with theory. But surely the system prevailing in Germany is party-government in one of its worst forms. What is the "Blue-Black Block"? Perhaps

never before in a representative parliament has such an example been witnessed of the political demoralisation wrought by feudal privilege banded with a clerical party whose religion it hates and would persecute if it could. Take the last three Chancellors, Hohenlohe, Bülow, and Bethmann-Hollweg. Are these men not class-conscious ? They all belong to the same class and have always supported its interests. They denounce as disturbers of social stability those who preach the gospel of hatred of the "upper" classes, but they just as strenuously preach the gospel of distrust of liberty and the masses. They cannot reconcile a wide political and religious tolerance with social stability, and yet only in such reconciliation is there any hope for progress. This withholding of political life from the people robs them of a certain amount of culture, of political outlook, of a sense of personal corporateness in the commonwealth. What evidence have the ruling classes in Germany ever given that they alone represent the political intelligence of the community ? During the two and a half years that Bethmann-Hollweg has been at the helm in the Empire he has not made a single speech that breathes a spirit of liberty and progress. He is everlastingly harping on the word *Parteilosigkeit* (freedom from party politics), which is only a cloak to cover one of the worst forms of party government. He has said a hundred times that one of the principal aims of

himself and of his Government is to down Social Democracy. But in a country like Germany any man with the Kaiser and the army behind him can and will say that. It is an assertion that shows nothing of the statesman and outlines no practical policy. That the "red danger" (*die rote Gefahr*) is a real danger for Bethmann-Hollweg and his party is a statement that hardly needs so much laboured asseveration.

Responsible ministries must ultimately be conceded to the German people. When the present Chancellor expresses the contrary opinion he simply shows how limited are the notions of statecraft held by a dominant caste, ruling not by intellectual superiority, but by chance of birth, and how unable he is to interpret German political aspiration. In his speech (already referred to) in the Prussian State Parliament just after his appointment as Chancellor, he declared that the parliamentary system of party government could never be introduced into Germany as long as the power of the monarchy remained unbroken.

"The power of this monarchy, whose proud tradition is that it is a monarchy for all, shall not be tampered with. . . . There is in many circles a desire that Prussia may become so democratised by the granting of a modern form of electoral right that in the end a democratic Federal Council may determine the fate of the Empire."

He further states that in all countries where parlia-

ments had been elected on a democratic franchise, political principles were shallow and progress was blocked. Bismarck, who had grown up in an atmosphere of "divine right," and whose defence of absolutism was fairly sincere, said in the Reichstag on 17th September, 1878, that he preferred a parliament in which the voice of the people could make itself distinctly heard. A good many things have happened in Germany since then, some of them probably unforeseen even by Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg.

CHAPTER XVIII

BAGDAD AND THE PERSIAN GULF

"THE control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiality, a 'fleet in being' there, based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the farther East, to India and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire, regarded as a political system; and although at present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position" (A. T. Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect*, pp. 224, 225).

Both in England and Germany during the past twelve months the public has heard or read something almost daily about the Bagdad railway. The history of the various projects for establishing railway communication between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf has been given so often lately that it is unnecessary to repeat it here. This short note merely aims at presenting to English readers German views and opinions on the subject as expressed in nearly all

quarters of the Fatherland. Nothing could show more conclusively the present mind of Germany towards Great Britain than the statements which have appeared in every section of the Press recently concerning the possibilities and stirring prospects which the new line will open up. At the very moment when England is striving to come to an understanding with Germany on the question of naval armaments and in other matters supposed to be of mutual interest, the German Press and politicians are showing unmistakably and unanimously how they view the situation. They go far to confirm what was once said by Professor Dicey—that it is difficult for an Englishman who has never lived on the Continent to realise the extent to which the mere existence of the British Empire is a source of irritation. The prevailing note struck proclaims not how much benefit will accrue to Germany, but how far Great Britain will be weakened. Perhaps these are only two counterparts of one proposition.

The *Vossische Zeitung* recently asserted that the railway is one of the triumphs of German diplomacy, and will be carried to the Gulf with or without the consent of Great Britain; while the *Frankfurter Zeitung* declared a few months ago that if England attempts to block the extension of the line to the Gulf she must simply be swept out of the way. Dr. Paul Rohrbach, who has visited Asia Minor four times and knows the country thoroughly, is considered

the greatest authority in Germany, if not in Europe, on this question. After referring to the changed international attitude of Germany towards Great Britain since 1890, when Heligoland was exchanged by the latter for certain rights in East Africa—a cession which he asserts would be unthinkable in England to-day—he goes on :—

"If it came to a matter of war with England it would be for Germany simply a question of life or death. The possibility that events may turn out favourably for us depends wholly and solely upon whether we can succeed in bringing England herself into a dangerous position. That cannot be brought about in any way by a direct attack in the North Sea, all idea of invading England is purely chimerical. We must therefore look for another combination that will enable us to attack England at a vulnerable spot —and this brings us to the point where, as regards Germany's policy, the situation in Turkey and the conditions prevailing there decide that policy, the corner-stone of which to-day is, to keep her attention riveted on England" (*Die Bagdadbahn*, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 18).

He then proceeds to show, completely to his own satisfaction, that there is only one place where England can be attacked on land by a European Power, namely, in Egypt, and that the strengthening of Turkey means that England will ultimately lose the control of the Suez Canal and all influence in Persia,

possibly also Central and East Africa and India (*ibid.*, p. 19).

After the Berlin Congress German trade with Turkey began to make giant strides, and every year now sees it advance. The value of German exports to Turkey rose from thirty-three million marks in 1901 to sixty-seven millions in 1904. When the Hamid regime broke up England and France were looked upon as friends of the Young Turks, and the German policy was to assert as loudly as possible that it suits England's policy, above all other things, to keep Turkey weak and split up. This statement has been so persistently and consistently circulated by Germans in and out of Turkey that it is now accepted by the Young Turks. The Turkish army has been remodelled on the pattern of the German by military instructors supplied by the Pan-Germanist, General von der Goltz. The extent of German influence was further revealed recently in connection with the negotiations for a Turkish loan, while travellers declare that every city of importance in the Empire is overrun with German bankers, clerks, and bagmen.

Herr Ernest Bötticher, who has written extensively on this question, says much to the same effect as Dr. Rohrbach, and ridicules Great Britain's claim to a protectorate over Koweit or to political control over any part of the Gulf. (See especially *Der Reichsbote*, 26th March, 1911.)

The Socialistic *Leipziger Volkszeitung* in March

this year declared with unrestrained jubilation that since Potsdam England has no hope of co-operating with Russia to exploit Mesopotamia, and that the new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor will hasten the final break-up of the British Empire, which is already beginning to totter (*schwanken*). In another Socialist publication, *Die Neue Zeit* (2nd June, 1911, pp. 293, 300) Herr Karl Radek tells us very frankly :—

"The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success of which, attained with so much effort, is the Bagdad railway, the victory of the revolutionary party in Turkey, the prospect of a modern revolutionary movement in India, which, of course, must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier scattered risings of individual tribes, the movement toward nationalism in Egypt, the beginning of reform in Persia—all this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political significance of the Bagdad railway question.

"The Bagdad railway being a blow at the interests of English Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the German Company because she knew that Germany's army and navy stood behind her, which makes it appear to England and Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey."[1]

[1] Herr Radek's article is, however, on the whole, the fairest I have seen.

Professor R. Mangelsdorf, another recognised authority on German policy and politics, is equally candid :—

" The political and military power which an organised railway system will confer upon Turkey is altogether in the interest of Germany, which can only obtain a share in actual economic developments if Turkey is independent ; and besides, any attempt to increase the power and ambition of England, in any case oppressively great, is thereby effectively thwarted. To some extent, indeed, Turkey's constructing a railway system is a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most vulnerable part of the body of England's world-empire, namely, Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility " (*Akademische Blätter*, Berlin, 1st June, 1911).

I could easily lengthen the list, for it would be difficult to find a public man or a newspaper in Germany willing to admit the force or justice of any argument on this matter that tells in favour of Great Britain. On the contrary, the whole enterprise is hailed as the first step in a move forward to the time when Germany or Turkey, or both, will be able to strike England in the " most vulnerable part of the body." It is more abundantly clear than ever that English Imperialism must follow with the closest attention any alteration in the relative position of the Powers on the Persian Gulf. Captain Mahan gives three reasons why Britain must exercise para-

mount political influence in the Gulf—first, for the mere security of India; second, to maintain control of the sea-way to India and the farther East; and third, to advance the economic welfare of India which can only act politically through the Empire.[1] For a century this has been Great Britain's policy, and she has spared neither blood nor treasure to carry it through. At her own expense she has surveyed and charted the Gulf waters, lighted the coast, and erected telegraph stations. Since the beginning of last century the piratical tribes of Eastern Arabia have been one after another held in check, with the result that the ocean highway has been kept clear. The smuggling of arms into Persia and Beluchistan intended to pass through Afghanistan for the ultimate use of the wild clans on the North-west Frontier of India has also been checked, if not entirely stopped. English gunboats are, in fact, still busy with this work, which is rendered the more difficult because Muscat, the central mart for distributing the arms, is used by the French as a coaling station, and French firms have done a thriving trade in fire-arms and ammunition with the natives. Hand in hand with these military precautions diplomatic measures have been brought to bear, with the result that most of the native chiefs on the West Coast of the Gulf, including the Sheikh of Koweit, have been brought into political dependence upon Great Britain. In

[1] *l.c.*, p. 224.

spite of all this, we are openly and offensively told that our past work counts for nothing, that we are playing a dog-in-the-manger game in asking for any share in the control of the line, and that the railway will be extended to the Gulf with or without the approval of England.

CHAPTER XIX

NORTH AND SOUTH

PRUSSIANS, Bavarians, Saxons, Holsteiners, Schlesiens, Thuringians, Hessians, Prussian Poles, Rhinelanders, and many others are included in popular English phraseology under the appellation "German." Omitting Alsace-Lorraine, which is administered from Prussia, the German Empire is made up of twenty-five states, which still retain a considerable part of their original sovereignty. Though the Germans are, and feel that they are, one people, Germany is not yet homogeneous either racially or politically. There is a difference between the East Prussian and the Westphalian, and even between a Berliner and a Bremer. The distinction between North and South, usually so forcibly stressed, is arbitrary, and appears the more so the more we observe similarity and difference in the national characteristics and note how the inhabitants of this or that district incline to North or South. And yet passing from Berlin or Hamburg to Leipsic or Munich the traveller *is* confronted by a great contrast in manners, social life, and politics. In the North nearly everybody and everything is practical, scien-

tific, "materialist," absorbed in money-making. A few hours' journey brings us to a people where there still linger elements of what the Northerner calls, perhaps rightly, non-progression, to a land where we still come across folk who are never in a hurry, who remind us of the Spaniard with his eternal "to-morrow." The Southerner is more sociable than the Northman. The Prussian speaks of the "easy-going sociability" (*gemütliche Geselligkeit*) of the Munchener. That complete ease both of body and mind which goes with sociability impresses the most cursory observer in the South. It is a first and a last impression. The Prussian likes his sarcastic joke at the expense of the Saxon or Bavarian, who invites the hustling commercial traveller from the North to dinner and afterwards to the theatre, and tells him there is time enough in the morning to talk business. But in the matter of sarcasm the South German can hit as hard as his Northern brother. All the best comic papers are published in the South, and they delight in nothing more than in caricaturing the Prussian's love of titles and uniform. But however keen the Munchener may be on what is bright and breezy in life, he rarely steps out of bounds. I have heard many complaints, sometimes tinged with bitter indignation, that the North German comes down during the various national festivities held throughout the year and forgets the distinction between merriment and licence.

I have travelled for hours in the trains in the North and noticed that the passengers hardly exchanged a word. In the trains in Saxony and Bavaria everybody talks to everybody all the time. Travellers on the New South Wales railways notice a similar sociability as contrasted with English coldness. But then in New South Wales there is a large Irish element. Not only in the trains, in the cafés and drinking houses, especially in Munich, the motto of the Southerner seems to be, "All friends and no strangers." Here again I note a similarity to Sydney. You will meet more smiling faces in a week in Munich than you will see in Berlin or Bremen in six months. In the matter of clothing, too, the Southerner's love of *Gemütlichkeit* leads him to wear what he finds soft and easy, regardless of appearances. In summer he is often seen in a soft slouch shirt—a thing hardly ever worn by business people in the North.

The whole aspect of the South is more hospitable than that of the North, with its vast stretches of plain and uniformity, and the people likewise are warmer, more hospitable. They are easily excited, quarrel faster, and make up their quarrels faster than the surly Northerner. The South German has more affinity with the Frenchman, the Northman with the Scandinavian or Englishman. In one respect there is a strong resemblance between the genuine Anglo-Saxon and the Prussian, and just as strong a

contrast between him and the Munchener. The Englishman, the Berliner, the Hanoverian, and the Holsteiner are chary of making new acquaintances. The Northmen look upon the Bavarian's friendlier nature with suspicion until they are satisfied that his motives are "strictly honourable." For them the man who does not button up his coat and look over his shoulder with an air of icy coldness as soon as he meets a new-comer is "worth the watching," as the Scotchman says.

The idea of separateness between the various States was most marked before the *Freizügigkeit*, that is, the right of unrestrained movement from one State to another, with permission to settle or carry on business without payment of a special tax or other disability. Article 3 of the North German Confederation (1867) and the Federal Constitution (1871) did away with the domiciliary restrictions which had made a Bavarian a foreigner in Berlin or Hamburg. The authorities also aim at making the various parts of the Fatherland better known to residents in different districts by sending the young fellows doing their military service as far away from home as possible.

But Prussia is and will remain the "predominant partner." The tendency towards imperial unity and the industrialisation of Germany is hardening the South, not softening the North. Nearly everywhere in Munich, and sometimes in Leipsic, one

hears the statement, often accompanied with a sigh, that the South is being Prussianised (*verpreusst*). With one important exception, there is much more in common than in contention between the States, much more to make them friendly than antagonistic. They have a common language and literature, and their national history contains records of a common struggle against oppression from without as well as records of mutual distrust. The important exception to these unifying influences is religion. The North and Saxony are Protestant, Bavaria and Baden are Catholic. In Bavaria the clerical party has always fought hard against Prussianisation and defended "particularism"—what those provincialists in New South Wales and Victoria who are always against strengthening the Commonwealth Government call "State rights." The spirit of antagonism between Catholic and Protestant is still a very real barrier to German unity. In an article on "German Religion and German Unity" in the *Volkserzieher* (11th June, 1911) Herr Johann Platt says :—

"Is not Germany every day becoming more retrograde in the matter of emphasising religious differences? Have we not for more than half a century been witnessing a diminution of German unity, a weakening of the earnest desire to look upon ourselves as all Germans and brothers? . . . Do not Catholic and Protestant to-day face each other divided by sharper differences than ever?"

It may be so in Germany. But I know that when the Saxon or Bavarian or Westphalian away in Sydney or Melbourne meets his brother German from Berlin or Bremen, it is as a brother that he hails him, as a son of the same Fatherland, and the fact of their little differences in manner or accent, or perhaps even religion, only intensifies the feeling of brotherhood. It may be the same at home some day.

Classes in the North have always been more sharply demarcated than in the South. Class distinctions in the South there are and always have been, but they never amounted almost to a system of caste as in Prussia. This helps to explain the great difference in political party spirit in the North and in the South. Most of the Socialists of Bavaria and Baden have aimed at reform rather than revolution, they have striven for what seemed to further the common weal whether they pleased the authorities or not. In Baden the Socialists voted with the Government in support of the budget, and were censured by the National Party on the ground that they were helping to uphold the existing economic conditions. These men, who are called Revisionists by the true-blue Marxians, were declared guilty of treachery.

Though the Southerner talks more and faster than the Northerner, there is not so much offensive bombast in his talk. The South has bred more than its share of the Fatherland's poets and philosophers and musicians, but this is not everlastingly dinned

into the visitor's ears. Prussia has produced more than her share of Berserkers, and she proclaims it from the housetops. Leipsic is one of the musical centres of the world, perhaps *the* musical centre, though Munich is a very close second. There are few people in whom there can be found a higher standard of literary culture than in the Leipsigers. No other town in the world of the same size has so many literary, artistic, and musical societies. It is the Athens of Germany, but the stranger finds that out for himself. The Berlin artists declare that Munich is no longer the head-quarters of German art. However that may be, most of them, as well as many other European artists, owe their inspiration to the Bavarian capital, whose international exhibitions have done far more for European art than Berlin or any other city in the Empire.

In spite of all tendencies towards closer union, we do now and then find a Saxon or a Bavarian in whom the anti-Prussian sentiment remains fairly strong. One of the first Leipsigers I met—strange to say, a man who had lived in Sydney and Melbourne a good many years and spoke English perfectly—always had a special reserve of wrath in store for Prussian officialdom. He seemed to hate the ugly thing much more than I do. He said to me on one occasion: "What I don't like about the Prussian official is, if he can't get at you in a direct way he'll get at you through the back doors of the law," and

then he asked with characteristic southern *naïveté*, "Do you know what I mean by the *back doors of the law?*" I assured him that English was my mother tongue, and that I understood every word he said; but he remained sceptical.

INDEX

A

Agrarian Union, 124
Albert Committee, 41
Alsace and Lorraine, 17, 83–8
Angell, Norman, quoted, 24
Anti-Semitism, 275–8
Arndt, 2, 65
"Asia for the Asiatics," 57
Australia and Imperialism, 57, 59, 60, 63
Australian Labour Party, 50

B

Bagdad Railway, 295–302
Ballance, Hon. J., quoted, 58, 59
Bassermann, Herr, quoted, 52
Beamtenbeleidigung, 205–8
Berlin, 243–62
Berlin and Culture, 246–7
— — London as World-cities, 250
— City Shelter in, 251–2
— "Fantastic Desires" in, 257
— as Theatre-city, 254–6
— Disappearing Thoroughfares, 261–2
— Public Buildings, 244
— Scheunen Quarter, 253
— Sects and Brotherhoods, 259–60
— Streets, 244–5
— Sunday in, 249–50
Bernhardi, Colonel, 4
Besson, Vice-Admiral, quoted, 17
Bethmann-Hollweg, 53, 115, 120, 285–94
Bismarck and Alsace, 83
— — Denmark, 280
— — National Insurance, 127
— — Poland, 78–9
— — Socialism, 99
— — the Kulturkampf, 103
Blatchford, Robert, 2, 200
Bley, Fritz, quoted, 70
Boer War, 21, 64, 86
Brentano, Professor, quoted, 122
Bureaucracy, 203, 208

C

Capital Punishment, 269–72
Catholicism in Germany, 226–42
Centre, The, 102–4
Chamberlain, H. S., quoted, 75, 277
Conservative Party, 96
Constitutionalism, The Fight for, 95, 105–15
Continuation Schools, 156–8
Corporal Punishment in Schools, 170
Cox, Sir Edmund C., quoted, 4
Cremation, 272–5

D

Danish Question, 279–84
Dutch Colonies, 69

E

Education, 142–80
Emperor. *See* Kaiser
Expropriation Law, 80–1

F

Flottenverein, 7, 17, 25, 47, 53
Forest Schools, 155–6
Fournier, Admiral, 17
Free Trade and Protection, 117–24
French and German Imperialism, 16, 54

G

Girls' Schools, 161–3
Goltz, General von der, 14, 27
Gotthein, Herr Bergrat, 122
Grey, Sir Edward, 55
Gymnasium, 159–60

H

Harms, Professor, 37–8
Hodgkin, Dr. T., 13
Holland and Germany, 64–71
Hislam, P. A., quoted, 57
Hyndman, H. M., 18, 43–4

I

Imperialism, 1–63
Insurance, National, 127–41
Italy and Pan-Germanism, 18

J

Jameson Raid and the Kaiser, 14, 18
Jatho case, 221–4

K

Kaiser and Beuron Monks, 91, 94
— — Divine Right, 89–95
— — The Fleet, 20, 21, 52
Kalau, Rear-Admiral, 16
Kautsky, K., 12
Keim, Major-General, 30
Kiderlen-Wächter, 52
Kindergarten, 152–5
Kirchenstein, Dr., and "Model Schools," 192–3
Knibbs, G. H., 145
Königsberg Speech, 90, 105
Koppelow, Traugott von, quoted, 92
Köster, Admiral von, 42, 53

L

Ledebour, Herr, 46, 125
Lenz, Professor, 28
Leuthner, Herr Karl, 32–3
Liberal Parties, 97–8
List, 2, 65
Lyndon-Bell, Colonel, 4

M

Macdonald, Mr. J. R., 28, 29, 200
Materialism, 1
Mahan, Captain A. T., 16, 202, 295
Maximilian, Prince, 233–4
Middle Schools, 158–9
Modernism, 229
Modern Language Teaching, 168–70
Moltke, von, 15, 28, 35
Monroe Doctrine, 11
Möser, 2
Mother Tongue in the School, 166–7

N

National Characteristics, 198–215
Naumann, Herr Friedrich, 107
Nauticus, 26, 27, 53
Navy League. *See* Flottenverein
North and South, 303–10

O

Oberrealschule, 160–1
Orderliness, German, 211–12
Organisation, Capacity for, 202

P

Pan-Germanism, 5, 7, 42
Patriotism in the School, 172
Peace Society, German, 42
Polish Question, 72–83
Population, Increase in, 8
Primary Schools, 155–6
Protestantism, 216–25
Protection and Free Trade, 117–24

R

Ratzel, Professor, quoted, 21
Ramsay, Sir W. M., quoted, 48
Realgymnasium, 160
Religion in Schools, 181–97
Reventlow, Count, 42, 49
Rohrbach, Dr. Paul, 297
Rome and Germany, 226–42
Rosebery, Lord, 61

S

Schiemann, Professor, 13
Schöneberg and Unemployment Insurance, 137
Schools, 142–80
— Primary, 155
Schroeder, Adolf, 5
Schubart, Hartwig, 45
Schundliteratur, 178–80
Socialism and Imperialism, 31–4, 118
— — Revisionism, 111
Socialist Party, 99–102
— Progress since 1890, 116–18
South and North, 303
Sports and Physical Culture in the Schools, 175–7
Spree and Yarra compared, 245
Stein, 2
Stengel, Professor, 14

T

Teachers, Training of, 149–52
Technical High Schools, 163
Three-class Electoral System, 113
Tirpitz, Admiral von, 22, 42
Traub case, 221
Treitschke, 2, 3, 4

U

Ultramontane Spirit, The, 241
Unemployment, Insurance against, 133
Uniform, Prussian's love of, 203, 304
Universities and Examinations, 164

V

Valois, Admiral, 40, 45
Verboten, Es ist, 208
Volksschulen, 155
Volkstum, Deutsches. *See* National Characteristics

W

Women's Movement, 263
Wrangel, General, quoted, 72

Z

Zechlin, Dr., quoted, 14

PRINTED BY
WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD.
PLYMOUTH

MY LIFE

BY

RICHARD WAGNER

Two Vols. 31*s* 6*d. net.*

THE TIMES.—". . . The two volumes are eminently readable throughout. There can be no doubt that the autobiography is of inestimable worth to students of character."

DAILY TELEGRAPH.—". . . The immense interest and charm of the book . . . its freshness and vigour of language. A book full of delights that will appeal to many a reader in virtue of its singularly human qualities."

OBSERVER.—"'My Life' is a document of amazing self-revelation. It is the very Egoist unveiled. In these pages we have all the struggle and stress of a wonderful career. . . . This extraordinary book. It is surely one of the most notable contributions on record to the study of psychology of genius."

PALL MALL GAZETTE.—"Wagner's autobiography must be held to rank among the most fascinating and interesting personal documents ever made public."

DAILY NEWS.—"Extraordinarily vivid, detailed, romantic. . . . Wonderful is really the term to apply to the volumes."

DAILY CHRONICLE.—"The book is simply indispensable, and supersedes all the amiable biographies written by intensely respectful devotees. . . . In no other biography does the indomitable spirit of the man come out so clearly as in this . . . a most remarkable book."

DAILY MAIL.—"There are ten thousand details to excite the interest of all. . . . There are dark pages telling of the years of hack-work and semi-starvation at Paris."

DAILY GRAPHIC.—"The autobiography is full of new material. On every phase of Wagner's career fresh and vivid light is thrown . . . the unique charm and interest of this wonderful book."

YORKSHIRE POST.—"Nothing can exceed in importance, as a clue to Wagner's character and artistic career, the wonderful self-revelation contained in his autobiography, which must always remain the chief source of information for his career."

London: CONSTABLE & CO. LTD. 10 Orange Street W.C.

"This thought-compelling book ought to do England invaluable service."—*Truth*

Sir WILLIAM BUTLER

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

16s. *net.*

Daily News.—"Here is a book worth reading."

Westminster Gazette.—"Here is a new light on recent history."

Morning Post.—"The record Butler has left is worthy of the life he lived."

Standard.—"The record of a great thinker, a brilliant soldier, a high-minded gentleman."

Pall Mall Gazette.—"None can resist the fascinating matter and style of the Autobiography."

Spectator.—"A delightful narrative of adventure and the revelation of a lovable character."

Athenæum.—"More alive and alert than any other life-record of recent years."

SIR FREDERICK HAINES

By ROBERT S. RAIT,

Fellow of New College, Oxford.

Demy 8*vo*. Illustrated. **10s. 6d.** *net.*

Frederick Paul Haines fought his first battles against the Sikhs, serving as Lord Gough's Military Secretary. His letters describe the battles of Alma and Balaclava, and are specially important as to Inkerman.

The Times.—"The book is of great value to students of the political and military history of India in the nineteenth century."

Daily Telegraph.—"Mr. Rait has been able to make use of Sir Frederick's letters and papers and has done so with good effect, so that his volume is not only a biography of the soldier, but also a work throwing many fresh lights on some aspects of the campaigns in which he was engaged."

Daily Chronicle.—"Mr. Rait has sketched for us the career of a soldier who was as cultured as he was courageous and as blameless in all the walks of life as he was ever bold in battle—a British Bayard, in fact, without fear and without reproach."

London: CONSTABLE & CO. LTD.

And of all Booksellers and Libraries.

00083694

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020